A comparison of environmental impact assessment in the United States and the European Union : the case study of Italy by BALSAMO, Edward J.
3•!i:
::•>
»^¿i-u litiu ij ^  is riU Jii <i ii4i tiiiii df iUiiii iiiiii; ?au iitiaii
A' -
/ ? .
A Comparison of Environmental Impact Assessment 
in the United States and the European Union: 
The Case Study of Italy
Edward J. Balsamo
B.A., B.S., J.D., Candidate for LL.M Degree (Legum Magistur)
October 1,2003 
European University Institute 
Florence, Italy
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Diploma in Comparative, 
European and International Legal Studies (Ll.M.)


M.KM.).jTJniinjuumnnüK»n;wf
iüaMüati iuMMimnniiiMnnMini—mi— ^ rtW<É^ M|MMtn)|||f1rr i fcMj'
European University Institute
3 0001 0041 4725 4
A Comparison of Environmental Impact Assessment 
in the United States and the European Union: 
The Case Study of Italy
Edward J. Balsamo
B.A., B.S., JJ>., Candidate for LLJVÍ Degree (Legum Magistur)
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Diploma in Comparative, 
European and international Legal Studies (LI.M.)
October 1,2003 
European University Institute 
Florence, Italy
i ' /  -f:
LAW
ECwJ9
BAL
X
/-M
I. Introduction.....................................................................................................................4
II. An Overview of Environmental Impact Assessment................................................... 5
A. What is Environmental Impact Assessment?.............................................................5
B. Growth of Environmental Impact Assessment Internationally................................7
III. NEPA and the EU Directive -  A Brief Comparison.................................................11
A. NEPA........................................................................................................................ 11
1. Background and Overview................................................................................... 11
2. NEPA and the Role of the Courts............................................................   13
3. Assessing the Success of NEPA.........................................................................17
B. European Union EIA Directives and Deviations from NEPA...............................18
1. Introduction: Development of Environmental Law and EIA Law in the EU ... 18
2. The 1985 EIA Directive....................................................................................... 27
3. The 1997 EIA Amendments.................................................................................29
4. The 2001 SEA Directive...................................................................................... 32
5. The 2003 Amendments to the EIA Directive..................................................... 35
C. The EIA Directive before the ECJ................................... ......................................38
1. Temporal Issues.................................................................................................... 41
2. Application of Directives to Annex II Projects................................................... 46
3. Direct Effect of the EIA Directives.....................................................................55
4. Article 1 Exceptions from EIA............................................................................57
5. Regional Issues.....................................................................................................61
6. Conclusions from the ECJ Jurisprudence........................................................... 63
D. Summary of Differences between NEPA and the EU Directive.......................... 64
1. Who Prepares the EIA?.........................................................................................65
2. Role of the National Courts.................................................................................66
3. Conclusions...........................................   69
IV. The Problems Implementing EU Environmental Laws at the Member State Level 
71
A. Introduction: Is there really a problem?...................................................................71
B. Problem of Legislative Misfit.................................................................................76
C. Problems of Enforcement via the Commission.................................... ................ 78
D. Possibility for Direct Application of EU Directives.............................................. 83
E. Lack of Overarching EU Environmental Body..................................................... 85
F. Conclusion................................................................................................................87
V. Overview of the Italian Environmental Law System................................................. 88
A. Introduction to the “Italian Syndrome”....................................................................88
B. Environmental Law In Italy....................................................................................93
1. History...................................................................................................................93
2. Roles and Institutions.................................   94
C. Environmental Litigation in Italy............................................................................98
1. Overview..............................................   98
2. Overview of the Court System.............................................................................99
3. Administrative Courts......................................................................................... 101
4. Standing in General........................................................................................... 103
5. Application of EC Law in Italian Courts..........................................................107
2
D. Identifying and Explaining the Problems with Italian Environmental Law.......110
1. Italy’s Late Start................................................................................................... 111
a. Belated Acceptance of EU Law.................................................................... 111
b. Political Apathy/Emphasis on Economic Development.............................. 114
c. Belated Emergence of Environmental Movement........................................ 116
2. Political and Legislative Difficulties...............................................   121
a. Political Volatility and the Predominance o f Party Politics......................... 121
b. Politics of Emergency......................................................................................125
c. Complexity of the Legislative Arrangement................................................ 127
3. Convoluted Administrative Structure.................................................................. 129
a. Lack o f Strong Central Environmental Authority and Ministry Infighting 129
b. State/Regional Struggle................................................................................... 135
c. Variation Among Regions...............................................................................141
d. Institutional Fragmentation and Administrative Bureaucracy......................144
4. Corruption............................................................................................................ 149
a. The Role of the Mafia.................................................................................... 150
b. Corruption in the Political Ranks....................................................................151
c. Corruption in Administration and Enforcement o f  the Laws...................... 153
5. Conclusions on the Impediments to Implementation o f  EU Environmental Law
in Italy........................................................................................................................... 155
E. The Legislative History o f EIA in Italy.................................................................156
1. Introduction...........................................................................................................156
2. Legislative History -  National EIA ....................................... ........................... 156
3. Legislative History -  Regional EIA..................................................................... 160
VI. Recent Developments for EIA in Italy.................................................................... 166
A. The Status o f Implementation.................................................................................. 166
1. Legislative Implementation.................................................................................. 166
2. Enforcement on the Ground....................................................................... ,.......168
B. Legge Obiettivo: Moving Backwards.....................................................................173
1. What is the Legge Obiettivo'? ................................................................................173
2. Responses to the law.............................................................................................177
VII. Conclusion................................................................................................................ 181
VIII. Annex: Italian EIA Legislation................................................................................183
I WlfW j. a w»»|<
I. Introduction
Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) is a widely used tool for identifying 
the impacts associated with an action and forcing a decision-maker to consider those 
impacts prior to taking that action. EIA had its formal beginnings in the United States in 
the early 1970s. Since then it has become an international decision-making tool, .found in 
the legislation o f over 90 countries, several international treaties, and in the procedures of 
many international organizations. The European Community adopted EIA procedures in 
the mid-1980s.
This paper will analyze the growth of EIA, first summarizing EIA practice in the 
United States, and then paying particular attention to its development in the European 
Union (“EU”). In analyzing the effectiveness of EIA in the EU, it will attempt to 
illustrate the general difficulties of implementing environmental law in the EU due to the 
particularities of the EU political system. It will then look in detail at one EU Member 
State, Italy, and its experience with the implementation of the EU EIA Directive. The 
case study of Italy will focus on the many difficulties Italy has had enacting and 
enforcing environmental laws in general, using the EIA Directive to illustrate these 
difficulties. Through the example o f Italy, the paper will highlight the difficulties of 
implementing environmental directives at the Member State level and suggest that such 
difficulties in implementation of environmental directives such as that for Environmental 
Impact Assessment can result in uneven enforcement across Member States, hence 
jeopardizing the achievement of uniform economic and environmental conditions within 
the EU. While a comprehensive comparison of EIA practices in the US and Italy will not 
be attempted, the US experience will be mentioned frequently to give context to the
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discussion. Ultimately, though, the goal o f this thesis is to use Italy’s experience 
implementing the EIA Directive to illustrate the challenges o f achieving EU 
environmental policy goals across the EU.
II. An Overview of Environmental Impact Assessment 
A. What is Environmental Impact Assessment?
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is defined as a systematic and detailed 
study o f the effects, both adverse and beneficial, that a planned activity may have on the 
environment.1 Its value to society is based upon the premise that if  a project proponent is 
required to prepare and consider detailed statements about the impacts a proposed project 
will have on the environment, the proponent will be more likely to make decisions related 
to that project that will be protective o f the environment.2 EIA is said to “institutionalize 
foresight”3 by forcing the decision-making authority to look beyond the present and 
incorporate into its decision the possible irreversible future effects an activity may have 
on the environment.4 EIA also has political value. It legitimizes decisions of the 
government in the minds of the people by making their decisions at least appear more 
informed. It further legitimizes the decisions by empowering the public with the right to 
participate in the process.
There is no single defined process for performing an EIA, but there are some 
general principles that can be gleaned from the various EIA regimes around the world.
1 Erika L. Preiss, The International Obligation to Conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment: The ICJ  
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 7 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 307 (1999).
2 Ronald E. Bass, Alberti. Herson, Kenneth M. Bogdan, TheNEPA Book: A step-by-step guide 
on how to  comply with the National Environmental Policy act , Second Edition (2001), at p. 61. 
[herein, Th eNEPA BOOK]
3 Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
Rev. 591, 594 (1991).
4 Cary Ichter, Note, "Beyond Judicial Scrutiny": Military Compliance with NEPA, 18 Ga L. Rev. 639,645 
(1984).
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The EIA process commences when someone (an individual, a company, the government) 
decides to take some action. This action can be a specific development project like the 
decision to build to a bridge, or it can be “programmatic” in nature, like a local 
government’s adoption of a General Plan. Next, a government decision-maker is 
identified. This is the body that will oversee the EIA process and that will ultimately be 
responsible for approving or denying the proposed action. Then there is “Scoping” or 
“Screening.”5 In this phase, the range of impacts of the action must be identified, paying 
particular attention to the magnitude o f the project and the specific characteristics o f the 
environment likely to be impacted by the project.6 In general, potential impacts on 
humans, the environment, flora and fauna, and the economy are considered, though the 
weight placed on each varies among jurisdictions. Most jurisdictions require some type 
of public notice during scoping,7 so as to allow the public to have input as to what things 
will actually be impacted by the proposed action, and thus to help guide which impacts 
will be assessed during the formal impact analysis. Typically at this point, a decision is 
made whether, considering the scope o f possible impacts, a full-blown EIA is required.8
If a full-blown EIA is required, there are again a set of procedures typically used 
to carry out the EIA. First, a baseline study of the project area must be conducted (i.e. of 
the existing environment), in order to have a basis for assessing the new impacts to be
5 The CEQ Regulations to NEPA describe scoping as “the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be 
considered in and environmental impact statement.” Council o f Environmental Quality Implementing 
Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1500 et seq, at 1508.25 (1978). [herein, CEQ Regulations]. EIA professionals 
often parce these out into two or three separate steps. In either case, each occurs early on in a typical EIA 
process. The CEQ Regulations were implementing regulations for the NEPA law, passed via Executive 
Order in 1978.
6 See Preiss, supra note 1, at p. 313.
7 Often this notice is provided via newspaper publication, or, as in the United States, in a government 
register.
8 In the United States, under NEPA, the procedures described up to this point constitute and Environmental 
Assessment (EA). From the results o f the EA, the agency can conclude a “Finding of No Significant 
Impact” (FONSI), or decide to conduct an in-depth EIA.
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introduced by the project.9 Next, a range of alternatives to the proposed project are 
identified. For example, alternatives to a proposed double-decker bridge might be a 
tunnel, a ferry service, some type of train service, a smaller bridge, or no bridge at all.10 
Then, the potential impacts o f each alternative are identified, quantified, and compared to 
one another. Possible mitigation steps for the impacts are usually considered. At this 
point, an opportunity is again given to the public and to other government agencies to 
comment on the analysis and raise any additional concerns.11 Typically, the preparer of 
the EIA then supplements the analysis by incorporating the public comment as well as 
any new information submitted by the project proponent. Finally, the government agency 
responsible for granting or denying consent to the project is asked to “take into account” 
the results of the EIA,12 though the extent to which decision-makers must take the EIA’s 
conclusions into account when making the decision on development consent varies 
among jurisdictions.
B. Growth of Environmental Impact Assessment Internationally 
The birth of EIA was the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) in the United States in 1969.13 Signed into law by President Nixon in 1970, it 
was the first law anywhere requiring an EIA to be performed for major federal actions
9 Yusuf J. Ahmed & George K. Sammy, Guidelines to Environmental Impact Assessment in Developing 
Countries, at 9 (1985) (no further citation given).
10 In the United States, a “No Project” alternative must also be analyzed. CEQ Regulations, supra note 5, § 
1502.14. In other words, the decision-maker must answer the question: What are the impacts, good and 
bad, o f doing nothing?
11 Brian R. Popile, From Customary Law to Environmental Impact Assessment: A New Approach to 
Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage Between Canada and the United States, 22 B.C. Envtl. 
Aff. La. Rev. 447,462 (1995).
12 Howard L. Brown, Expanding the Effectiveness o f  the European Union's Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law, 20 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 313 (1997).
13 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C, tj§ 4321, et seq. (1994 & Supp. II 1996). [Herein, 
NEPA]
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“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”14 At least nineteen states, 
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have subsequently enacted environmental 
policy acts or "Little NEPA's."15 These acts recognize the fact that many significant 
projects are proposed which are not federal in nature but that should nonetheless be 
subjected to an informed decision-making process. Even some large municipalities at 
sub-state level, like New York City, have adopted their own El A provisions.16
From the United States, EIA gradually spread to other nations. It initially 
emerged in other developed countries like Canada, France, and Great Britain, but 
eventually crept into the legal systems o f developing nations such as Brazil, Korea, and 
the Philippines.17 18As of 1995, an estimated 86 countries had adopted some type of EIA 
procedure. Over time procedures for EIA were adopted by supranational institutions 
like the European Union in 1985.19 20In the same year, the Agreement of the Association 
of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
stated that any proposed activities in South-East Asia that may have significant impact on
Oilthe environment must be assessed before they are initiated.
14 NEPA, supra note 13, at § 4332(2XC).
15 American Law Institute -  American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, ALIABI Course of 
Study, SG026 ALI-ABA197, "Little NEPA’s and Their Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures ", 
David Sive, Mark A. Chertok. See also, Dinah Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act: Its Origins 
and Evolutions, 10 Nat. Res. & Env’t 3,71 (1995). There are varying numbers of states, depending on the 
source, but at least two sources confirmed 19 as the total number of states with EIA procedures.
16 See Bear, supra note 15.
17 See Preiss, supra note 1, at pp. 315,316. The Philippines established EIA in 1977, Korea in 1980, and 
Brazil in 1981.
18 See Bear, supra note 15, at 71. Other studies estimate that 70% of the nations of the world have some 
forni of EIA legislation. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Application and 
Implementation, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 5th Sess., 
P 94, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 17/1997/8 (1997).
”  Council Directive No. 85/337 o f 27 June 1985 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and 
Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L I75) 40. [Hereinafter 1985 Directive]
20 Association o f  South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation o f  Nature and Natural 
Resources, 15 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 64 (1985).
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The concept of EIA has also found its way into international conventions like the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, which stated “[environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, 
shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national 
authority.” Other international agreements requiring EIA include, inter alia, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
the Antarctic Treaty, the 1991 United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact in a 
Transboundary Context (ESPOO Convention), and the Kuwait Regional Convention for 
Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution.21 2
International organizations have also gotten into the act. The United Nations, 
through the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has issued non-binding 
guidelines encouraging the use of EIA and establishing common principles of EIA.23 Aid 
organizations like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European 
Investment Bank have required the use of EIA in the recipient country as a prerequisite to 
releasing aid moneys.24 25
In fact, some scholars and practitioners have recently argued that EIA is so 
ubiquitous that it has established itself as a “norm o f international law.”23 The preceding 
discussion highlights the presence certain provisions of EIA in nation-states, sub-states,
21 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development: The Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, June 13,1992, principle 17,31 l.L.M. 874,879.
22 See Preiss, supra note 1, at pp. 317-320 for a good overview of the prevalence of EIA in international 
frameworks.
23 See Preiss, supra note 1, at p. 321.
24 Id., at p. 322.
25 Id., See also, Judge Weeramentry’s ICJ opinions in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), 19971.C.J. 92 (September 25), [Herein, Case Concerning the Gabcikovo- 
Nagymaros Project], and Nuclear Testing (New Zealand/France) (1995).
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treaties, international aid organizations, non-profit groups, etc. Further support for the 
contention that EIA is a norm of international law is found in the 1997 International 
Court o f Justice (ICJ) decision in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project.26
The case involved a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia about the breach o f a 
bilateral treaty in which the nations had agreed to build a series o f coordinated dams and 
locks along the Danube River.27 Each nation was responsible for separate aspects o f  the 
project along the river, which also served as their border. Slovakia for the most part 
fulfilled its obligations under the treaty; Hungary did not. Hungary attempted to abrogate 
the treaty, arguing inter alia that as a principle of general international law, additional 
environmental impact studies needed to be performed before proceeding further with the 
project. Ultimately the ICJ resolved the case based on language within the original treaty 
relating to Hungary’s obligations to complete the project, and additional treaty language 
requiring environmental analysis prior to construction. But in a concurring opinion, 
Justice Weeramantry discussed the importance of conducting an EIA before proceeding 
further with the project. He built his argument on the principles he had first raised in his 
dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Testing (New Zealand/France) case (1995). J. 
Weeramantry acknowledged language within the treaty that required a type of EIA prior 
to commencement of additional work. But he also argued that EIA was a general 
principle of international law, regardless of whether the treaty required it, stating 
“environmental law in its current state o f development would read into treaties which 
may reasonably be considered to have an impact on the environment, a duty of
26 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 25.
27 See Preiss, supra note 3, at p. 307.
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environmental impact assessment.”28 Furthermore, J. Weeramantry supported implying 
such an obligation into a treaty today, even if the international environmental norm did 
not exist at the time when the treaty was made.29
While the opinion of J. Weeramantry is only a concurring opinion, it serves notice 
to the international community that EIA has become so widely accepted that nations 
should consider its use mandatory in all endeavors that might result in significant impact 
to the environment. The many institutions that now utilize EIA as common procedure are 
further evidence that EIA may come to be considered a norm or general principle of 
international law. In short, EIA has become an international phenomenon and is perhaps 
the most widely used tool for ensuring that environmental impacts are taken into 
consideration before proceeding with an activity. Despite this growing universality, the 
particular application of EIA principles varies depending on the body applying the law, as 
will be revealed in the following sections.
III. NEPA and the EU Directive -  A Brief Comparison 
A. NEPA
1. Background and Overview
As noted, NEPA legislation was created in 1969 around the time of the first Earth 
Day, and signed into law in 1970. The NEPA law established overarching environmental 
goals for the United States, established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and 
introduced the EIA procedure. Procedurally, NEPA EIA follows roughly the generic EIA 
process described above in section 11(A). NEPA’s reach is limited in that the EIA
28 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 25, at 20 
The ICJ majority opinion looked only the norms of 1977 when the treaty was made, and said any norms
evolving subsequent to the treaty must be expressly incorporated into the treaty by the parties. Case 
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 25.
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requirement is only applied to projects and activities that are sponsored or significantly 
funded by the federal government.30 This does, however, include those private actions 
which require a Federal approval or permit as a precondition for action.31 32This greatly 
expands the scope of NEPA by virtue of the fact that practically any new activity, private 
or public, on federal lands would be subject to NEPA requirements. The goal o f the 
EIA process in NEPA is to “utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will 
insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design 
arts in planning and decision-making which may have an impact on man’s 
environment.”33 In other words, NEPA strives for an informed, cross-disciplinary 
approach to decision-making.
NEPA rose up out of the activist aura that pervaded the 1960s. Concern for the 
environment was growing in response to deteriorating environmental conditions such as 
the air quality in the Los Angeles basin. These concerns were further fueled by activist 
literature such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. Simultaneously, the Vietnam War had 
sparked in many a general distrust in, if  not disdain for the federal government. NEPA 
directly responded to both the environmental and procedural concerns in that it not only 
laid out a “National Environmental Policy,” but also required the government to open up 
its decision-making processes to the public. While the substantive findings of an EIA 
would not be binding on the government (i.e. a finding of adverse environmental impacts 
would not necessarily be grounds to stop a project), NEPA would at least force the
30 NEPA, supra note 13, at § 4332(C).
31 CEQ Regulations, supra note 5, at § 1508.18 (defining “major federal actions”).
32 The Federal government has at various times in history owned as much as 80% of the nation's lands, and 
today still holds title to approximately 29% of the total area. http://w3 .access.gpo.gov/blm/pls96/part 1 .html 
This land in particular is subject to development as the G.W. Bush Administration pushes for new energy 
opportunities, and as many military bases from the World War II era are in the process o f conversion to 
civilian uses.
33 NEPA, supra note 13, at § 4332(A).
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government to consider the impacts and suggest mitigation for them, with the input and 
participation of the public. The NEPA statute was supplemented by CEQ implementing 
regulations in 1978. These regulations helped to clarify what procedures were necessary 
for EIA and helped standardize EIA procedures among the different federal agencies.34
2. NEPA and the Role o f the Courts
One distinctive feature of NEPA worthy of separate analysis is the role that the 
courts play in the process. The role o f the courts is notable for two reasons. First is the 
fact that oversight of NEPA is left to the public citizenry via citizen suit. Secondly, the 
level of judicial activism with respect to NEPA cases has been significant.
A NEPA EIA has no substantive effect. That is to say, even if  the analysis finds 
that the proposed alternative will have dire adverse consequences, or that another 
alternative would have less adverse consequences, the federal agency can still approve 
the project as proposed. The NEPA statute does not authorize either the EPA or the CEQ 
to bring suit or otherwise prohibit the lead agency from going forward with its proposed 
action.35 They are limited to their ability as interested federal agencies to make 
comments on the EIA.36 NEPA similarly has no provision for citizen enforcement of its 
provisions. Even if NEPA did expressly allow for citizen enforcement, the role of 
plaintiffs would be limited by the fact that they could not challenge the substantive 
decision o f the agency; only procedural aspects o f the EIA,37
34 THE NEPA BOOK, supra note 2, at pp. 7-8.
33 THE NEPA BOOK, supra note 2, at p. 171. The EPA does play a special role in the EIA process in that it 
is expressly authorized to make comments on EIAs. CEQ regulations allow any agency with specialized 
expertise and interest in the matter to comment on an EIA (CEQ Regulations, supra note 5, at § 1503.1). 
However, the CAA (in § 309, which has nothing to do with air quality) specifically authorizes the EPA the 
right to comment on any action subject to NEPA requirements.
36 Id.
37 This idea is actually not very novel. While one traditionally thinks of environmental citizen suits as 
being a the result of substantive harms (i.e. X contaminate Y’s water supply in violation of the Clean Water
13
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With that backdrop, it wouldn’t seem that there would be much of a role for the 
courts in the enforcement of NHPA. Instead, the courts have become the major 
interpreters and enforcers of NEPA and the associated CEQ regulations.38 While NEPA 
itself had no provisions for citizen suit, the Administrative Procedure Act o f  1946 
contains the general notion that “[A] person suffering a legal wrong, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to 
judicial relief thereof.”39 The first important NEPA case extending this concept to NEPA 
came one year after the statute’s enactment. In Calvert Cliffs ’ Coordinating Committee 
v. Atomic Energy Commission, the D.C. Circuit decided that NEPA allowed for judicial 
review o f federal agency compliance with the statute, and struck down the Commission’s 
licensing of a nuclear power plant on the basis that it had not sufficiently considered the 
project’s environmental effects as required by NEPA.40 The decision is important for 
three reasons: (1) it established the right o f NEPA citizen suits; (2) it created a role for 
judicial review o f NEPA procedures; and (3) it showed that NEPA could have a 
substantive effect on decision-making even when a suit was brought wholly for 
procedural deficiencies. Later Supreme Court cases created broad notion of standing as 
related to NEPA suits, requiring only that the plaintiff(s) have aesthetic interests in the 
lands they seek to protect,41 and that they had participated meaningfully in the EIA
Act), in fact many environmental citizen suits have to do with procedural matters, such as the EPA’s 
adoption o f  a rule under the Clean Air Act (see, e.g. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984)).
3* The NEPA BOOK, supra note 2, p. 171.
39 Administrative Procedure Act o f 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404,60 Stat.237,5 U.S.C. § 702 (1946).
40 Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission ,449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
41 See, e.g. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1992); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures, 412 UI.S. 669 (1973).
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administrative process prior to filing suit (i.e. submitted public comment, etc.).42 The 
1970s saw a rapid growth in number, membership, and influence of environmental 
interest groups in the United States.43 Given the Court’s liberal notions of standing, this 
amounted to rapid growth of potential NEPA plaintiffs. Over time, the courts became the 
main forum for enforcing NEPA’s procedural requirements through suits by concerned 
citizens, environmental interest groups, and state and local government agencies.44 Since 
1971, there have been over 2,000 NEPA cases decided by the federal courts, and 
countless other suits under state and local EIA laws.
Another reason for the frequency of NEPA lawsuits is that there is little risk for 
the plaintiffs. Under the American legal system, plaintiffs do not have to pay the 
opposition’s attorney fees and costs if  they lose the case. If anything, many American 
environmental statutes allow for “one way fee shifting”, where the defendant has to pay 
the plaintiff’s legal costs if  the plaintiff prevails, but the plaintiff does not have to pay if 
the defendant prevails 45 While NEPA does not have fee shifting (or any mention of 
litigation in the statute, for that matter), plaintiffs know that they will not be obliged to 
pay their opponents costs should they lose the case. Thus even if their case is a sure 
loser, there might be incentive to file suit because o f the possibility to delay the impacts 
o f the project or in some cases even kill it solely due to the time-consuming litigation.
The second interesting aspect of court involvement in NEPA has been the level o f 
judicial activism with respect to the statute. This is attributed at least partially to the fact
42 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,553 
(1978).
43 THE NEPA BOOK, supra note 2, p. 171.
44 In 1997,56 o f the 102 plaintiffs in NEPA suits were public interest organizations or citizen groups. THE 
NEPA Book, supra note 2, p. 173.
45 This is the so-called “private attorney general” concept, where the citizen is just jumping into the shoes 
o f the prosecutor. Mark Squillace, An American Perspective on Environmental Impact Assessment in 
Australia, 20 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 43,56 (1995).
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that American judges, especially in the federal courts, enjoy a large degree of 
independence from the government, and are willing to challenge decisions of 
governmental planners.46 This activism has been seen primarily at the district and circuit 
court level. The lower courts established early on that (1) NEPA standing requirements 
would be interpreted broadly; (2) NEPA applied to decisions o f independent regulatory 
agencies in addition to executive agencies; (3) deference should be had to the CEQ’s 
implementing regulations;47 and (4) good faith efforts should be made by the agencies to 
comply with NEPA’s full disclosure objectives.48 As NEPA provides no guidance on the 
litigation process, lower courts have employed varying standards of judicial review to 
agency NEPA procedures. While most courts have applied the relatively deferential 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard found in the Administrative Procedure Act, others 
have employed the more stringent “hard look doctrine”, examining whether an agency 
took a hard look at environmental consequences before deciding on a proposed action.49 
The interesting thing is that for all the activism in the lower courts, the US Supreme 
Court has generally interpreted the NEPA statute narrowly. It has sided with the federal 
agency in each of the twelve NEPA cases that it has heard.50 Nevertheless, the federal 
courts have allowed NEPA to evolve into something that is not merely a procedural 
exercise. Through the courts, public citizens have frequently been able to annul or 
forestall agency decisions, even if only until procedural errors on the part o f the agency
46 Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: the American Way of Law 208, Harvard University 
Press (2001).
47 President Carter issued Exec. Order No. 11,991,3 C.F.R. § 123-24 in 1977, calling that theCEQ 
regulations were to be binding on Federal Agencies. See also, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979), 
for a case upholding the binding nature of the CEQ regulations, noting that they are entitled to “substantial 
judicial deference.”
48 The NEPA Book, supra note 2, p. 172.
49 The NEPA Book, supra note 2, p. 180.
50 See THE NEPA BOOK, supra note 2, at p. 180, for a brief summary of each of the 12 cases.
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were corrected. As one Judge has noted: “The ready availability of a remedy helps keep 
government authorities on their toes. It ensures that there is a public watchdog on 
regulatory authorities to ensure that they do not fall asleep on the job."51
3. Assessing the Success of NEPA
There is an ongoing debate over whether NEPA can be deemed a success.52 
Many environmentalists believe that NEPA has been instrumental in requiring the 
consideration of environmental impacts of federal actions and informing the decision 
making process. NEPA has without question resulted in the halting o f many potentially 
harmful projects in instances where concerned citizens were able to sue for procedural 
deficiencies in the preparation of the EIA. Even where projects aren’t completely halted, 
the ensuing delays can result in more informed, mitigated solutions. Wholly apart from 
litigation, the assessments themselves have forced the government, in an almost painful, 
methodical manner to look at alternative solutions. This has no doubt reshaped projects 
into forms less detrimental to the environment than originally proposed.
There are also many critics of NEPA who point to its high cost of administration 
relative to the limited beneficial effect it has on the environment. Part of this criticism 
stems from the fact that NEPA is purely procedural: its findings, even if  adverse to the 
environment, do not dictate a course of action.53 The accusation is that federal agencies 
approach NEPA EIAs simply as a mechanistic procedural task that they must satisfy in 
order to go forward with their project, with little real consideration o f findings or impacts 
contained in the EIA. A straightforward economic criticism has been that NEPA EIAs
51 Justice Paul Stein, Can Review Bodies Lead to Better Decision-Making?, 66 Canberra Bull. Pub. Admin. 
118,119(1991).
52 This section draws heavily from the Erika Preiss article, supra note 1, at pp. 314-315.
53 See e.g. Stacker's Bar Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
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require too many economic resources, cause unnecessary project delays, stifle economic 
development, and weaken the United States* competitive position vis a vis nations 
without comparable EIA legislation. In other words, this is an argument that NEPA has 
been too effective.54 Finally, in a rather perverse twist, industry groups have begun using 
the NEPA process as a means of improving their competitive position. It used to-be that 
only environmental or citizen groups used the NEPA process to delay or annul federal 
projects. Today, commercial entitites sometimes use the EIA process to delay the 
progress of a competitor. Or, recognizing, for example, that a legislative bill on fuel 
additives is a major federal action subject to an EIA, industry groups will manipulate the 
EIA process to delay or kill the adoption of such legislation which might otherwise have 
produced environmental benefits.
For all its critics, there can be no denying that the NEPA EIA process has forced 
the government to at least analyze the impacts of its projects, and in many cases led it to 
take actions that have been less detrimental to the environment.55
B. European Union EIA Directives and Deviations from NEPA
1. Introduction: Development o f Environmental Law and EIA Law 
in the EU
Before proceeding to a comparison of EIA in the EU and the US, there must be a 
basic understanding of the context of EIA and environmental law in general within the
54 See Kagan, supra note 46, at Chapter 10.
ss See generally, Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact 
Statement Strategy of Administrative Reform, Stanford University Press (1984), at Appendix E. In 
a study of the first 9 years of NEPA, Taylor found that 1,052 NEPA suits had been filed. In that same time 
period, approximately 10,000 EIAs had been filed with CEQ. O f the 1,000 suits, approximately 20% 
resulted in injunctions against government action. See Taylor's study for additional information on delays 
caused by NEPA.
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EU. By first understanding the evolution of environmental policy making in the EU, one 
can more fully appreciate the dynamics of implementation at the Member State level.
Originally a group of 6 nations joined by treaty in 1951 to regulate the steel and 
coal sector, it could not have been foreseen that this community would grow to be a 15 
country union regulating such diverse areas as monetary policy, anti-trust, and 
environmental protection. The regulation of Member States* domestic land use decisions 
and their impacts on the environment certainly wasn’t envisioned. Yet over time, as the 
benefits of economic and social cohesion became more and more apparent, what was 
once a 6 nation trading block grew into a powerful economic and social union that today 
wields power on an international scale. The move towards environmental regulation 
within the EU was, however, slow. Briefly examining the development o f EIA 
legislation in the EU provides a nice lens by which to trace the gradual development of 
environmental law in the EU in general. It also places in context the legal status of 
environmental directives within the individual Member States.
There are often three reasons given to justify the enactment of environmental law 
by the European Union.56 The first is driven by geography and science: many, if  not 
most environmental problems are transboundary in nature; soot particles in the air and 
chemicals in the river do not suddenly disappear at the border. The second justification is 
the standard “level playing field” argument, under which uniform environmental laws are 
necessary to ensure fair economic competition between members of the EU. Couched in 
this justification is the political reality that some business enterprises in those states 
where there already are environmental laws apply pressure on the EU to pass community
i6 N.S.J. KOEMAN, Environmental Law in Europe (1999), from chapter “European Environmental Law: 
an Introduction”, written by Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, at p. 1. [herein, Environmental Law in EUROPE]
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wide environmental laws in order to balance competition. Similarly, environmentalists in 
countries like Italy where it is difficult to pass national environmental laws are able to use 
the EU as a medium through which to bypass unresponsive national governments. The 
final justification characterizes environmentalism as a form of natural law. Under this 
theory, all citizens of the EU deserve some baseline level of environmental protection.57 
As will be seen below, the EU has moved beyond economic balancing arguments and 
towards the “natural law” concept by identifying environmental protection as one of the 
fundamental principles of the Union.
While these three justifications help to explain the political inspiration for EU 
environmental lawmaking, they do not answer the question what is the legal basis o f EU 
environmental law. As indicated above, the foundation for the EC was the creation of an 
open market economy with free competition.58 Initially comprised of three separate 
treaties59, the Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the 
European Communities60 (herein, EEC Treaty) consolidated the three treaties and set up 
the basic framework for EU lawmaking.61 However, nowhere within the treaty was there 
any language concerning the environment. Initially, environmental legislation was
57 Support for this theory is found in some member state constitutions such as Italy, where the State has a 
duty to protect the health of individuals. Italian Constitution (1948).
5S Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 140, 
see art. 2 (stating the EEC goal to “promote the harmonious development o f economic activities”).
59 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,261 U.N.T.S. 140; 
Treaty Establishing the European atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 167; 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 267.
[herein, treaty provisions will be referred to as EC TREATY, and refer to the Treaty as currently amended, 
unless otherwise noted]
60 Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, 
Apr. 8 ,1 9 6 5 ,4 1.L.M 776.
61 Id. This treaty set up the basic institutions o f the EU still in existence today, such as the Commission, the 
Council, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice.
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passed with reference to Articles 100 and 235 o f the treaty.62 Both were general 
provisions. Article 100 provided “The Council acting by means of a unanimous vote on a 
proposal o f the Commission, shall issue directives . . .  as have a direct incidence on the 
establishment or functioning of the common market.” Article 235 was a similar “catch 
all”, authorizing the Council to “enact the appropriate provisions” in cases where the 
treaty had not spoken directly to the matter but where provisions were “necessary to 
achieve. . .  one of the aims of the community.”63 Drawing on the broad language of 
these two provisions, the Council enacted environmental laws.
However, there was initially disagreement over whether Articles 100 and 235 
provided a legitimate basis for the enactment o f  environmental laws. In a sign o f  things 
to come, it was Italy in 1980 that challenged the Council’s authority to pass 
environmental legislation under Articles 100 and 235. Italy had failed to implement 
Directive 73/404 relating to the biodegradability o f detergents. Italy’s primary argument 
was that Article 100 provided no basis for environmental legislation, and that by doing so 
the Council was in effect amending a term into the EC Treaty. The ECJ was dismissive 
of the Italian reasoning, instead casting the argument in terms of harmonization and free 
competition: “Provisions which are made necessary by considerations relating to the 
environment. . .  may be a burden . . .  and if there is no harmonization o f national 
provisions on the matter, competition may be appreciably distorted.”64 The general
62 For an example of such early legislation, See, e.g. Council Directive No. 67/548 on the Classification, 
Packaging and Labeling of Dangerous Substances, 1967 O.J. (196) 1, as amended by Council Directive No. 
79/831,1979 O J. (L 259) 10.
63 EC Treaty, Art. 235. Article 235 States:
If  any action by the community appears necessaiy to achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, 
one of the aims o f the community in cases where this treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of 
action, the Council, acting by means of unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the 
Assembly has been consulted shall enact the appropriate provisions.
64 See generally, Commission v. Italy, Case, 91/79,1980 E.C.R. 1099, 1115.
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harmonization principles of Articles 100 and 235 were thus upheld as providing the 
necessary bases for environmental legislation.
Even having established the substantive basis for passing environmental laws, the 
move towards EIA in Europe progressed slowly. Building on the momentum created by 
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm65^ the EU 
in 1973 instituted a series of five-year Action Programmes to identify specific 
environmental objectives and performance targets for carrying out the broader goals of 
the EEC Treaty.66 The Action Programmes were not environmental legislation in and of 
themselves, but they were symbolic o f  the growing importance o f environmental issues in 
the EU. The second Programme Resolution, in 1977, could be viewed as the birthplace 
of EIA in the European Union. The Programme listed 11 guiding principles of 
environmental law, the second principle being that “Environmental impacts should be 
taken into account at the earliest possible stage in decision-making.”67
The original EU EIA Law, Directive 85/337, was premised on the principles of 
the Action Programmes (“Whereas the 1973 and 1977 action programmes o f the 
European Communities on the environment. . .  affirm the need to take effects on the 
environment into account at the earliest possible stage.. .”)68, though its substantive legal 
bases in the Treaty were the general community principles o f Articles 100 and 235, 
mentioned above. The first sentence o f the Directive reads “Having regard to the Treaty
es See Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment: Final Documents, U.N., reprinted 
in 11 I.L.M. 1416-69 (1972). The declaration encouraged the idea of identifying impacts of activities on 
the environment and having responsibility for mitigating those effects.
66 Council Resolution, 1973 J.O. (C 112) (First Action Programme on the Environment). The Action 
Programme was subsequently renewed in 1977, 1983, 1987, and 1993.
67 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and o f the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States, Meeting within the Council o f 17 May 1977 on the Continuation and 
Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment, 1973 O.J. 
(C112)1.
68 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Preamble
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establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Articles 100 and 235 
thereof.”69 When the Directive was proposed in 1980, England, Ireland, Germany, and 
France already had EIA laws in place, explaining the preamble statement “Whereas the 
disparities between the laws in force in the various Member States with regard to the 
assessment of the environmental effects of public and private projects may create 
unfavorable competitive conditions and thereby affect the functioning o f the common 
market; whereas, therefore, it is necessary to approximate national laws pursuant to 
Article 100 of the Treaty . . .  Whereas, since the Treaty has not provided the powers 
required for this end, recourse should be had to Article 235 of the Treaty.”70 The 1985 
Directive demonstrates exactly how the EU had broad liberties to issue directives not just 
in the environmental area, but in just about any area, under the authority of Articles 100 
and 235. As long as the objective o f the directive related to unfair conditions and the 
functioning of the common market (Art. 100), and so long as the treaty had not otherwise 
provided for legislation in this specific area (Art. 235), then the Council could pass 
legislation as necessary, though at that time it could only do so by unanimous vote (Art. 
100).71
After 1985, there were important changes to the foundation of the institutions of 
the EU. In 1986, the European Community signed the Single European Act (SEA).72 For 
the first time, the EU treaty contained rules explicitly pertaining to environmental
69 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at
70 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at
71 See McHugh, supra note [ ], at 605 for a description of the legislative history of the Directive. McHugh 
notes that Britain, France, Ireland, and Germany already had EIA laws in place at the time of the 
enactment. McHugh further notes that the enactment of the Directive was ostensibly fulfilling one of the 
goals o f Articles 100/235 -  “to avoid disparities between the EIA laws in force in several of the member 
nations which might create unfavorable competitive conditions, thereby directly affecting the functioning 
o f the common market.”
73 Single European act, Feb. 28 ,1 9 8 6 ,2 5 1.L.M. 506 (1986). [herein, Single European act]
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protection. Article 100a (“Harmonization”) for the first time recognized the relationship 
between the environment and the promotion of the common market, authorizing the 
Council to adopt measures “concerning health, safety, [and] environmental protection.”73 
Title VII of the SEA was dedicated to the environment, and contained three articles -  
130r, 130s, and 130t.74 Article 130s outlined the basic environmental policy goals o f the 
European Community: to protect the environment and natural resources, to protect human 
health, to focus on prevention of harms before they occur, to utilize available scientific 
data, and to weigh costs and benefits of actions.75 These guiding principles provided a 
clear substantive basis for the enactment of EIA legislation. 130r also introduced for the 
first time to EU law the “subsidiarity” concept.76 Article 130s identified the necessary 
legislative procedure for passing environmental legislation, which at that time was a 
unanimous vote from the Council after consultation with the Parliament (the so-called 
“Consultative Process”). The final article also introduced an important environmental 
concept familiar to American environmental law. Article 130t stated “[t]he protective 
measures adopted in common pursuant to [the environment] shall not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures 
compatible with this Treaty.”77 In other words, if a country wanted to introduce
73 See Single European act, supra note 72, Art. 100a.
74 See Single European Act, supra note 72, Article 25
75 See SINGLE European Act, supra note 72, Art. 130r,Para. 1-3
76 Paragraph 4 states the concept: “The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the 
extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at Community level than at 
the level o f  the individual Member States.” See SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, supra note 72, Art 130r, Para. 4. 
While this would appear to place limits on the ability to enact environmental legislation, scholars generally 
agree that it has placed few practical limits on the EU’s regulation of the environment. Turner T. Smith Jr. 
and Roszell D. Hunter, The European Community Environmental Legal System, 22 ELR 10106 (page 
references not available), (February, 1992). Professor Martin Shapiro also commented that the meaning of 
the subsidiarity principle is unclear and that its impact has been limited. Comparative Constitutional Law 
Lecture, University o f  California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School o f Law, May 1,2002.
77 See Single European act, supra note 72, Art. 130t
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legislation that was more protective of the environment than was an EU directive, or if it 
already had such laws in place, the EU environmental laws would permit this.
Now that environmental provisions had their rightful place among the expanding 
aspirations o f the EU, there was no need to rely on the general provisions like the old 
Article 100 and 235 to pass environmental laws. The role o f the environment in the EU 
continued to grow with the amendments to the Treaty passed in Maastricht (1992)78 9, 
Amsterdam (1997)80, and, to a lesser extent, in Nice (2001)81. Concepts such as 
“sustainable development” and a “high level of protection” of the environment were now 
among the general principles of the EU. The Treaty’s environmental provisions 
continued to be found in 3 articles, the first laying out the basic environmental goals, the 
second articulating the legislative procedure for achieving these goals, and the third 
permitting Member States to adopt more stringent environmental standards. As to the 
legislative procedure, for most environmental legislation it is the now the Co-decision 
procedure, though for “measures o f town and country planning” and “land use”, the 
unanimous vote of the Council upon consultation with Parliament is still required. The 
1997 El A Amendments, the 2001 SEA for Plans and Programmes, and the 2003 El A 
Amendments were all passed using the Co-Decision procedure.
Lastly, mention must be made of provisions for the environment in the Draft 
Constitution proposed for the EU. The idea of a “Constitution for Europe” was first 
conceived in December o f 2001. A Convention on the Future of Europe was formed, and
78 The Clean Air Act in the U.S. provides a comparable example, setting National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS), but allowing individual states to take measures or set regulations that would exceed 
the national standards. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § [ ] (1999).
79 T reaty on European Union (1992).
80 EC Treaty, supra note 59.
81 Treaty OF N ice, signed February 26,2001; ratified October 19,2002.
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that group presented a Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution to European Council on 
June 20, 2003 [herein, Proposed Constitution],82 The Proposed Constitution doesn’t 
introduce any big new concepts relating to the environment, and the basic structure o f the 
3 environmental provisions remains intact. The environment remains prominent among 
the principle aims of the EU; the concepts of “environment” or “sustainable 
development” are found in at least 12 places within the Proposed Constitution.
In the end, there has been a great evolution in the environmental doctrine o f the 
European Union. The move towards expressly making the environment part of the EU 
agenda commenced with a series of Action Programmes on the Environment starting in 
1973. Environmental concerns were originally not even considered to be within the 
purview of the EU’s legislative powers. Later, they came to be recognized, but only as a 
necessary expedient for the harmonization of the economic community. As certain 
“green” Member States began regulating the environment, the need to level the playing 
field so as to protect business in those states from unfair competition (or prevent their 
migration to the “environmental laggards”) became clear. Environmental laws were 
passed pursuant to the general EU authority to legislate on matters of economic cohesion. 
By 1987 with the Single European Act, the EU had a Title dedicated to environmental 
protection. As the Treaty has subsequently been modified in Maastricht in 1992 and 
Amsterdam in 1997, the environmental provisions have evolved and strengthened. 
Moreover, environmentalist language has gradually crept into the language of the guiding 
principles of the European Union, firmly establishing environmental protection not just as 
an area in which the EU has a right to pass legislation, but also an area in which it has a
82 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, adopted by consensus of European 
Convention, July 10, 2003, at Preface, [herein, Proposed Constitution] See also, Joanne Scott and Jan H. 
Jans, The Convention on the Future of Europe: An Environmental Perspective (Draft, Summer 2003).
26
duty to do so. The Proposed Constitution for Europe, if  adopted, will maintain these 
themes since the concepts o f environmental protection and sustainable development are 
to be found throughout the document. We now turn to a detailed analysis of the 
development of EIA law within the context described above.
2. The 1985 EIA Directive
To review, the EU EIA regime is actually the product of four distinct legislative 
efforts. The first EIA Directive was enacted in 1985. It was amended in 1997, 
supplemented in 2001, and amended again in 2003. In tracking the progression of EU 
EIA law through these four legislative efforts, the EU EIA regime will be contrasted with 
that of its US counterpart.
Tracking closely with the situation in the US, a strong environmental movement 
emerged in Europe starting in the early 1970s.83 Symbolic of this new consciousness was 
the release by the EU of the First Environmental Action Programme in 1973. Recall tha 
the second Action Programme, issued in 1977, listed EIA as one of the eleven “guiding 
principles” of EU environmental policy. Additionally, by 1980, France, England,
Ireland, and Germany had already adopted EIA laws. There was a fear in these “greener” 
countries that the lack of EIA in other Member States could distort economic competition 
in the community.84 The Commission first formally proposed EIA legislation in 1980. 
After a series of twenty drafts, the Commission submitted a proposed EIA directive to the 
European Council. The 20 drafts needed to pass the legislation is reflection of both the 
sensitivity o f Member States at that time to pass a law that directly regulated domestic
83 For an overview of the progression o f EU environmental law, see Environmental Law in Europe, 
supra note 56.
84 Louis L. Bono, The Implementation o f  the EC Directive on Environmental Impact Assessments with the 
English Planning System: A Refinement o f  the NEPA Process, 9 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 155,157 (1991).
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land use decisions, as well as the need for unanimity of the Covmcil to pass the 
legislation. In 1985, Council Directive 85/337/EEC “on the assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private projects on the environment”, was adopted, [herein, 1985 
Directive]
Again, the basic steps o f EIA described in the overview above (scoping, 
alternatives, public participation, etc.) were embodied in the 1985 Directive. One 
significant departure from NEPA was the determination of when EIA would apply to a 
project. Under NEPA, an EIA is required anytime a federal action significantly affects 
the quality of the environment. The 1985 EU Directive, on the other hand, simply listed 
categories of projects to which EIA would apply, and plans and programs were not 
mentioned. There was one list of projects for which EIA was mandatory (Annex I -  
primarily large projects like Crude Oil Refineries, Hazardous Waste Facilities, and 
Highways), and a second list for which EIA would apply only to the extent that “Member 
States consider their characteristics so require.” (Annex II — a variety of projects 
including the Agricultural, Transportation, and Chemical sectors).85 As to Annex I, the 
use of lists seemed limiting. One could imagine large-scale projects with many 
environmental impacts somehow landing outside of the categories in the list. As to the 
Annex II list, asking the Member States to employ EIA to projects when they “consider 
their characteristics so require” was very open-ended, though this conclusion must be 
tempered in light o f three things. First, all EU directives must be sensitive to the 
sovereignty of the Member States, and this provision afforded necessary discretion to the 
Member States. Second, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the European Court
8i 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Article 4. See also, Annex 1 and Annex II for a listing of affected 
projects.
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of Justice minimized the discretion to be employed as regards Annex II projects by giving 
an extremely narrow interpretation o f the language “where Member States consider that 
their characteristics so require.” Lastly, the 1997 Amendments to the Directive firmed up 
the language relating to Annex II projects.
Aside from the use o f lists, the EU EIA scheme also differed from NEPA-in that it 
only applied to “projects”, defined in the Directive as “the execution of construction 
works or o f other installations or schemes, or other interventions in the natural 
surroundings and landscape.” NEPA applies to any type of federal action impacting the 
environment, including legislative actions, plans, or programs. In this regard, the 2001 
Directive helped close the gap between NEPA and the EU process by extending the EIA 
process to certain plans and programmes. The 2001 Directive will be discussed in greater 
detail below.
3. The 1997 EIA Amendments
In 1997, the EU adopted amendments to the 1985 Directive. Council Directive 
97/11 “amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment” [herein 1997 Directive],86 7 stated “experience 
acquired in environmental impact assessment, as recorded in the report on the 
implementation of Directive 85/337/EEC . . .  shows that it is necessary to introduce 
provisions designed to clarify, supplement and improve the rules on the assessment 
procedure, in order to ensure that the Directive is applied in an increasingly harmonized
86 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art 1(2).
87 Council Directive 97/11/EC o f  3 March 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the 
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. L 73/5 O.J. 1997; March 14,1997. 
[herein 1997 Directive]
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and efficient manner.” Language in the 1997 Directive emphasized the “requirement 
for development consent”8 90 as precursor to commencement of the project, stating clearly 
in the Preamble that “the assessment should be carried out before such consent is 
granted.”91 The 1985 Directive had also required that the assessment be performed 
“before consent is given”92, but the language in the preamble to the 1997 highlighted and 
reinforced this point. The 1997 Amendments clarified that the results of the EIA “must 
be taken into consideration in the Development Consent procedure” and that the agency 
must provide the public with “the main reasons and considerations on which the decision 
was based.”93 Under NEPA, the Federal agencies are similarly obligated to consider the 
contents of the EIA and state in the record their reasons for arriving at their decision, 
though the conclusions of the EIA are not binding on the decision-maker.94 By requiring 
the agency to provide the public with the reasons for its consent decision, but not 
requiring the agency to alter its decision based on adverse findings, the EU is following a 
similar approach.
The 1997 Amendments also added projects to the Annex I list of projects for 
which EIA is mandatory,95 and finned up the criteria under which Annex II projects 
should be subject to EIA requirements. The language “where Member States consider 
that their characteristics so require” was very ambiguous and had resulted in confusion 
and wide disparities in practice among the Member States. For example, in Italy, no
88 1 99 7 Directive, Preamble at Para. 4.
89 See Ludwig Kramer, Casebook on EU Environmental Law, Hart Publishing (Oxford 2002). atpp. 151- 
153, for a discussion of the weaknesses of the original Directive and how subsequent changes addressed 
those weaknesses.
90 1997 Directive, Art 2(1).
91 1997 Directive, Preamble at Para. 5.
92 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 2(1).
93 1997 Directive, Art 8,9.
94 CEQ Regulations, supra note 5, at § 1505.2.
95 1997 Directive, Annex I. The categories of projects subject to mandatory EIA increased from 9 to 23.
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national measures had been put in place regarding Annex II projects as o f 1997; Annex II 
projects simply weren’t part of the EIA process in Italy. The 1997 Amendments 
attempted to create clearer standards for knowing when Annex II projects were to be 
assessed, partly in response to ECJ case law (to be discussed below) that had already 
tackled the issue. The “where Member States consider that their characteristics so 
require” language from the old Article 4 was completely stricken. The new Article 4 
instructed Member States to decide which Annex II projects would be subject to EIA 
either by (1) doing a case-by-case examination of projects falling under Annex II, or (2) 
setting thresholds or criteria under which a determination can be made.96 Member states 
no longer had the option to simply “specify certain types o f projects subject to 
assessment.” Furthermore, the new Article 4 referred Member States to a new Annex III 
which provided selection criteria to be used in “setting thresholds” or performing “case- 
by-case examination” for Annex II projects.97 The new language was a direct response to 
the confusion in the Member States over how to deal with Annex II Projects, as well as to 
the aggressive position the ECJ had staked out in this regard.
Again, this problem does not exist under NEPA since NEPA does not use lists to 
identify which projects are subject to EIA.98 Instead the focus is on whether the federal 
action is likely to significantly impact the environment. If the significance of the impact 
on the environment is unclear, an Environmental Assessment (EA) is first prepared (a 
“mini-EIA” that briefly reviews impacts and alternatives).99 Based on the findings o f the
96 1997 Directive, Art. 4(2).
97 1997 Directive, Ait 4(3), referring to Annex III.
It should be noted that most Federal agencies have their own EIA procedures in the form of circulars and 
guidance documents. These do often establish thresholds for the agency to consider in making its decision 
to conduct an EIA, but these thresholds have no legal value.
CEQ Regulations, supra note 5, at § 1501.3. CEQ has recommended that EAs be limited to 15 pages. 
However, over time EAs have become the primary mechanism through which NEPA has been applied, and
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EA, a decision is made whether a full-blown EIA is necessary or, conversely, whether 
there should be a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).* 100 In other words, under 
NEPA, a case-by-case examination is always performed.
Finally, the 1997 Directive brought the EIA process more in line with NEPA by 
strengthening the language related to alternatives analysis. Whereas the 1985 Directive 
had suggested in an appendix that alternatives analysis be performed “where 
appropriate”101, the 1997 Directive required “an outline of the main alternatives studied 
by the developer and an indication of the main reasons for his choice.”102 The “where 
appropriate” language was dropped. This “outline” of alternatives falls well short of the 
NEPA process, where the alternatives analysis is said to be “the heart of the [EIA],” 
calling on agencies to “[rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable 
alternatives” and to “[d]evote substantial treatment to each alternative . . .  including the 
proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.”103 
Nonetheless, the EU amendment was a step forward from the scant 1985 alternatives 
requirement.
In summary, the 1997 Amendments attempted to shore up some of the 
ambiguities of the 1985 Directive, particularly in regard to which Annex II projects EIA 
would apply, what should be contained in the EIA, and how the completed EIA should 
factor into the decision to approve or deny the project.
4. The 2001 SEA Directive
EAs often take many pages in order to determine whether or not a full blown EIA is necessary. The NEPA 
BOOK, supra note 2, p. 47.
100 CEQ Regulations, supra note 5, at §§ 1501.3,1501.4.
101 1985 Directive, Annex 111(2).
102 1997 Directive, Art. 5.
,M CEQ Regulations, supra note 5, at § 1502.14.
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In 2001, the EU expanded the scope of the EIA process. The 2001 Directive was 
inspired by the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). The Aarhus 
Convention was a call for sustainable European development by linking public . 
participation to the government decision-making process. The convention has been 
signed by the European Community and its Member States but has not yet received all 
necessary ratifications from the EC and the States. In any case the EU is moving forward 
on the implementation of its provisions. Until 2001, the EU EIA process applied only to 
“projects.” The Aarhus convention took recognition of the fact that certain government 
decisions, even if not specific development projects, can have environmental impacts.104 
The 2001 Directive responded to this reality, and also served as an equalizing measure 
due to the fact that several Member States already had assessment procedures for plans 
and programs
Directive 2001/42/EC “on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and 
programs on the environment”105 [herein, 2001 Directive] finally sought to apply the EIA 
process not just to ‘‘projects”, but also to certain plans and programs. An assessment 
procedure distinct from project EIA (a so-called “Strategic Environmental Assessment”, 
SEA) is to be applied to these plans and programs. The 2001 Directive lays out this 
procedure and describes the contents of a programmatic EIA. Under NEP A, the language 
for when an EIA is required has always been much broader. The language to the 1969 
NEPA statute required EIAs for “proposals for legislation and all other major Federal *0
104 See generally, AARHUS homepage, http://www.unece.org/env/pp
l0i Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the 
environment., C5-0118/2001. (Herein, 2001 Directive).
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Actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment/’106 The CEQ 
Implementing Regulations expressly state that “[environmental impact statements . . .  
are sometimes required for broad Federal actions such as the adoption of new agency 
programs or regulations/’107 Thus, under NEPA, EIAs have always been required for 
programs and plans (not just projects), so long as the program or plan was likely to have a 
significant impact on the environment. The 2001 EIA Directive sought to widen the 
scope of the EIA process, and brought it closer in line with NEPA in this sense.
The 2001 EU Directive is set up much like the “project” EIA Directive. Plans or 
programs relating to certain listed sectors (agriculture, forestry, energy, transportation, 
etc.) are required to have an EIA of their likely impacts. For all other plans and 
programs, the Member States are to determine criteria, based on guidance from the 
directive, as to when an EIA is required.108 Thus the scheme for programmatic EIAs 
differs from NEPA in the same way that it does for project EIAs: the EU relies on lists 
and criteria established by the Member States to determine when an EIA is necessary, 
while the US simply determines if the program or plan is likely to have a significant 
impact on the environment. The deadline for transposition and implementation of the 
2001 Directive is June o f2004. Thus at least until next year, the US EIA requirement 
will have a greater scope than that of the EU.
Assuming for sake of argument the successful implementation of the 2001 
Directive, it is difficult to draw conclusions about which EIA system has a broader scope 
of application. NEPA, which applies to all Federal actions having significant impacts on 
the environment, and which does not make use of lists or fixed thresholds, would appear
106 NEPA, supra note 13, at § 4332(C)
107 CEQ Regulations, § 1502.4(b).
108 2001 Directive, Art. 3.
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to be broader in scope. However, it cannot be forgotten that NEPA only applies to 
federal actions, or actions requiring a federal permit. For complete coverage, the US 
system has to count on the various state and local El A laws that may apply to non-federal 
actions significantly impacting the environment. The EU Directives apply to projects 
and, now, plans and programs, be they private or public, and regardless of whether they 
require national or sub-national approval. In the end it suffices to conclude that the 2001 
Amendments greatly enhance the scope of the EIA process in the EU.
5. The 2003 Amendments to the EIA Directive 
On May 26,2003, a Directive was passed requiring a second set o f Amendments 
to the original 1985 Directive. Directive 2003/35/EC “providing for public participation 
in respect o f the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment 
and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 
85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC” 109 10[herein 2003 Directive] was, like the 2001 Directive on 
plans and programs, inspired by the Aarhus Convention which the EU signed in 1998. 
Some clarification should be made as to exactly what the 2003 Directive does. As the 
title indicates, it has three purposes: 1) to ensure public participation in the creation of 
certain plans and programmes; 2) to modify or add public participation and access to 
justice provisions in the 1985 EIA Directive; and 3) to do the same with the 96/61/EC 
IPPC Directive.no It does not modify the 2001 Directive on plans and programmes. In 
fact, the 2003 Directive expressly states that its provisions on public participation do not
109 Directive 2003/35/EC ‘‘providing for public participation in respect o f the drawing up of certain plans 
and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to 
justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC”, OJ L 156/17, May 26,2003. [herein 2003 
Directive]
110 Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, OJ 
L 257, October 10,1996.
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Uapply to projects listed in Annex I of the 2001 Directive on plans and programmes.111 
The 2001 Directive is about the “assessment of the effects” of certain plans and 
programs, while this 2003 Directive is about public participation in the actual creation o f 
such plans and programs.
Article 3 o f the 2003 Directive does directly and extensively modify the 1985 EIA 
Directive with regard to public participation and judicial access.112 As to public 
participation, the 2003 amendments essentially modify Article 6 o f the 1985 Directive, 
which deals with public participation in the EIA process. The amended version generally 
strengthens the opportunity for public participation provided by Article 6, using such 
language as “as soon as information can reasonably be provided” and “early and effective 
opportunity to participate.”113 The Directive on two occasions states that information 
must be provided to the public within “reasonable time frames” to be fixed by the 
Member States.114 One could envision a plethora of case law both within Member States 
and at the level of the ECJ before such time frames are fully understood. One other 
important amendment is to Article 9 o f the EIA Directive. It is no longer sufficient that 
agencies provide "‘the main reasons and considerations on which a decision was 
made.”115 They must also respond or at least make reference to the concerns raised 
through the public participation process. This again brings the EU EIA process closer in 
line with that of NEPA, where agencies have long since been required to respond in 
writing to comments submitted by the public. In fact, the CEQ Regulations to NEPA 
require the agency preparing the EIA to “affirmatively solicit comments from those
In 2003 Directive, Art. 2(5).
112 2003 Directive, Preamble P(ll).
115 2003 Directive, Art. 3(4).
1,4 Ibid.
115 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 9.
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persons or organizations who may be interested or affected.”116 Furthermore, the US 
agency must respond to the comments either by changing the analysis contained within 
the EIA, or explaining in a statement attached to the EIA why an individual’s comment 
did not warrant a response or alteration.117 While the 2003 Amendments fall short of this 
rigor, they do enhance opportunities for public participation, and there is always the 
possibility that at the Member State level further guarantees will be made to be 
responsive to public comments.
One of the most striking o f the 2003 amendments is the addition of a new article 
10a to the EIA Directive, which focuses on judicial access. Prior to the 2003 
amendments, the EIA Directive, like NEPA, made no mention of courts or judicial 
access. Now the operative language requires Member States to “ensure that. . .  
members o f the public concerned . . .  have access to a review procedure before a court of 
law or another independent and impartial body . . .  to challenge the substantive or 
procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions” taken pursuant to the Directive.118 
There are two important points related to judicial access. First, though access per the 
Directive must be given to those “having sufficient interest” or “maintaining the 
impairment of a right,” the determination o f who constitutes “the public concerned” shall 
be made “in accordance with the relevant national legal system.”119 Similarly, non­
governmental organizations are guaranteed access to the courts, but only those “meeting 
any requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest.”120 This seems 
to set up an ambiguous requirement: the public must have access to challenge decisions,
116 CEQ Regulations, 1503.1(a)(4).
117 CEQ Regulations, 1503.4.
n8 2003 Directive, Art. 3(7).
119 Ibid. See also, Art 3(1), defining “the public” and “the public concerned”.
120 Ibid. See also, Art 3(1), defining “the public” and “the public concerned”.
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but standing is to be conferred on the basis of existing Member State law. It will be 
interesting to see how broadly the ECJ interprets the provisions on access to courts, 
considering that national court procedures have traditionally been considered a 
“domestic” concern in the EU.
The second point to remember with regard to judicial access is that Member 
States retain the option of setting up administrative panels to hear challenges. This 
authorization is important since, as we shall see below, some Member States such as 
Ireland and the Netherlands have already created such forums through which to appeal 
EIA decisions.
One should recall that in the US, there are no provisions for judicial access within 
the NEPA statute or the CEQ implementing regulations (and only certain general 
provisions with regard to public participation). However, recall also that the guarantees 
provided under the US Administrative Procedure Act, which governs decision-making of 
all federal agencies, require certain minimum levels of public participation and access to 
federal courts to appeal all acts o f federal agencies. The EU does not have an analogous 
overarching system, but through directives such as this one and Directive 2003/4/EC “on 
public access to environmental information,”121 the EU system roughly approximates the 
US system, at least in the environmental area.
The 2003 Amendments must be brought into force by the Member States by June 
25, 2005.122
C. The EIA Directive before the ECJ
121 Directive 2003/4/EC "on public access to environmental information,” OJ L41, February 14,2003.
122 2003 Directive, Art. 6.
38
The scheme for EIA in the EU cannot be sufficiently described without discussing 
the role ECJ has played in its enforcement. In fact the review of the EIA Directives 
above is nothing more than that: a review of the text of the Directives. The role of the 
ECJ in enforcing the EIA Directives and in broadening their application has been nothing 
short of remarkable.123 . .
As noted, the US EIA system has been characterized by judicial activism; the 
federal courts have played a large role in defining the contours of NEPA and the CEQ 
regulations. In particular the lower courts have often been protective o f the environment, 
though the US Supreme court has been deferential to agency decision-making in each of 
the 12 EIA cases it has heard. Some defining characteristics of the ECJ imply that it too 
can play an active role in the EIA process. Like many US courts, the ECJ relies heavily 
on contextual interpretation, as opposed to literal readings o f  text.124 125However, the ECJ 
goes further than US courts in its more open embrace of using policy considerations to 
arrive at a decision. This so-called “teleological interpretation” pushes the ECJ closer to 
the role o f judicial legislator. Under the teleological method, a court “interprets texts
on the basis o f what it thinks they should be trying to achieve: it molds the law according 
to what it regards as the needs of the Community.”126 In the EIA caselaw, the Court has 
often leaned on the “broad purpose” of the Directive to bolster its legal conclusions. This
123 For a comprehensive analysis o f the ECJ’s EIA jurisprudence, see Aine Ryall, ’Effective Judicial 
Protection* and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive in Ireland, Chapter 4 (forthcoming) 
Doctorate Thesis at the European University Institute, June 2003. Ryall notes that “The Court has taken a 
concistently rigorous and puiposive approach when called upon to interpret the directive.”
124 The ECJ “ looks at the words used and considers their meaning in the context of the instrument as a 
whole. In doing this, it tries to give the provision an interpretation which fits in with the general scheme of 
the instrum ent. . .  “ T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law 58 (Clarendon 
Press, 1981).
125 Jacqueline L. Smith, Consideration o f  Socioeconomic Effects Under NEPA and the EC Directive on 
Environmental Impact Assessment, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 355 (1992).
126 Hartley, supra note 126, at 59
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approach is consistent with the realities o f the EU, where legislative intent is often 
difficult to decipher. Often, an EU environmental directive is a political compromise 
between the desire of “greener” Member States to equalize the regulatory requirements 
across Member States, and the desire of the lower performing nations to maintain the 
status quo while at the same time securing political victories. In fact, the ECJ rarely 
looks to legislative intent in the form o f an examination of the legislative history as do 
US courts, in part because discussions of the Council are not public.127 Because of the 
peculiar nature o f EU politics, the door is left open for the ECJ to play an active role in 
the development of EU environmental law. As will be described in greater detail below, 
the ECJ has walked proudly through this door as regards the EIA Directive,128 12930
interpreting it in a broad manner that has been highly protective o f the environment.
In doing so, the Court has relied primarily on the combined language of two 
articles within the Directive.129130 The first is the general statement of Article 1 that 
“[tjhis Directive shall apply to the assessment of the environmental effects of those 
public and private projects which are likely to have significant effects on the 
environment.”131 The second is Article 2, Paragraph 1, which states “Member states shall 
adopt all necessary measures to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to 
have significant effects on the environment. . .  are made subject to an assessment with
127 See Ludwig Kramer, Casebook on EU Environmental Law, “Interpreting EC Environmental Law”, p. 46 
Hart Publishing (Oxford 2002).
128 It has decided 15 EIA cases in the 15 years since the Directive became effective in 1988.
129 Note that the above discussion will center primarily upon the 1985 Directive, prior to its being amended 
by the 1997 Directive. The reason for this is that the court has not yet had opportunity to substantively 
interpret the 1997 amendments. It has heard only one case involving the 1997 Amendments (Commission 
v. Grand Duchy o f  Luxembourg, C-366/00, February 19,2002), which simply said that Luxembourg had 
failed to fulfill its obligation to transpose the 1997 Amendments.
130 See Ryall, supra note 123, at Chapter 4, for additional analysis of how the Court has used the language 
of Article 2(1) to ensure that “the core objectives o f the directive are not undermined in practice.”
131 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Article 1.
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regard to their effects.”132 Under a narrower view, the first could be regarded as a mere 
statement that the Directive has to do with environmental assessment of projects. 
Similarly, the second could be read merely to indicate that Member States need to pass 
laws for carrying out EIA, where applicable. Instead, as will be seen below, the court has 
used these 2 general statements in tandem to consistently expand the reach and strength 
o f the Directive. The Court’s EIA jurisprudence can be roughly broken down into the 
following 5 categories: Temporal issues, Annex II interpretations, Direct Effect issues, 
Exemptions/Exceptions to the Directive, and Internal Government issues.
1. Temporal Issues
These cases center basically on Member States failure to meet the deadline for 
transposing and implementing the requirements o f  the Directives. Article 12 of the 1985 
Directive gave Member States three years to adopt measures implementing the 
Directive,133 either by introducing new legislation or altering/augmenting existing 
legislation.134 The grace period expired on July 3, 1988. In the first EIA case heard by 
the ECJ, Commission v. Luxembourg (1994),135 the court swept aside Luxembourg’s 
response to the Commission that a draft Grand Ducal regulation was soon to be adopted, 
stating flatly that an EIA regulation ‘"was not in force at the time when the period 
prescribed by the reasoned opinion expired.”136 The court faced a similar issue in the 
1996 Commission v. Belgium137 case. Again, prior to the trial and judgment, but after the 
expiration o f the time prescribed in the Reasoned Opinion, the Belgian government had
132 1 9 8 5 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 2(1).
133 1 98 5 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 12.
134 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 2(2).
135 Commission v. Grand Duchy o f  Luxembourg, C-313/93, April 13, 1994.
136 Ibid, at P(10).
137 Commission v. Kingdom o f  Belgium, C -133/94, May 2,1996.
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enacted regulations implementing the 1985 Directive. The court noted that it must assess 
the guilt o f the Member State based on “the position in which [it] found itself at the end 
of the period laid down by the reasoned opinion.”138
The legal reasoning of the Court in both of these cases (and reiterated in 
Commission v. Ireland, 1999139; Commission v. Luxembourg, 2002140; Commission v. 
Spain, 2002) is not unlike that o f the “Mootness” doctrine employed by US Courts in 
some environmental cases. Under normal circumstances, if the issue in a case has been 
resolved before trial, the court will abstain from hearing the case since there is no “case 
or controversy” as required by the US Constitution. If however, the violation in dispute 
was one “capable o f repetition, yet evading review”, then the court would hear the case 
on the merits.141 In the above EU cases, i f  a Member State could absolve itself from 
liability simply by passing or proposing legislation at the last minute, a perverse incentive 
would be created to delay implementation until the eve of trial. The ECJ instead applied 
the longstanding case law that the expiration of the Reasoned Opinion must be the cutoff 
for assessing culpability.
While the Luxembourg and Belgium cases were rather straightforward 
applications of the 3 year deadline for transposition of the Directive, the 1994 Bund 
Naturschutz v. Freistaat Bayern142 case presented a slightly more complex issue, if not a 
similarly straightforward response from the court. Germany had belatedly passed its EIA
138 Ibid, at P(17).
139 Commission v. Ireland, C-392/96, September 21,1999.
140 Commission v. Grand Duchy o f  Luxembourg, C-366/00, February 19,2002. Note that in this case the 
court was referring to Luxembourg’s failure to implement the 1997 Directive, whereas all other case 
reviewed in this section refer to violations of the 1985 Directive.
141 This doctrine was developed in the seminal Roe v. Wade abortion case in the early 1970s. By the time a 
dispute on abortion rights actually reached trial, the woman would invariably have already delivered or 
aborted the child, thus rendering the dispute one “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
142 Bund Naturschutz in Bayern e. V. and Richard Stahnsdork and others v. Freistaat Bayern, Stadt 
Vilsbiburg and Landkreis Landshut, C-396/92, August 9,1994.
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law in 1990. While the law laid down transitional rules for projects initiated after July 3, 
1988 but which had not already been notified to the public, it instead exempted those 
projects which HAD already been notified to the public, but for which no Consent 
Decision had yet been taken. In the specific case referred to the ECJ by the German 
national court, the Highway Department had already lodged consent applications for a 
new road and had notified the public prior to the (belated) 1990 implementation law, but 
subsequent to the July 3,1988 deadline imposed by the Directive. The ECJ simply 
referred to the text of the Directive and pointed out that nothing in the Directive allowed 
for transitional provisions. “On the contrary, all the provisions in the directive were 
formulated on the basis that it was to be transposed into the legal systems of the Member 
States by 3 July 1988 at the latest.”143
Germany was back before the ECJ again the following year with regard to the 
timing of transposition. In Commission v. Germany (1) ,144 however, the argument was 
slightly more nuanced. In this case, several meetings between the German government 
and German power company regarding a planned expansion of a power plant had already 
taken place prior to the July 3,1988 deadline for transposition. In addition, per existing 
German law, the expansion had been formally notified to the government prior to the 
deadline for transposition of the Directive. However, the formal application for 
development consent was not lodged until July 26, 1988, a little more than three weeks 
after the deadline. In what could be viewed as the court’s first instance o f judicial 
activism regarding El A, it ruled that under “the principle of legal certainty”, the date of 
the formal application for consent must be used for the purposes of applying the
143 Ibid, P(18).
144 Commission v, Germany (1), C-431/92, August 11,1995.
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Directive.145 The Court could have also ruled that German national law should be used to 
ascertain the determinative date (i.e. the date of formal notice o f the project to the 
German government), but instead opted for the legal certainty o f the formal consent 
application as the applicable date.
Three years passed before the timing issue was again before the Court in the 1998 
case Burgemeester v. Noord-Holland.146 This Dutch case was closely related to the two 
German cases analyzed above. Development consent had already been given in 1968 to a 
plan for constructing a port and industrial zone in Western Amsterdam. The project was 
later modified in 1979 and 1984, but work never commenced. The basic question was 
whether, in a case where development consent had already been granted prior to the July 
3, 1988 deadline set for implementing the Directive, but where a fresh consent procedure 
for the same project was initiated after the deadline, an HI A was required. Interestingly 
enough, the Commission, intervening, argued that a mere “plan” to develop should not be 
subject to the 1985 Directive, since development consent can only be had where a 
particular developer is given the right to proceed with the project.147 The ECJ dismissed 
this argument by noting that the Dutch court had already determined that approval of the 
plan constituted development consent. That matter being settled, the court continued 
with the legal reasoning it had developed in the two German cases, namely that if a fresh 
application for development consent is made after the July 3, 1988 deadline imposed by 
the 1985 Directive, this procedure is subject to the constraints o f the Directive.148
,4S Ibid, P(32).
146 Burgemeester en Wethouders van Haarlemmerliede en Spaarmvoulde and Others v. Gedeputeerde 
Staten van Noord-Holland, C-81/96, Junc 18, 1998.
147 Burgemeester, P(18).
148 Ibid, P(27).
44
In 1998 Germany was before the court still a third time for its failure to 
implement the 1985 Directive (Commission v. Germany (2))u9 Note that it was then 18 
years since the Directive was first proposed by the Commission, 13 years since its 
adoption, 10 years since the expiration of the deadline for transposition, and 1 year after 
the adoption of the 1997 Directive amending the original Directive. This time the issue 
was slightly different. Germany being a federal system, it had passed a coordinating law 
at the national level, which required individual entities such as the German Lander to 
pass their own implementing legislation. Legislation had been adopted by the Lander, 
but not communicated to the Commission. Germany argued that this was immaterial, 
since even if such regulation didn’t exist or was insufficient, the national provisions were 
directly applicable. The court’s response was again rather technical in nature. It 
maintained that the text of the Directive (Article 12(2)), required that all legislation must 
be communicated to the Commission, regardless of the precedence of the national 
provisions.* 150 The importance of this holding is not simply that Member States need to 
send regional legislation to the Commission. It also implies that an overarching national 
provision does not suffice for successful implementation of the Directive where 
subnational regulations are necessary, but insufficient or absent. This holding arms the 
Commission with important precedent for future actions against countries such as Italy 
and Spain, who have transposed national legislation in a way that requires additional 
regional legislation in order to have complete implementation. This is all the more true 
given the historical difficulties these countries have had in securing effective Regional 
implementation of national laws.
M9 Commission v. Germany (2), C-301/95, October 22,1998. Herein, Commission v. Germany (2).
150 Ibid, P.(21-23).
45
Commission v. Portugal15! the following year raised a similar issue with regard to 
the interface of national provisions in confrontation with Community law. Portugal’s 
1997 implementing law, like Germany’s 5 years prior in Bund Naturschutz, was flawed 
in that it allowed for a transitional period i.e. consent procedures initiated before the law 
but not decided upon prior to its adoption were exempted from EIA requirements.
Portugal took a different legal strategy, however. Rather than argue that the text of the 
Directive allowed for a transitional period, it instead argued that the principal of legal 
certainty embodied Article 12 of the Portuguese Civil Code made it impermissible for the 
government to pass a law that interfered with the legally protected interests, legitimate 
expectations, and vested rights of its citizens.15 52 The Court dismissed this argument by 
referring to the “settled case-law that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices 
or circumstances in its own internal legal system in order to justify a failure comply with 
the obligations . . .  laid down in a directive.”153 Again, this holding isn’t groundbreaking 
in and of itself, but it does bear importance for a country like Italy which tends to point to 
its convoluted legislative or administrative structures in order to justify its failure or delay 
in enacting community law.
2. Application of Directives to Annex II Projects 
Perhaps no single issue has aroused as much controversy or confusion in the 
Member States as has the application of EIA to Annex II projects. The ambiguous 
language of Article 4(2), and the not-so-obvious relationship of Article 4(2) with Article 
2(1) has caused this issue to be brought before the court on 6 occasions since the adoption 
of the Directive in 1985.
151 Commission v. Portuguese Republic, C-150/97, January 21,1999.
152 Ibid. P (13,15,17)
153 Ibid. P(21).
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It was an additional issue facing the court in Commission v. Germany (1), already 
mentioned above. The issue was whether a proposed modification to a thermal power 
station should be treated as part of Annex II or whether it was an Annex I project. 
Germany’s argument was essentially that Paragraph 12 o f Annex II, which made 
modifications to Annex I projects subject to the “optional” EIA procedure, left the 
discretion in Germany’s hands whether it had to subject the modification to an EIA. The 
difficult issue for the court was that the proposed modification of the thermal plant was 
actually a 500 Megawatt power station. While it was only a new addition to the existing 
plant, the 500 MW power station would have fallen into Annex I and been subject to the 
mandatory Annex I EIA procedure had it been a free standing project. On its face, the 
Directive was poorly written and ambiguous as to this situation. This was a modification 
to an Annex I structure, however it was also a large enough addition to fall under Annex I 
in its own right. The ECJ chose the pro-environmental interpretation, holding that since 
the new addition was itself on the scale o f an Annex I project, it should be subjected to 
the mandatory Annex I procedure, not the discretionary Annex II process.154
The more typical Annex II problem the court has addressed is the previously 
described language of Article 4 “Projects. . .  in Annex II shall be made subject to an 
assessment. . .  where Member States consider that their characteristics so require,” and 
the two options therein to “specify certain types o f projects” or establish “criteria and/or 
thresholds” for determining when a project in the Annex II class is subject to EIA. To the 
naked eye, this would appear to present the Member States with tremendous discretion as 
to when and whether to perform EIA for the classes of projects listed in Annex II. Enter 
the ECJ.
154 Commission v. Germany (1), P(35).
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The Court’s first occasion to address the Article 4 issue was in the 1995
Commission v. Belgium case. Belgium, supported by intervenor Germany, argued that 
the plain language of the Directive gave Member States full discretion over the 
assessment of Annex II projects. They could list projects to be assessed, they could 
establish criteria, they could establish thresholds, etc. Germany made the point that 
Article 4 stresses that “Member States” have these two options. Any interpretation 
requiring case-by-case analysis removes this right from the Member State government 
and transfers it to the individual decision maker. Both governments pointed out that that 
most Member States had interpreted the Directive in the same way, and that the 
Commission had already proposed an amendment to the Directive that would preclude 
the listing of Annex II Projects subject to EIA as Belgium had done in the present case. 
Despite all of these arguments and against the plain language of the Directive, the Court 
held for the environment using a technical legal argument. It stated that within Annex II 
there were 12 “Classes” of projects, with more specific projects listed for each class. So 
while a Member State could list specific projects within a “Class” to be subjected to EIA, 
it could not eliminate ex ante a whole “class” of projects.155 Under this perverse logic, a 
Member State could in theory list one subcategory of projects within each o f the 12 
“classes” of projects as being subject to EIA, require no EIA for all other Annex II 
projects, and satisfy the requirements o f the Directive.
The next Annex II case the court decided is the often-cited Kraaijeveld case.156 
At issue in this case was the Government of the Netherlands approval of a zoning plan for 
the construction of a dyke alongside a Rotterdam waterway. A private citizen whose
1JJ Commission v. Belgium, supra note 137, P(41).
m  AannemersbedrijfP.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland, C-72/95, October 
24,1996.
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business stood suffer from construction of the new dyke challenged the approval on the 
basis that no EIA had been performed. The first issue the court had to address was 
whether such a dyke fell under the Annex II, Paragraph 10(e) category “Canalization ar 
flood-relief works.” It was in deciding this issue that the Court first invoked the overall 
purpose of the directive to advance its protectionist jurisprudence. Citing the language 
Article 2(1), the court noted that “the directive is aimed at ‘projects likely to have 
significant effects on the environment. . .  The wording of the directive indicates that it 
has a wide scope and purpose.”157 *Accordingly the Court ruled that the approved dyke 
did fall under the purview of Annex II.
The next Annex II issue the court addressed in Kraaijeveid was an extension of 
the court’s holding in Commission v. Germany(1), discussed above. Again, the drafrers 
of the Directive had clearly erred. They indicated in Annex II that modifications to 
Annex I projects were subject to the constraints imposed on Annex II projects. Howeve 
they did not address the situation where modifications were made to Annex II  projects. 
The absence of such language in Annex II coupled with the existence o f a provision for 
modifications of Annex I projects could plausibly lead one to assume that such 
modifications are not subject to EIA requirements. In fact Kramer and other scholars 
have pointed out that the EIA Directive is based on positive lists i.e. projects that are not 
listed should not come under its scope. The Court however returned to the language i 
had just used to dispatch of the first issue of the case. It reiterated that “the scope of the 
directive is wide and its purpose very broad.” Given the Directive’s stated purpose in 
Art. 2(1) to require assessment of projects “likely to have significant impact on the
157 Kraaijeveid, supra note 156, at P(30,31).
m Kramer, supra note 89, at p. 49. Kramer gives his interpretation “[wlhat the court probably wanted to 
express” when it found that the project was covered.
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environment,” modifications of Annex II projects such as the dyke would also be 
covered. It is interesting to note that in the amended 1997 Directive, the language o f 
Annex II was changed to cover “[A]ny change or extension of projects listed in Annex I 
OR Annex II.”* 160
The final issue addressed in Kraaijeveld was the Article 4 issue i.e. the Member 
States discretion to either use lists or set thresholds/criteria for determining when an 
Annex II project would be subject to EIA. Recall that in Commission v. Belgium, the 
Court had decided this question on the technical legal basis that while a Member State 
could conceivably exclude certain Annex II projects from EIA, it could not exclude in 
entirety any of the 12 “classes” of projects listed in Annex II. Kraaijeveld took this 
reasoning to its logical next step. If a Member State could not exclude an entire “class” 
of projects from EIA, could it still exclude entire “subcategories” of projects listed within 
the 12 Annex II classes? In Kraaijeveld, the Government of the Netherlands had 
established criteria, as permitted by Article 4(2) of the Directive, such that dykes like the 
one at issue in the case were excluded because they were smaller than the thresholds 
specified by the government. The Commission tried to argue that such thresholds are 
merely “designed to facilitate examination of projects in order to determine whether they 
should undergo an impact assessment.”161 The Court rightly pointed out that if the 
Commission argument held true, then the whole concept introduced by Article 4(2) o f 
setting thresholds to eliminate projects from assessment would be rendered 
meaningless.162 However, the Court again returned to its favorite credo from Article
150 Kraaijeveld, supra note 156, at P(39,42)
160 1997 Directive, Annex II P(13).
161 Kraaijeveld, supra note 156,P(45).
162 Ibid at P(49).
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2(1), namely that such discretion enjoyed by Member States per Article 4(2) is always 
tempered by the obligation that ‘‘projects likely. . .  to have significant effects on the 
environment are to be subject to an impact assessment.”163 Thus where the threshold set 
by the Government of the Netherlands was likely to eliminate all river dykes from 
assessment, it was not permissible under the Directive.164 Thus in Kraaijeveld, the court 
broadened the scope of Annex II in 3 distinct ways, each time relying on the general 
purpose of the Directive as stated in Article 2(1). It said that the scope of the categories 
listed in Annex II should be interpreted broadly, that modifications of Annex II projects 
should also be subject to EIA even in the absence of such language in the Directive, and 
that any thresholds set by Member States could not exclude entire categories o f Annex II 
projects.
In Commission v. Germany (2), the court finally gave an explicit answer to the 
question whether entire “subcategories” of projects within Annex IPs twelve “classes” 
could be exempted from EIA analysis. Germany had availed itself of the first option 
under Article 4(2), that of listing specific types of projects from Annex II that would be 
subject to EIA. It had listed at least one project (subcategory) from each of the 12 
“classes” of projects designated in Annex II. Ostensibly, then, it had complied with the 
language of the Directive, even taking into account the broad interpretation given it by 
the Court as described above. The Court predictably saw it in a different way. Noting 
that the word “classes” had been used in Article 4 both in reference to Annex I and 
Annex II, and that the categories in Annex I corresponded more closely to the SUB-
163 Ibid at P(50).
164 The court did not explicitly stated whether entire subcategories (within the Annex II classes) could be 
ignored by the Member State EIA law, instead simply stating that in this case the Directive was not fulfilled 
since all dykes would be ignored.
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categories in Annex II, the court concluded that “classes” as used in article 4(2) must 
refer to the subcategories of Annex II, and not to the 12 broader designations therein, 
which the Court now instead characterized as “vast field(s) of economic activity.”165 
Having already established in Commission v. Belgium and Kraaijeveld that entire classes 
of projects could not be excluded from the requirement to carry out an El A, the Court 
held that the German law was insufficient.
Owing to the ambiguities o f Article 4, the Annex II issue was again before the 
court in 1999, this time the confused Member State being Italy.166 The project at issue 
was an expansion of an existing airport. The expansion of the runway was to a distance 
of less than 2,100 meters, thus removing it from any mandatory EIA obligations under 
Annex I of the Directive, but clearly capturing it under point 10(d) of Annex II relating to 
airfields other than those referred to in Annex I. In Italy, Autonomous Regions and 
Provinces such as Bolzano are authorized to pass their own EIA legislation for all 
projects not falling under a National EIA procedure (roughly corresponding to the 
projects listed in Annex II of the Directive). The Autonomous Province of Bolzano had 
passed such a law, and under this law the airport extension was analyzed, but only 
underwent a “simplified environmental assessment.” In essence the Bolzano law called 
for individual examination of Annex II projects by a special panel (called a “Regional 
Director’s Conference”). The Court mostly maintained the “party line” as regards the 
assessment, reiterating that Bolzano could not exclude entire classes of projects (either 
through the use of lists or overly stringent thresholds) if such projects were likely to have 
significant effects on the environment. Here, however, the ECJ determined that the
163 Kraaijeveld, supra note 156, P(31-46).
166 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Others v. Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others, C-435/97, September 
16, 1999.
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“simplified environmental assessment” used to examine the airport expansion may have 
been sufficient scrutiny for an Annex II project, but that this was for the national court to 
decide.167 It was a rare instance where the Court found that the Member State law might 
be adequate. In sum, the court affirmed that the “case-by-case” method employed by the 
Bolzano law was sufficient to meet the requirements o f the 1985 Directive as regards 
Annex II. Interestingly enough, at the time Bolzano was decided, the “case-by-case” 
method had already been introduced in the 1997 Directive as one of the options for 
determining the necessity of EIA on Annex II projects. The Court’s interpretation was 
really an affirmation of the amended law, though the amended law did not apply to the 
Bolzano case.
Commission v. Ireland added a new layer to the Annex II analysis because it 
actually addressed the substantive and practical aspects of the way in which Ireland had 
transposed the Directive, and took particular account o f the unique geographical 
conditions in Ireland. Ireland had chosen the second option under Art. 4(2), that of 
setting thresholds for determining when Annex II projects would be subject to EIA. The 
Commission argued that the thresholds were set too high, that they didn’t take into 
consideration the possibility that the Annex I project (e.g. peat extraction) might be 
taking place in particularly sensitive natural setting, and that the thresholds would permit 
many small projects whose combined (cumulative) effect might be damaging to the 
environment. In making this argument, the Commission cited actual studies of 
environmental damage in Ireland from activities such as grazing, peat extraction and land 
reclamation for which high thresholds had been set. It also cited economic conditions in 
Ireland such as the prevalence o f many small firms likely to do small individual projects
167 Ibid, P(49).
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thus falling below the scrutiny of EIA due to the high thresholds set by the Irish 
authorities. Here the court again referenced the established case law from Kraaijercld. ct 
al that the Member States discretion under Article 4(2) is always tempered by Article 
2(1) requirement that “projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by 
virtue inter alia, o f  their nature, size or location arc made subject to an assessment.” 
(emphasis added) The Court took the argument in a new direction by pointing out that 
the use of such thresholds by Ireland only took account of size of project, while ignoring 
its nature and location. It was precisely these considerations that would capture the risks 
o f cumulative effects or harm to particularly sensitive natural areas.168 The court 
pontificated further on the concept of “cumulative effects,”169 though it is again 
illustrative to note that the concept of “cumulative effects” was not added to the EIA 
scheme until the 1997 Amendments, where it was noted as one of the characteristics to be 
considered in assessing criteria and thresholds.170 The 1997 Amendments took effect in 
1999, the year this case was decided.
Again, the relationship between Articles 2(1) and 4(2) is far from dear. Ludw ig 
Kramer notes that the ambiguity of the relationship is bomc out by the large number of 
ECJ cases (five) that attempt to clarify the issue.171 The Court, probably rightfully, made 
an interpretation that was consistent with the broad purpose of the Directive, even if it 
pushed the bounds of honest textual interpretation. Note that under the Court’s 
interpretations of Article 4 above, the first option for Member States under Article 4(2), 
that of listing projects to be subject to EIA, really is not an option, unless the Member
168 Commission v. Ireland, supra note 139, P(64-70).
169 Ibid, P(76).
170 1997 Directive, Annex III(l).
171 Kramer, supra note 89, at p. 50.
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State lists every subcategory within Annex II. It is again worth noting the Commission’s 
response to this in the amended 1997 Directive, where the option o f listing projects was 
removed and replaced by the option of case-by-case examination. In the end the Court’s 
jurisprudence really only tolerates the case-by-case approach, since even the under the 
alternative of setting thresholds, Member States cannot set thresholds at such a level that 
might eliminate “whole classes” of projects from analysis or ignore cumulative impacts 
as seen in the Ireland case.172 It is perhaps in this area that the Court’s activism has had 
the most profound effect on EIA practice in Europe.
3. Direct Effect of the EIA Directives
The Court has been less precise in its EIA jurisprudence regarding “Direct 
Effect”, The issue was first raised before the court in the forementioned Commission v. 
Germany (!) in 1995. Germany argued that the provisions of the 1985 Directive were not 
directly effective. As one can perceive from the name of the case, the court didn’t reach 
the question of whether the Directive provides for Direct Effect since the case didn’t have 
anything to do with an individual trying to rely on the Directive as against the Member 
State, but rather involved the Commission’s claim that Germany had failed to implement 
the Directive.
One of the many issues raised in the Kraaijeveld decision was the issue of direct 
effect. The Netherlands court referred the question to the ECJ, essentially asking whether 
the obligation in the Directive to perform an EIA could be relied on by an individual in a 
national court as against the Member State. It is established ECJ jurisprudence that in 
order for an individual to invoke a Directive in a national court, the provisions of the 17
171 Sec Kramer, supra note 89, at pp. 50-51 as support for this conclusion.
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directive must be unconditional and sufficiently precise.173 It seems straightforward 
enough to say that any provision containing the phrase “where the Member States 
consider that their characteristics so require” and then leaving it within discretion of the 
Member States to set thresholds or establish criteria or specify projects, would not satisfy 
the requirements of the direct effect doctrine as it has been defined by the court.74 The 
Court, however, again took a pro-environmental stance, and essentially sidestepped the 
issue of whether there was direct effect, instead noting that “it would be incompatible 
with the binding effect attributed to a directive [and]. . .  the useful effect of such an act 
would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national 
courts.”175 Then the court noted in the abstract that national courts must “ensure the legal 
protection which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community 
Law.”176 Rather than going to the next step and deciding whether Article 4 was directly 
effective, the court simply concluded that national courts were obliged to determine 
whether the government had acted within the bounds of discretion afforded by the 
Directive in Article 4.177
In its reference to the ECJ in the Bolzano Airport case, the Italian administrative 
court asked whether the Directive was “vertically directly effective.”178 The Court again 
did not answer the question of whether the Directive was directly effective. It instead 
repeated its reasoning from Kraaijeveld that the effectiveness of a directive would be 
diminished if  individuals could not rely on it as against national authorities in national
173 Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, C-8/81,1982.
174 See Kramer, supra note 89, at pp. 68-69, acknowledging “it is perhaps doubtful whether these two 
conditions [unconditional and sufficiently precise] are really fulfilled’’
175 Kraaijeveld, supra note 156, P(56).
176 Kraaijeveld, supra note 156, P58, citing Factomame, C-213/89,1990.
177 Kraaijeveld, supra note 156, P(59)
178 Bolzano, supra note 166, P(27).
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courts. That being said, national courts were not merely permitted, but had an obligation 
to take measures to ensure the enforcement of the Directive.179 *The same logic was used 
in the 2000 EIA case, Luxembourg v. Linster.m  The Court is perhaps acknowledging 
that the discretionary language of the Directive does not meet the requirements of Direct 
Effect, and it therefore uses terms like “effectiveness” and “useful effect” to arrive at a 
result that is protective of the environment.181 Whatever the technical legal arguments, 
the end result is clear: citizens can rely directly on the provisions of the Directive when 
their national governments fail to properly implement it.
4. Article 1 Exceptions from EIA
Article 1 of the 1985 Directive provided two exceptions to the EIA requirements: 
a national defence exception, and a “legislative” exception. The defence exception is 
rather straightforward: “Projects serving national defence purposes are not covered by 
this Directive.”182 The legislative exception is also straightforward, at least on its face, 
stating "This Directive shall not apply to projects the details of which are adopted by a 
specific act of national legislation, since the objectives of this Directive, including that of 
supplying information, are achieved through the legislative process.”183 As we shall see 
though, the Court found a way to make this second exception more complex, and more 
difficult to invoke for the Member States.
The Bolzano Airport case was the only case in which the ECJ interpreted the 
national defence exception. The Italian administrative court asked the ECJ to interpret
,7i Bolzano, supra note 166, P(69-71).
,M Grand Duchy o f Luxembourg v. Berth Linster, Aloyse Linster and Yvonne Linster, C-287/98, September 
19,2000. The only twist to this case was that the Luxembourg court had been asked to directly apply the 
Directive as a side-issue in what was otherwise and expropriation/takings case.
‘*1 See Kramer, supra note 89, at pp. 68-69.
^  1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 1(4).
,lJ 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 1(5).
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the exception in light o f the fact that while the proposed airport would sene both civilian 
and military purposes, its primary use would commercial. Having no further guidance 
from the Directive itself, the court created the legal rule that projects whose “principal 
objective” was commercial/non-defence would fall under the ambit of the Directive. 
While pro-environmental, this interpretation by the court hardly seems unreasonable or 
surprising. It should be noted that the 2003 Directive softened the language of the 
defence exception, stating “Member States may decide, on a case-by-case basis. . .  not to 
apply this Directive . . .  if they deem that such application would have an adverse effect 
on these [national defence] purposes.”184 In other words, there will now be presumption 
that an EIA will be done even for national defence projects. Contrast this with the 
original language “Projects serving national defence are not covered by this Directive.”185 
The Bolzano Airport case also dealt with, however, the legislative exception, 
since the planned airport extension was provided for in a legislative provision by the 
Autonomous Bolzano Government. Recall that the legislative exception applies to 
projects whose details are adopted by a piece of national legislation, “SINCE” the 
objectives o f the Directive are achieved through the legislative process. In other words, 
the theory is that the legislative process brings out the public debate and discussion of 
alternatives, etc. that would otherwise characterize the EIA process, thereby abrogating 
the need for EIA. The Bolzano court stretched this into quite another thing. The court 
said two things were required: (1) the details of the project had to be adopted by a 
specific legislative act; and (2) the objectives of the Directive, including that of supplying
114 2003 Directive, Art. 3(2),
1,5 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art 1(4).
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information, “MUST” be achieved through the legislative process.186 It is difficult to 
understand logically how the court transformed the word “since” in the Directive to 
“must.” From a policy standpoint, it makes sense, since without this interpretation 
governments might abuse this exception by proposing all projects in the form o f a piece 
of legislation.187 But from a strictly textual interpretation, it’s hard to see how the court 
arrived at its conclusion.
Furthermore, the Court stated that the legislative act “must be specific and display 
the same characteristics as the development consent specified in Article 1(2) o f the 
Directive. . .  [including] all the elements o f the project relevant to the environmental 
impact assessment.”188 Again, it is difficult to comprehend how the court came up with 
these requirements, which are plainly absent from the text of the Directive.189 If the 
legislation must display the same characteristics and include all the elements o f an EIA, 
then what is the purpose of this exception anyway? Again, from a policy standpoint the 
Court’s pronouncement makes sense, but its legal reasoning is questionable.
The Court’s final pronouncement made much more sense, wherein it basically 
said the Bolzano legislation was not a final act, since an additional administrative consent 
procedure was required in order to commence the project. The language of the Directive 
supports this logic, since the exception requires a detailed “specific act of national 
legislation,” not one that required further administrative steps towards adoption. The 
amended 1997 Directive did not alter or clarify the legislative exception, which can at
m  Bolzano, supra note 166, P(56).
187 See Kramer, supra note 89, at p. 65, “the court referred more to the objectives of the Directive than to its 
wording, as this wording was not very precise.”
188 Bolzano, supra note 166, P(58,59).
189 See Kramer, supra note 89, atpp. 65-66 for further analysis o f the Court’s reasoning. He admits “the 
requirements for the application of the derogatory provision of Article 1 (5) o f the Directive appear rather 
high.”
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least partly be explained by the fact that the Bolzano case was not referred to the ECJ 
until 1997, and not decided until 1999.
The legislative exception was tackled by the Court again the following year.190 In 
this case the Luxembourg Parliament, after public parliamentary debate, adopted an act to 
build a motorway, though without specifying the exact route of the road. The problem is 
that the act called upon the Government to adopt further implementing legislation which 
would identify the exact route. The Court clarified the jurisprudence from Bolzano. 
Recall that Bolzano said the legislative act itself, and the legislative procedures, must 
contain all the characteristics of a normal EIA, even though there was no such 
requirement to be found in the Directive. The Linster Court clarified that instead “the 
legislature must have available to it information equivalent to that which would be 
submitted to the competent authority in an ordinary procedure for authorizing a 
project.”191 Even this is not to be found in the text of the Directive. However, this rule of 
law seems to comport better with the justification offered for the exception (“since” the 
legislative process would typically meet the objectives o f the Directive). The Court also 
introduced the concept in this case that exceptions to the general objective and field of 
application o f a Directive are to be given a very restrictive interpretation.192 This 
comports not only with US standards of legislative interpretation, but also those 
employed by international bodies such as the International Court o f Justice and World 
Trade Organization’s Appellate Body. After stating the above principles of law, the 
Court said it was for the Luxembourg Court to decide whether the principles had been 
met in the current case.
190 Luxembourg v. Linster, supra note 180.
191 Ibid, at P(54).
192 Ibid, at P(49).
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5. Regional Issues
We have already seen above in the Belgium (l)> Germany (2), Portugal, and 
Belgium (2) cases how the ECJ has dealt with issues of regionalism/federalism within the 
Member States. First, it has made the point that particularities o f  the national legislative 
processes (for example, the need for regional legislation) and other internal difficulties 
cannot be used as an excuse for fulfilling Community obligations. Second, in the 
Portugal judgment, the court noted that differences in the national legal regimes, be they 
constitutional (such as protecting individual rights), statutory, or otherwise cannot be 
used as a defense to fulfilling Community obligations. The court returned to these 
themes in its most recent EIA case, Commission v. Spain.193 The case is of particular 
importance to the Italian case study below because in Spain, as in Italy, both legislative 
and executive competence in the field o f the environment is shared between the State and 
the regions/autonomous areas.194 Like Italy, Spain also has autonomous cities with 
certain legislative and executive competencies.195 And finally in Spain, as in Italy, 
implementation of EIA law has been characterized by a plethora o f law's, implementing 
decrees, national laws governing EIA for specific industrial sectors, and various regional 
laws, not to mention a spotty record of implementation o f these laws at the Regional 
level.196
Similar to many of its EU counterparts, Spain ran into trouble with its 
implementation of EIA for Annex II projects (see review of caselaw above). It attempted 
to communicate to the Commission its patchwork of legislation from the State, the
193 Commission v. Kingdom o f Spain, C-474/99, June 13,2002.
194 Ibid, P(9-ll).
195 Ibid, P(12).
196 Ibid, P(13-16).
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autonomous areas, etc., but the Commission was not satisfied that all Annex II projects in 1 i
i
all of the country were covered by the legislation. The deficiencies were similar to those ' j
encountered by the other Member States, and the court’s disposition of the issue was the : !
'
same: namely that any discretion thought to be had from Article 4(2) of the Directive was j
tempered by the fact that projects likely to have an impact on the environment must be 
subjected to assessment, and that none of the 83 subcategories of projects from Annex II i.
could be excluded in entirety from scrutiny.
i
What bears singling out in this case was the court’s pronouncement that “the 1
constitutional division of powers between [national authorities and decentralized 
authorities] has no effect on the assessment of the infringement. It is for the Member ^
States to ensure that the implementation of their Community obligations by the 
centralized and decentralized competent authorities is effective.”197 The way in which 
the court attacked the Spanish attempt was illustrative of what could happen should such 
a case be brought against Italy. First, it examined all the various pieces of national EIA 
legislation, and found that neither individually nor in aggregate did they satisfy EIA 
requirements.198 Next the Court reviewed the various pieces of regional EIA legislation. *
To this end, Spain had belatedly presented to the Commission a table which listed, region 
by region, which Annex II projects were covered by EIA legislation. The court found 
this evidence insufficient on both a procedural and substantive level. Procedurally, the 
evidence presented was simply a table created by the Spanish government. The 
government had not submitted any actual legislation from the various regions.
Substantively, even if  there were laws consistent with the summary documentation
197 Ibid, P(28).
198 Ibid, P(38).
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provided, it was clear that not all the Annex II projects were subject to EIA. Having 
found that the regional legislation did not make-up for the deficiencies already proven at 
the national level, the court found that Spain had failed to fulfill its obligations under the 
Directive. Again, this is a lesson for the situation in Italy, where national legislation has 
been passed calling on the regions to pass implementing legislation for Annex II projects. 
As we shall see, not all of the 20 regions have managed to do so, thus opening Italy to the 
possibility of a similar condemnation before the ECJ.199
6. Conclusions from the ECJ Jurisprudence 
The discussion above reveals a consistent and aggressive broadening of the reach 
and strength of the 1985 Directive. On the issue of timing, the court was dismissive of 
Member State attempts to build in ‘transitional periods” for projects that had already 
been conceived o f prior to enactment of the Directive, and similarly dismissive of 
Member State claims that forthcoming legislation would soon rectify inadequacies in 
implementation o f the Directive. Without a doubt the court was most active in its 
analysis o f Article 4(2) and the Annex II projects, both in the frequency with which it 
addressed the issue, and the amount of protection it afforded the environment. Relying 
on the overall objective o f the Directive that eveiy project likely to have an impact on the 
environment should be subject to an EIA, the Court essentially took away most of the 
discretion seemingly afforded by Article 4(2) of the 1985 Directive. The fact that the 
court didn’t find much discretion in Article 4(2) carried over in its approach to whether 
the provision had Direct Effect. The court repeatedly held that in order to maintain the
199 For an example of an ECJ case against Italy where the non-implementation of a Region was the issue, 
see Commission v. Italy, C-33/90, December 13, 1991. The case involved the Campania Region’s failure to 
properly implement national legislation with respect to waste Directives 75/442 and 78/319. Italy argued 
that its duties were fulfilled once the national decree was passed, but the ECJ rejected this argument with 
reasoning similar to that described above.
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effectiveness o f  the Directive, individuals must be able to invoke it in national courts. 
The court consistently interpreted exceptions to Directive in a narrow fashion, 
particularly with regard to the so-called “legislative exception.” And finally, any excuses 
put forth by the Member States with regard to their internal political structures, 
constitutional setting, or geopolitical issues were cast aside as inappropriate defenses to 
the obligation to implement Community law.
In summary, the Court greatly strengthened the 1985 Directive. Its jurisprudence 
both shaped (in early years) and reflected (in recent years) many of the amendments 
adopted in the 1997 Directive. More importantly, the jurisprudence practically 
eliminated one of the primary differences between the US and EU approach to EIA 
because it all but forced the Member States to adopt a “case-by-case” approach to 
screening of Annex II projects.
D. Summary of Differences between NEPA and the EU Directive
Topic United States European Union
Responsible Party Government Agency Project Proponent
Applies to All Federal Actions, 
including plans, programs, 
and legislation.
Public and Private Projects, 
and specified plans and 
programs starting in 2004.
Screening Significant Impact on 
Environment
Listing of Projects. For 
Annex II, either case-by- 
case or listing of thresholds.
Alternatives “Heart of the EIA” Just need to outline them
Role o f Judicial Review Active role; Sole means of 
post-decision enforcement. 
Lower courts have been 
active to enforce NEPA; 
Supreme Court deferential 
to Agency actions.
Individual "direct-effect” 
suits and Commission 
actions before the ECJ for 
deficient implementation of 
Directives; ECJ has shown 
Judicial Activism; varies by 
Member State for review of 
individual EIA decisions.
Cost o f Litigation Parties pay their own costs. Losing party (e.g. the state) 
pays costs before the ECJ. 
Varies in Member States.
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Ultímate Effect o f  ElA Purely an informational tool Must be considered before 
giving “Development 
Consent”
1. Who Prepares the HI A?
Some differences between NEPA and the EU Directive, such as the scope of 
application (Annex II issue/approach to plans and programs), the emphasis on developing 
alternatives, and the ultimate effect of an EIA have already been discussed. There are 
some additional distinctions worth mentioning. The first relates to who is responsible for 
preparing the EIA. In the United States, it is the relevant government agency that 
prepares the EIA.200 This makes sense since NEPA only applies to significant federal 
actions. Typically, the federal agency itself is the project developer. Sometimes, 
however, an EIA is required for the federal action of issuing a federal permit or license 
for a private project. In these cases, the private party may “submit environmental 
information for possible use by the agency in preparing and [EIA].”201 The public also 
has input, but ultimate responsibility for completing the EIA remains with the 
government agency issuing the permit.202 In the EU, a reverse presumption of 
responsibility exists. The Directive states “this assessment must be conducted on the 
basis of appropriate information supplied by the developer, which may be supplemented 
by the authorities and by the people who may be concerned by the project in question.”203
200 CEQ Regulations, § 1502.2.
201 CEQ Regulations, § 1506.5.
202 See CEQ Regulations § 1502.2 (“To achieve the purposes [of NEPA], agencies shall prepare 
environmental impact statements in the following m anner. . . ”). See also, § 1506.5(b): an agency can 
permit an applicant for a Federal license/pennit to prepare an environmental assessment (a “mini-EIA" to 
determine whether a full-blown EIA is required), but even in this case, the agency makes its own evaluation 
of the environmental issues and takes responsibility for the scope and content o f the environmental 
assessment). Full-blown EIA’s are always prepared by the agency, or by a contractor selected by the 
agency that has no financial interest in the outcome o f the EIA (see § 1506.5 (c)).
203 1997 Directive, Preamble.
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In those cases where the developer is a private entity, the EU Directive seems to 
institutionalize the possibility of bias, since it's in the private developer’s best interest to 
downplay the significance of environmental effects. It is true that in some cases, US 
Federal Agencies themselves might have biases for or against a project. However, unlike 
private project proponents, an agency’s political mandate is not based on generating 
profits, as with a private entity. At least in theory, agencies are accountable to the public 
and working for the public, thereby diminishing the importance of institutional bias 
relative to that of a profit-oriented private developer. Others have argued that by putting 
the control of information and expertise in the hands of the developer, the capacity of the 
public to influence the process is diminished.204 Thus, at least as regards private projects, 
the EU system of leaving the preparation of the El A to the private developer could be 
considered a weakness relative to the NEPA.
2. Role of the National Courts
The role of ECJ in expanding the reach of the EIA Directives has already been 
examined. The role of US courts in enforcing NEPA has also been reviewed. The lower 
US Federal courts have been active in defending the procedural rights embodied by 
NEPA, while the US Supreme Court has deferred to the decision of the federal agency in 
each of the 12 NEPA cases it has heard. Finally, the role of the national courts in the 
EU’s EIA process should be discussed, for they are in essence the equivalent of the lower 
US federal courts. Their role is crucial to the successful enforcement of the Directive 
since the ECJ and the Commission can only tackle the broader compliance issues.
204 See generally, Maria Eduarda Goncalves, Technological Change, Globalization and the 
Europeanization o f Rights, Inti. Rev. of Law Computers & Tech., Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 301-316 (2002).
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Prior to the 2003 Amendments (and thus until June of 2005), the Directives 
themselves had not explicitly defined a role for the national courts in the EIA process.
The Directives have always provided a role for public participation, requiring Member 
States to ensure that information gathered during the EIA process is made available to the 
public, that the public has an opportunity to comment before the project commences, and 
that the public is informed of the final decision and the reasons for that decision.205 
However, these mandates are broad, leaving room for variation within individual 
Member States. The Fifth Environmental Action Programme of the EU calls for the 
active involvement o f NGOs, trade unions, and professional associations in the EIA 
process.206 Again, these are generalized calls for action; the level of actual participation 
depends on the legal institutions and level o f environmental activism within the 
individual Member States.
While the US has seen litigation and the courts at the forefront of EIA 
enforcement, other alternatives have been employed by EU countries that are generally 
less focused on litigation in comparison to the US. For example, in the Netherlands, 
administrative processes have been set up; an independent commission judges the 
sufficiency of the EIA.207 In Ireland, since the year 2000, both the project proponent and 
anyone who made written submissions to the planning authority can appeal EIA decisions 
to An Bord Pleanala, a special board set up to hear such appeals. However, the board 
cannot resolve disputes on questions o f law; thus questions such as the interpretation of
205 Kevin R. Gray, International Environmental Impact Assessment: Potential fo r  a Multilateral 
Environmental Agreement, Colo. J. ln t’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 83,123 (2000). 1985 Directive, Art. 6.
206 The 2003 Amendments also “institutionalize” a role for environmental NGOs in the EIA process.
207 See Nicholas A. Robinson, supra note 3, at 594.
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the directive would be directly reviewed in the courts.208 The Dutch method is similar; 
formal two-party litigation plays a small role in the EIA process and other administrative 
alternatives are more often pursued.209 In Italy, as will be discussed below, a decision on 
a project’s “environmental compatibility” can be appealed in the administrative courts by 
those parties directly affected by the decision as well as by specific environmental 
organizations recognized by the national government. Due to the absence o f public 
hearings, litigation has been extensively (perhaps excessively) put to use in Italy. In 
England, decisions of the local planning authority can be appealed, first to the Secretary 
o f State for the Environment, and then to the High Court. Nevertheless, litigation in 
England has been minor at least in contrast to the US, largely because England’s 
implementing legislation employs detailed thresholds and indicative criteria to be utilized 
during the assessment process.210 This has been said to minimize the discretion o f  the 
EIA authority and correspondingly minimizes the role of litigation. France places more 
emphasis on ensuring that the procedural requirements of EIA are met. It will defer to 
the factfinding efforts o f the agency so long as EIA procedures were followed, though a 
decision will be annulled if procedures aren’t followed scrupulously. German courts,
on the other hand, may find procedural errors with the EIA, but if  there is no substantive 
harm suffered from the error, the court may choose not to annul the decision on
20S See generally, Aine Ryall, supra note 123.
209 Nicholas A. Robinson, supra note 3, at p. 600.
210 N. Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy and Britain 355 (2d ed. 1987); see generally, Louis Bono, 
supra note 84. See Ryall, supra note [ ], for further elaboration on the situation in Ireland and UK, where 
she refers “to the rigorous manner in which the [English] House of Lords has analysed the basic 
requirements o f the directive”, in contrast to the Irish case law which shows “a lack o f appreciation o f the 
potential of the EIA process as a tool for environmental protection.”
11 Karl-Heinz Ladeur “Flexibility and ‘Co-Operative Law’: The Co-ordination o f European Member 
States* Laws — The Example o f Environmental Law” in Grainne De Burca and Joanne Scott, Constitutional 
Change in the EU From Uniformity to Flexibility?, Hart Publishing (Oxford 2000), at pp. 288-292.
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environmental compatibility i.e a lack of public participation would only void an El A if 
the participation would have changed the outcome of determination.
Again, it is difficult to generalize about the use of judicial review for the 
enforcement of El A throughout the EU. One author has asserted generally (1) that in the 
land use context European businesses are less likely to use the courts as political 
resources; (2) that US businesses, public interest groups, and local government bodies are 
more likely to pursue actions against the central government than are continental 
European nations; and (3) that US developers are more likely to use lawyers at each step 
in the planning process.212 The discussion above provides a mere sampling of approaches 
in several Member States. The examination of Italy below will provide a more detailed 
picture for at least one Member State.
3. Conclusions
Despite these differences, at the end of the day the basic components o f NEPA 
and the EU EIA Directives are the same. The overarching differences are more a 
reflection of the differing political situations. In the United States, the NEPA process 
applies to Federal Agencies. There is no doubting the federal Government’s right to 
regulate the activities of its own federal agencies. In the European Union, there remains 
the issue of state sovereignty. Member states don’t want to be told how and when they 
can pursue activities within their borders, and they especially don’t want to be told how 
or when to make use of the land within their borders. The result is that the EU’s 
legislation is generally lighter on the details, resulting in variation at the Member State 
level. As Ladeur puts it “divergent standards of general administrative law concerning
2,2 See Jefferey M. Sellers, Litigation as a Local Political Resource: Courts in Controversies over Land 
Use in France, Germany, and the United States, 29 Law & Soc’y Rev 475,503 (1995). See also, Kagan, 
Adversarial Legalism, p. 208-209.
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judicial control, discretion, annulment etc. can lead to different versions of uniform 
European law.”213 In the United States, the CEQ has issued a detailed set of
implementing regulations laying out the specific procedures for completing an EIA and [
the precise contents o f the EIA. In the EU, there is simply a broad framework that j
requires the Member States to fill in the details. For this reason, in the EU there is greater
discretion over when EIA is to be applied to a project or how many alternatives must be
analyzed, and in what detail. EIA is but one example of how the structure of the EU (and
the respect for the sovereignty of its members) requires a less regimented approach to
environmental issues.
The EU institutional structure is also different in that there is generally less 
emphasis on litigation as a tool to enforce EIA laws. Still, individual Member States do |
provide administrative forums through which to contest EIA decisions, and in some
I
countries where administrative rights are lacking, litigation has been used as the primary \
means to uphold the Directives. The ECJ provides an overarching forum through which j
I
to press implementation of the EIA directives. And while the Directives at least on paper
afford Member States much discretion in implementing the Directive, the strong hand of !
the ECJ has limited that discretion, expanded the reach of the Directive, and generally l
i
lessened the differences between the EU and US systems. !j
Nonetheless, to fully assess the effectiveness of the EU EIA regime, one must |j
!;
understand how it is implemented at the Member State level. The following analysis will >
first look at the challenges of implementing environmental laws in the EU in general.
The subsequent analysis of the implementation of the EIA Directive in Italy will provide
2,3 Ladeur, supra note 211, at p. 285.
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an in depth picture o f the difficulties one Member State has had implementing HU 
environmental laws.
IV. The Problems Implementing EU Environmental Laws at the Member State 
Level
A. Introduction: Is there really a problem?
It has long been argued that the EU has suffers from ineffective implementation 
of environmental directives by the Member States. And the numbers support this 
assertion. From 1982 -  1997, 25% of all Complaint letters to the Commission were 
made in the environmental area. And from 1978 to 1999, fully 20% of all ECJ judgments 
were environmental cases. In 2001, the share o f environmental proceedings swelled to 
over a 1/3 of the total number o f complaint and infringement cases. These numbers are 
all the more striking when one considers that environmental legislation makes up only 
3% of all EU legislation!* 21516 The starting point for analyzing the implementation problem 
is at the EU level, the origin of the legislation. Later by looking at implementation of 
environmental law in Italy, problems o f implementation at the national and subnational 
levels will be identified.
2,4 See Tanya A. Borzel, Environmental Leaders and Laggards in Europe: Why there is (not) a 
SOUTHERN Problem, (Ashgate 2003), for an argument that there is NOT an implementation problem. 
Borzel argues that available statistics on implementation are misleading due, inter alia, to inconsistent 
reporting o f infringements by the Commission, uneven enforcement by the Commission, the swath of new 
environmental legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, and the difficulties new Member States had fulfilling the 
acquis communitaire in the 1980s and 1990s. While Mrs. Borzel’s arguments are interesting, they fail to 
prove her major contention that there is not an implementation problem, especially in the environmental 
area. The numbers, at least in a relative sense, show a consistent inability to implement environmental 
legislation. Moreover, while many of the arguments Mrs. Borzel raises point to reasons to be skeptical of 
numbers offered by the Commission, if  anything the corrected numbers would only reflect additional 
violations not currently captured or reported by the Commission.
215 Third Annual Survey on the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Environmental Law, 
January 2000 to December 2001, at p. 6. Offical Publication of the European Communities (Luxembourg 
2002).
216 See Borzel, supra note 214, p. 21.
71
*y * •*
The most frequently cited reason for the “implementation deficit” is the 
overarching structure of the EU. It is not a federal system like that o f the US where 
national law generally preempts state law and is binding directly on the states and their 
inhabitants. In the EU only regulations are directly binding and applicable in the 
Member States. For Directives, which account for 95% o f all environmental legislation 
in the EU,217 18 responsibility for implementation and enforcement falls on the individual 
Member States.219 Thus the system starts from a disadvantage in that its effectiveness is 
heavily dependent upon the good faith of the individual Member States to implement 
directives.
Directives are binding in terms of the results that they seek, though not as to the 
means used by the Member States to achieve them.220 21Directives are the most common 
regulatory form used by the EU to regulate the environment. In a typical 
environmental directive, the EU lays out the general requirements o f an environmental 
program, the various elements that must be included in such a program, and perhaps 
some indication of applicable thresholds (e.g. “EIA procedures shall apply to those 
chemical plants larger than 5 acres”). But it then leaves it to the individual Member 
States to fill in the details of the program. While Member States are afforded flexibility 
in implementing directives, they must enact legislation that has the “force o f law” within
217 See generally, ANTJE C. K. Brown, EU Environmental Policies in Subnational Regions; The 
CASE OF SCOTLAND and Bavaria, (Ashgate 2001 ), at introduction, for a summary o f the literature on the 
“implementation deficit.”
218 Borzel, supra note 214, at p. 22.
219 EC TREATY, supra note 59, Art. 10 (“Member states shall take all appropriate measures, whether general 
or particular, to ensure fulfillment of obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by  
the institutions of the Community.”)
2J°Ibid.
221 Jody Meier Reitzes, The Inconsistent Implementation o f the Environmental Laws o f  the European  
Community, 22 EnvtI. L. Rep. 10523 (August 1992).
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that country. For example, in EC Comm’n v. Belgium,222 the ECJ found the mere 
publishing of a government circular by the Member State to be an inadequate 
implementation of a toxic waste environmental directive. To the contrary, the court said 
that each Member State must fully transpose the directive into binding national law that 
meets the requirement of “legal certainty.”223 In this same vein, the court has said that 
use of administrative proceedings in lieu of an actual law does not suffice for 
implementation because there would be too much opportunity for inconsistency in 
application.224
There are many reasons the EU might prefer an environmental directive to a 
Regulation (another possible form of EU regulation that “is binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all states” ). First, a directive is politically easier to pass in the 
Council, in contrast to a regulation that immediately creates obligations. Second, it eases 
the burden on the Commission and the Council to arrive at concrete answers in a highly 
technical area such as environmental protection. In such cases, it may be politically and 
technically advantageous to pass the responsibility on to Member States. Third, Member 
States may value sovereignty in certain areas that have traditionally been “domestic” 
matters (e.g. land use decisions); in these cases a directive is a more delicate approach 
than a regulation. And finally, there is the very practical consideration that some 
problems, such as environmental issues, are very region-specific. The best approach to 
an environmental problem in southern Italy is not necessarily the best approach for a
Commission v. Belgium, Case 239/85,1986 E.C.R. 3645,51 C.M.L.R. 248 (1988) 
f i d .
214 Commission v. Belgium, Case 102/79,1980 E.C.R. 1473, 1486 (1980), condemning Belgium for failing 
to property implement 12 directives, 
f  EC TREATY, supra note 59, Art. 249 
2:6 See Reiizes, supra note 221.
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problem in northern Denmark. Directives allow Member States a degree of flexibility to 
tailor environmental laws to the particular concerns of their geography and society. In 
this sense, environmental Directives in the EU operate much like many Federal 
environmental laws in the United States, such as the Clean Air Act which sets air quality 
targets and allows states some flexibility in achieving them.
Before continuing with a discussion of the difficulties in implementing EU 
environmental directives, more must be said about flexibility and the advantages of 
legislation via directive. To reiterate, an environmental law that might make sense due to 
geographic or climate conditions in one part of Europe might make no sense in another 
region. Flexibility also allows Member States to integrate a single European law into 
their various political and administrative systems. For example, a law tailored to the 
common law legal traditions of Great Britain might mix awkwardly with the legal 
traditions and administrative setting in Italy. By giving Member States flexibility in the 
method of pursuing common goals, Directives accommodate cultural, political, 
geographic and other differences between Member States. In addition, flexibility allows 
for creativity and innovation at the Member State level; innovative solutions in one 
Member State can potentially be transferred to the other Member States. This benefit has 
been observed in the implementation of certain aspects of the United States Clean Air 
Act.*7 27
227 Some US environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act operate like Directives in that they set general 
emission standards and then allow the individual states flexibility in achieving the standard. This has 
resulted in innovation in certain states. From time to time, large, environmentally conscious states have set 
up more stringent requirements and this has caused a kind of “ripple effect” in other states. For example, 
when California required cars to meet heightened emission standards, the car makers in Detroit 
implemented the changes in all states. California was such a big market on its own that it didn’t make 
sense to manufacture one line of cars for it and another for all the other states.
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In fact, many scholars on both sides of the Atlantic such as Joanne Scott, Karl- 
Heinz Ladeur, Eric Orts, Daniel Farber, and Charles Sable have forcefully argued that 
flexibility is critical to the success of an environmental regulatory system. In addition 
to the benefits just mentioned above, these authors point to the learning and adaptation 
that is possible in flexible. Yet even these authors acknowledge a potential downside of 
flexibility: the discretion afforded the Member States can be abused. For example Farber 
cautions that the benefits of flexibility will only be realized when there is strong central 
supervision, clear and enforceable standards, information sharing, and ample opportunity 
for public input (Scott uses the term “conditional decentralization” to summarize these 
qualification to the general theory on flexibility).28 29 Ladeur also pins the effectiveness of 
such a system to a strong central authority in the form of an empowered European 
Environment Agency (see discussion below)230
These conditions to the general endorsement of flexibility cannot be ignored in 
the EU context. The EU does not have a strong central authority to ensure, for example, 
that EIAs are being carried out properly throughout the EU. The broad procedural 
mandates of a directive like the EIA Directive could hardly be considered “clear 
standards”; the rash of ECJ litigation on the EIA provisions is itself evidence of the 
ambiguities in the language of the Directive. As for information sharing, there is a loose 
network of EIA centers across the different EU Member States, and the Commission is 
supposed to report periodically on the implementation of the EIA Directive in the EU. In
228 For a good overview of these arguments, see Joanne Scott “Flexibility, ‘Proceduralization’, and 
Environmental Governance” and Karl-Heinz Ladeur “Flexibility and ‘Co-Operative Law’: The Co­
ordination of European Member States’ Laws -  The Example of Environmental Law” in Grainne De Burca 
and Joanne Scott, Constitutional Change in the EU From Uniformity to Flexibility?, Hart Publishing 
(Oxford 2000).
229 Scott, supra note 228, at p. 264.
230 Scott, supra note 228, at p. 265.
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this regard perhaps the qualifications o f Scott, et al, are met. But in the end the flexibility 
arguments are probably better directed to pollution-control efforts such as the IPPC 
Directive analyzed by Scott. These lend themselves to the setting of clear standards (e.g. 
emissions standards, ambient air quality levels, etc.), and then allow for flexibility in how 
the standards are met. Pollution control devices, or other technical pollution control 
techniques can more easily be transferred to other Member States. Again this has 
essentially been the experience with the US Clean Air Act, albeit in the context of 
relatively strong central authority (the EPA). For example, the EPA reserves the right to 
intervene and act on behalf o f a state should the state fail to meet air quality standards. 
Perhaps more importantly, under provisions of the Clean Air Act it can threaten to 
withhold Federal Highway Funds in the event o f non-compliance. In the EU, a 
equivalent control mechanism does not exist. The Commission would like to fulfill this 
role, and is empowered to do so by pursuing actions before the ECJ per Article 226 of the 
Treaty, but with its limited resources and with the limited mandate of the European 
Environmental Agency (see discussion below), the EU really doesn’t have the 
institutional oversight called upon by Scott, et al to make flexibility work.
B. Problem o f  Legislative Misfit
The basic operation o f directives and some of their benefits have been described 
above. Having already reviewed the empirical evidence of the difficulties the Member 
State have had implementing EU directives, we now return to the analysis of why such 
problems exist, first looking at these difficulties at the EU level. Later we will examine 
the difficulties at the Member State level by looking at the situation in Italy.
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The actual enactment of legislation appears to be the first obstacle to successful 
implementation of laws. Whether the legislation is passed via the Codecision method or 
through Consultation with Parliament and the unanimous vote of the Council, the final 
legislation is the result of a series of compromises. More environmentally conscious 
states want laws that will level out environmental protection costs across the EIL Poorer 
states, primarily the southern states, have other pressing needs, most importantly that of 
continued economic development. The result is often a compromised piece of legislation, 
which can result in confusion in implementation at the Member State level, as was borne 
out in the analysis of ECJ EIA caselaw above.
Then there is the problem of different political and administrative systems. A 
directive like the EIA Directive may work well in a country that has an established 
history of public participation in government decision making, but may be extremely 
difficult to implement in a country where administrative procedures have typically taken 
place behind closed doors. Even if these “doors” are unlocked, the public may not be 
sufficiently cognizant or mobilized to open them. Borzel has used the term “high policy 
misfit” to refer to this problem of mismatch between the EU law and the existing political 
or administrative systems within a Member State. When there is high policy misfit, 
there may also be a general distrust of or reticence to implement EU laws, especially on 
the part of “less green” states that never supported the legislation during the legislative 
process. Thus the problem of implementation of environmental laws may have its 231
231 Scott, supra note 228, generally and at p. 43.
232 See generally, Antje K. Brown, EU Environmental Policies in Subnational Regions: The Case of 
Scotland and Bavaria, Ashgate (Burlington 2001) for a discussion of the relationship between attitudes 
towards EU legislation and the effectiveness of implementation.
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origins in the EU lawmaking process itself, well before implementation is attempted “on 
the ground.”
C. Problems of Enforcement via the Commission
Anticipating that not all Member States will always fulfill all of their obligations, 
the EC Treaty reserves power in the Commission to “ensure that the provisions of this 
Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied/’233 There 
are essentially 5 possible violations of EU environmental law. The first is when treaty 
provisions, regulations, or decisions are not complied with. Since these are directly 
applicable, it isn’t necessary to incorporate them into national law. A violation occurs as 
soon as a Member State doesn’t comply with the treaty provision, decision or regulation. 
There are then 3 types of violations concerning Directives, which instead require 
implementation into national law. The first is when no measures are notified to the 
Commission. The second is when implementing measures have been notified to the 
Commission, but they do not adequately implement the Directive. Finally, a Member 
State can be in violation even if it has adequately implemented the Directive into national 
law, if  in practice the law is not being applied in a manner consistent with the Directive. 
The 5th possible violation of EU law occurs when an infringement has already been 
determined by the ECJ, and the Member State fails to comply with the ECJ judgment.234
Article 226 of the EC Treaty lays out a 6 stage process that the Commission must 
follow in proceeding for the abovementioned violations relating to Directives. First, the 
Commission issues a Formal Letter of Notice to the Member State, alerting it of the 
potential violation and initiating a discourse on the subject. If the Commission is not
233 EC Treaty, supra note 59, art 211.
234 See Borzel, supra note 214, at p. 8.
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satisfied with the Member State’s response to the Formal Letter, it can then issue a 
Reasoned Opinion to a Member State.235 The Reasoned Opinion formally lays out the 
legal justification for the infringement, and sets a time frame by which the Member State 
must take action to rectify the violation. Then if  the state fails to take actions consistent 
with the Commission’s opinion, the Commission can refer the matter to the ECJ 236 After 
hearing arguments, the ECJ can then issue a judgment of the Member State’s non- 
compliance with EU law. Until the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, ECJ judgments were not 
enforceable via penalties or sanctions. Now, Article 228(1) requires states to “take the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice.”237 If a Member 
State fails to take the measures prescribed in the judgment, the Commission can again 
bring the matter before the ECJ.238 Upon request and with the advice of the Commission, 
the ECJ can now impose lump sum or penalty payments on the state.239 Although as of 
1999 only 8 cases had reached this final step in the infringement process, the threat is 
real. Four o f the eight cases to reach the final step were environmental cases, and the 
Commission threatened Germany with fines up to €200,000/day for its persistent failure 
to properly implement the EIA Directive.240 And in 2000 when the ECJ issued its first 
penalty judgment ever under the Article 228 process, and it was an environmental case 
against Greece for its failure to comply with a waste directive.241 The Commission has
233 EC Treaty, supra note 59, Ait. 226.
236 Id.
237 EC Treaty, supra note 59, Art. 228, Para 1.
238 Id., Para. 2
239 Id.
240 See Borzel, supra note 214, pp, 3,21.
241 Commission’s Eighteenth Annual Report on Monitoring and Application of Community Law, 
Environment Chapter, European Community Publications (2001).
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frequently cited the Article 228 procedure as a “useful tool” and has applauded its 
effectiveness at inducing Member States into compliance via the threat o f penalties.242
While Commission enforcement seems straightforward, in practice it has been 
difficult to bring Member States into compliance with environmental laws.243 The threat 
o f penalties under Article 228 has strengthened the system, but problems remain. One 
problem stems from the lack of adequate information in the hands of the Commission as 
to when directives aren’t being implemented. A second problem is that while Member 
States may take the necessary steps to enact legislation, there may be little or no actual 
enforcement of the law. Another related problem is that the Commission has finite 
resources with which to identify and bring enforcement actions.244 Short of requiring 
Member States to send them the enacted legislation, the Commission cannot afford to 
systematically go out and check the enforcement of all such laws “on the ground.”
Recognizing these deficiencies, the EU has used something called the “Complaint 
System” in order to facilitate Commission enforcement. Under the Complaint System, 
individuals, or groups o f individuals such as environmental advocacy organizations can 
submit a complaint to the Commission, alleging that a national government has failed to 
implement a directive or has inadequately done so. The Commission then informs the 
national government and gives it chance to explain itself. The Commission can then 
make inspections or request documentation from the Member State. The Commission
242 See generally the Annual Surveys on the Implementation and Enforcement of Community 
Environmental Law.
243 See Special Report No.3, OJ 1992, C245/1, in which the European Court of Auditors in 1992 concluded 
that there is a significant gap between the EU environmental laws in force and their actual application.
244 See Smith, supra note 76, at footnote [64] therein. See also, Kramer, "Die Rechtsperchnung der EG- 
Gerichte zum Umweltrecth -  1995 bis 1997” (1998) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift, (30 June) 309- 
321, noting that in spite of the lack of resources, Commission environmental enforcement actions increased 
by 70% from 1995 -1997  (a total of 56 judgments rendered in this period).
then has discretion whether to initiate a proceeding against the Member State in the 
ECJ.243 *45 246
There are at least four weaknesses in the Complaint System as relates to the 
environmental field. First, grassroots support for environmental causes rarely rises to the 
level of issuance of a complaint, let alone the level necessary to compel the Commission 
to initiate a prosecution. In the environmental area, this type of support generally only 
emerges when a wrong has caused harm that is both significant and concentrated on a 
discreet group of victims.247 More typically, the effectiveness of such a system comes 
down to the level of environmental activism and existence o f strong NGOs in the 
individual Member States. Second, such a challenge by the Commission at the E.C.J. 
takes substantial time; on average more than three years elapse between the 
Commission’s decision to open a case and a final ruling by the E.C.J.248 This is a 
powerful disincentive to potential claimants who are looking for a more immediate 
response to their situation. Third, there is the institutional reality that the Commission 
has limited resources and many laws to police.249 It simply can’t respond to every 
complaint that it receives. And finally, the complaint system does not provide systematic 
enforcement of environmental laws. It merely puts out the bigger fires after they’ve 
started. The complaint system appears to sometimes provide an incentive for Member 
States to skirt requirements of the environmental directives, hoping instead that the issue
243 See Smith, supra note 76, pagination not given (“These complaints should n o t . . .  be confused with legal
actions -  they amount to nothing more than a means for individuals to notify the Commission of potential
Community law violations.”
246 Christel Smets, Is Belgium Polluting the European Environmental Picture? (Analysis and Perspective) 
13 Int’l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 180, 184 (Apr. 11, 1990).
247 Id.
248 EEC Law: Report on EEC Law in the Member States, Eur. Intelligence, Aug. -  Sept. 1991, s3, at 2.
249 See Environmental Law  in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 24 ("[t]he Commission receives far more 
complaints then it can deal with, so this route is slow and uncertain. In practice, the Commission will only 
deal with the most political or extreme cases o f  infringement.”)
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will never be raised by an individual complainant. Or that even if  it is, the delay in EU 
enforcement might make non-compliance, with the minor risk o f  penalties at an unknown 
time in the future, a more cost effective option than compliance now.
The Commission itself has acknowledged the limitations of the complaint system 
specifically with regard to the EIA Directive. The Commission estimates that % of all 
environmental complaints deal with environmental impact assessment.250 Recalling that 
in the most recent year for which figures were available, over 1/3 of all complaints had to 
do with the environment, this implies that over 8% of all EU complaints deal with EIA. 
Most EIA complaints involve citizens or environmental groups contesting EIA 
procedures for a specific project i.e. that the EIA was inadequate, or that environmental 
effects were not taken into consideration during the development consent decision, or that 
no EIA was performed. The Commission concedes that w[a]s regards complaints about 
the quality of impact assessments and the lack o f weight given to them, it is extremely 
difficult for the Commission to assess these cases . . .  Most of the cases brought to the 
Commission’s attention concerning incorrect application of this Directive revolve around 
points o f fact where the most effective evaluation should rather be ensured at a 
decentralized level, particularly through the competent national administrative and 
judiciary instances.”251 O f course, this ignores the fact that if citizens found national 
institutions to be adequately protective o f their interests, they probably would never have 
gone to the step o f making a complaint to the Commission. This is especially true in a 
country such as Italy, where the EU is often viewed as a more responsive guardian of 
environmental causes than is the Italian government. In the same report, the Commission
250 Third Annual Survey, supra note 215, p. 8.
251 Third Annual Survey, supra note 215, p. 11.
attributes the increasing number of environmental complaints to, inter alia, “[t]he 
organizational difficulties in Member States to ensure full compliance with Community 
environmental law, arising from their own constitutional and/or administrative structure, 
since the responsibility o f implementation lies often under more than one authority 
(different ministries, central, regional or local authorities, etc.).”252 The Commission 
could have just as well said ‘due to the administrative situation in Member States like 
Italy’ and made its report more concise. If the Commission fails to regularly act on such 
complaints (as it tacitly admits), and some Member States are known to be remiss on 
their enforcement, who is to ensure that the goals o f the Directive are realized across all 
of the EU?
D. Possibility for Direct Application o f EU Directives 
Apart from Commission enforcement and the Complaint System, there is another 
avenue for enforcement o f directives under the EU scheme. In certain limited situations, 
an individual can directly challenge, in a national court, either a Member State’s failure to 
implement a directive or its failure to implement it correctly.253 These are commonly 
known as “Direct Effect” suits.254 The 1994 E.C.J. case Comitato di Coordimentoper la 
Difesa della Cava v. Regione Lombardia provides a good example o f such a direct effect
252 Third Annual Survey, supra note 215, at p. 40.
253 See generally, Comitato di Coordinamento per Difesa della Cava and others v. Regione Lombardia and 
others, Case C-236/92,23 February 1994.
254 As to who may sue whom, the ECJ has also spoken. The court has stated “where a member state has 
failed to implement adequately a directive. . .  a person affected by that conduct may rely on that conduct as 
against the member state.” Publico Ministers v. Ratti, Case 148/78,1979 E.C.R. 1629. These are known 
as “vertical effect” cases. Conversely, the court has said that directives do not create causes of action for 
so-called “horizontal effects”, or effects as between individuals resulting from directives. “A directive may 
not o f itself impose obligations on an individual and. . .  a provision o f a directive may not be relied on as 
against such a person.” Marshall v. Southhampton and South-West Area Health Auth ., Case 152/84, 1986 
E.C.R. 723,749.
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case, and is of particular relevance as it involves the implementation of an environmental 
directive in Italy. In Comitato, group o f individuals challenged the siting of a waste 
tipping facility in the Lombardy Region of Italy. The Italian government had 
implemented Council Directive 75/442/EEC (a waste management directive) via 
Presidential Decree No. 915.255 256Plaintiffs argued that decree as implemented only 
realistically allowed for tipping facilities and effectively ruled out other waste 
management options such as incinerators, etc. The national court agreed that there was 
a dispute regarding the proper implementation o f the directive, and referenced the dispute 
to the ECJ for resolution. The ECJ stated the direct effect rule as annunciated in prior
“[W]herever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject- 
matter is concerned, to be unconditionally and sufficiently precise, those 
provisions may be relied upon by an individual against the State where the 
State fails to implement the directive into national law by the end of the 
period prescribed or where it fails to implement it correctly. A 
Community provision is unconditional where it is not subject, in its 
implementation or effects, to the taking o f any measure either by the 
institutions of the Community or by the Member States. Moreover, a 
provision is sufficiently precise to be relied on by an individual and 
applied by the court where the obligation which it imposes is set out in 
unequivocal terms.”257
The ECJ then examined the specific waste provision in question, and found that “it [does] 
not display the above characteristics.”258 Essentially, the court characterized the 
legislation as a “framework” that “does not lay down any particular requirement 
restricting the freedom of Member States regarding the way in which they organize the
i
255 Decree No. 915 of the President of the Italian Republic o f 10 September 1982, Gazzetta Ufficiale della 
Repubblica Italiana No. 342 of 15 December 1982, p. 9071).
256 Comitato, supra note 253, at Para. 4.
2S? Id., at Paras. 8-10.
2S8 Id., at Para. 11. The provision, Article 4 of the Waste Directive, essentially says that Member States 
must take measures with respect to waste so as not harm water, air, soil, human health, the country side, 
etc.
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supervision o f the activities referred to therein . .  .”259 260The case presents precisely the 
difficulty of relying on direct effect suits to force environmental action in the EU. In 
general, directives (including the EIA Directives) are written broadly so as to provide
A / A
general principles and broad discretion to Member States in their implementation.
Thus at least in theory, the use of direct effect suits as a means of forcing implementation 
of EU environmental directives is limited.261
E. Lack of Overarching EU Environmental Body 
Another reason for the implementation deficit may lie in the fact that there is no 
overarching EU environmental authority to oversee the effective implementation of 
environmental laws. The stretched resources o f  the Commission have already been 
described. It should be emphasized that environmental protection is just one of the many 
areas for which enforcement responsibility falls to the Commission. One author has 
asserted that the EU’s implementation difficulties are similar the federalism problems the 
US faced in the 50s and 60s prior to the creation o f the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1970.262 In the 50s and 60s, the United States had established several federal 
bureaucracies to perform research on air, soil, and water pollution. But their success was 
generally limited because of conflicts o f interest (for instance, lack o f independence), as 
well as the fact that they had no enforcement powers.263 In the court system, individuals
239 Id., at Para. 13.
260 Note though, that certain clauses within the EIA Directives could be said to have direct effect. For 
example, the projects listed in Annex 1 clearly require that an EIA be performed. I f  a member state’s EIA 
law exempted one o f these projects, an individual harmed by such exemption could be bring suit to compel 
state compliance with the directive. See Smith, supra note 76, for a discussion o f this and other examples.
261 But see above discussion in Section [ ] on Direct Effect jurisprudence for the EIA Directive. In certain 
cases, the ECJ has found ways to circumvent its own Direct Effect jurisprudence.
262 See Reitzes, supra note 221.
263 See generally, U.S. Council on Envtl. Quality, 1985 Annual Report 9 (1986)
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were largely relegated to traditional tort suits under nuisance or trespass causes of actions 
in order to press environmental suits.
It was not until the enactment of NEPA in 1969, and the formation of EPA in 
1970, that the role o f environmental law in the US legal system truly took root.264 265EPA 
consolidated the administration and enforcement of the various environmental laws in 
one central authority. Symbolically, EPA came to represent a unified source of 
environmental protection. While technically sitting within the executive branch, the EPA 
has become such a large entity that it performs many of its functions independent of strict 
executive oversight, including research activities, outreach programs, and the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion under the environmental laws. The European Union has no 
analogous champion of its environmental laws. Like the US prior to the formation of 
EPA, the EU must rely above all on the good faith of the Member State governments to 
properly implement and enforce the laws. Otherwise, it is up to individuals to bring 
violations to the Commission, and up to the Commission to decide if it has the time and 
resources to follow through on the complaint. Unlike the EPA, enforcement of 
environmental concerns is just one small part of the Commission’s overall 
responsibilities.
The European Environment Agency (EEA) was originally envisioned to be an 
equivalent to the US EPA and a solution to the longstanding implementation problem.
264 Id.
265 As an intern in the EPA’s Region 9 Office o f Regional Counsel, San Francisco, this author learned how 
the Agency operates, particularly with regard to who it decides to prosecute. A tremendous amount of 
discretion is left in the hands of the individual attorneys. This was true even as the Bush administration 
was coming into power in 2001.
86
When established by the Council of Ministers in 1990,266 the Member States could not 
reach consensus in favor of granting either enforcement or regulatory powers to the 
EEA.267 Thus the EEA’s original charge was simply the collecting, processing, and 
evaluating o f data on the environment, and the distribution o f this information to the 
EU.268 269The primary concern was that such an agency would conflict with the 
“constitutional” role of the Commission in the initiation and enforcement of laws. It is 
then difficult to even draw comparisons to the US EPA; enforcement and lawmaking are 
two o f US EPA’s primary powers. Still, there was hope for an expansion of EEA’s 
powers since the authorizing regulation committed the Council to “decide on further tasks 
for the Agency. . .  no later than two years after the entry in force of this Regulation.”270 
To date, no new tasks have been established for the EEA. It remains merely a collector 
and repository o f EU environmental information. Its primary service has been the 
creation of various reports on the state o f the environment in Europe. In summary, it 
remains to be seen whether the EEA will be used as mechanism by which to improve 
Member State performance in the implementation of Environmental Directives, or 
continue to function simply as an environmental data-collection center.
F. Conclusion
266 Council Regulation 1210/90 on the Establishment o f the European Environment Agency and European 
Environment Information and Observation Network, 1990 O.J. (L 120) 1. It became operational in 1994 
and its office sits (perhaps symbolically) not in Brussels, but in Copenhagen, Denmark.
267 See, e.g. Environment Ministers Agree on Pian to Set up European Environment Agency, (Current 
Report) 12 Int’I Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 579 (Dec. 13,1989).
268 Id., Art. 2 at 2.
269 Some Member States, especially the United Kingdom, feared the EEA would become a “green police 
force” outside the control o f  the other EC institutions. Then EC Environment Commissioner Carlo Ripa di 
Meana, perhaps easing their fears, said “only the EC Commission will have the power to take any legal 
action against offenders in the European Court o f  Justice.” Environment Ministers Set up Agency, (Current 
Report) 13 IntT Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 144 (Apr. 11,1990).
270 See Council Resolution 1210/90, supra note [61], Art. 20, at 5.
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Due to the peculiarities of the EU institutional setting, the EU has used directives 
as the primary means to pursue environmental policy goals. Directives are politically 
easier to enact and also have many benefits due to their flexibility. Notwithstanding 
these positive aspects, at least four difficulties at the EU level in the implementation of 
environmental directives have been identified: the compromised EU legislation can be 
ambiguous and result in ‘policy misfit; the difficult burden placed on the Commission to 
enforce laws with inadequate resources and reliance on the ‘complaint system;’ and the 
lack o f an overarching central environmental agency to monitor, enforce and pass 
implementing regulations in the environmental area. Thus successful implementation 
already faces several obstacles at the EU level. The study of Italy below will show that 
still greater obstacles exist when it comes to enforcement of environmental directives 
within individual Member States. Again, when appropriate and in order to give context 
to the discussion, comparison will be made to the US system.
V. Overview of the Italian Environmental Law System
A. Introduction to the “Italian Syndrome”
“Italian public administration has often been described as a system that is 
highly fragmented (where even the simplest action involves several 
autonomous and uncoordinated agencies), highly legalistic (where the acts 
of Parliament are extremely detailed and lead to tiresome and complicated 
proceedings), and highly politicized (where the interventions of political 
parties systematically disrupt administrative activities).”271
“Italy has, generally a sufficient legal basis for developing a policy for 
control of pollution and of environmental resource protection. . .  the 
existing regulations do not enforce implementation but could serve as a
271 Bruno Dente and Rudy Lewanski, Implementing Air Pollution Control in Italy: the Importance o f  the 
Political and Administrative Structure, in Paul Downing and Kenneth Hanf, International Comparisons in 
Implementing Pollution Laws, Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing (Boston 19S3).
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useful basis for many restoration actions if  they were intelligently and 
seriously applied. Unfortunately, this does not occur.”272
“Italy’s environmental legislation has been developing since the passing of 
the so-called “legga Anti-Smog” Air Pollution Control Act o f 1966, No 615, 
which, however, was not properly implemented . . .  However, as Casati put 
it, as far as enforcement and implementation are concerned, Italy’s 
environmental law is still in ‘children’s shoes’. Enforcement is belated 
and/or competent authorities are not setting sufficiently strict norms to * 
implement the legislation.”273
“Italy has not met a number o f its [environmental] commitments or is not on 
the way to meet them. Transposition o f EU legislation has often entailed 
significant delays . . .  Despite efforts made, the Italian legal framework 
remains too fragmented and complex . .  .There are important disparities in 
the environmental institutional capacity and the effectiveness of regional 
and local authorities.”274 275
What do the four pieces above have in common? Obviously they highlight some 
of the commonly identified problems o f environmental law in Italy, as found in the 
academic literature. But what is more revealing is the timing of the statements: The first 
is from 1983, the second from 1989, the third from 1996, and the fourth from 2003. Is 
this a case of over-critical academics from other countries giving Italy a bad rap, or is 
there truly some type o f ‘Italian Syndrome,’ a type of institutional affliction resulting in a 
consistent and longstanding inability to effectively regulate the environment?
As noted above, there is an academic debate over the existence and extent o f the 
implementation problem in Europe as a whole, both as to environmental laws and in 
general. A second longstanding debate is whether the implementation problem is 
concentrated in the southern EU Member States. This theory of a ‘Southern Problem’
272 Robert Marchetti, Italy, in Edward J. Kormondy, International Handbook of Pollution Control, Gower 
Technical (Aldershot 1989).
273 Sevine Ercmann, Pollution Control in the European Community: Guide to the EC Texts and their 
Implementation by the Member States, Kluwer Law International (London 1996).
274 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Italy, OECD Publications (2002). [herein OECD 2002]
275 See Borzel, supra note 214, at p. 7. The Commission itself, bolstered by scholars (Ehrlennan, Weiler, et 
al) argue that there is a problem, while others (Keohane, Hoffman, Neyer, Wolf, Borzel) maintain that there 
is not a problem or that the extent o f the problem is exaggerated.
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perhaps finds its origins in the persistent stereotypes northern Europeans have of their 
sister states to the south, and it has been given validation in numerous academic studies. 
Most famously, the Italian authors La Spina and Sciortino popularized the phrase 
‘Mediterranean Syndrome* to describe the seemingly systematic inability of southern 
States to comply with EU environmental law.276 According to La Spina and Sciortino, 
‘MS* is characterized by 1) norms of social behavior that condone non-compliance with 
the law, aversion to public service, and a tendency towards corruption; 2) a fragmented 
administrative bureaucracy characterized by lack o f coordination between administrative 
structures and a tendency towards clientelism and corruption; and 3) reactive, party 
dominated politics and an executive branch with strong regulatory powers.277 La Spina 
and Sciortino were careful to point out the MS was merely a theoretical model that could 
not be proven across all four southern Member States. More recently, Borzel and others 
have argued that the term “Mediterranean Syndrome” is reductionist in nature, an artifact 
of outdated cultural misconceptions and statistical misinterpretation, and that there is no 
general “Southern Problem” as regards environmental implementation 278
Whatever the merits of these debates, no author or politician has refuted the 
existence of a genuine problem in Italy with the implementation of EU laws. Even 
Borzel had to concede that Italy “seemfs] to be more stricken’* by Mediterranean 
Syndrome. She admitted that Italy scored higher on corruption and clentelism indices. 
She also noted that “only Italy has experienced shifting majorities and short-lived
276 Antonio La Spina and Giuseppe Sciortino, Common Agenda, Southern Rules: European Integration and 
Environmental Change in the Mediterranean States. In J. D. Liefferink, P. D. Lowe and A. P. J. Mol, 
European Integration and Environmental Policy, New York (Belhaven 1993), at pp. 217-236.
277 Ibid. See also Borzel, supra note 214, at pp. 27-28.
37! See Borzel, supra note 214, Chapters 1-3, and atp. 29.
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governments.” She concluded that “[0]nly Italy seem[s] to fit the diagnosis of the 
‘Mediterranean Syndrome.’”279 The statistics bear out this conclusion.
By almost any statistical measure, Italy has been the worst performing Member 
State with regard to implementation o f EU law (all areas o f law taken together).280 Even 
though Italy has the 4 largest EU population, it received the most Formal Letters and the 
most Reasoned Opinions from 1978 -  1999. It also accounted for the highest share of 
ECJ infringement proceedings opened in the period from 1983 - 1999 (11.6%). As of the 
end of 1999, Italy was second only to France in the number o f EC proceedings pending 
against it.281 Italy is also the only country that has had significant difficulties adhering to 
pronouncements of the court, having been subject to the most proceedings under Article 
228 for failure to comply with ECJ judgments.282
With regard to implementation of environmental legislation specifically, the 
picture is not much better. Statistics from the Commission’s Annual Report on 
Implementation showed that Italy had the worst or second worst transposition rate in 
every year from 1990 -  1996, and had the worst overall transposition rate from 1990- 
1999 (82.5% properly transposed). From 1978 -1999 in the environmental area, Italy 
received the second highest percentage of Reasoned Opinions, the second highest 
percentage o f referrals to the ECJ and the second highest percentage of ECJ Rulings. It 
was bested only by Portugal as to the first, and Belgium as to the second two categories,
279 See Borzel, supra note 214, at pp.27-28.
280 For the ensuing discussion o f Italy’s difficulties, see generally Borzel, supra note 214, Chapter 1. 
Borzel’s statistics are primarily drawn from the Commission’s Annual Reports on the Monitoring the 
Application o f  Community Law, which have been published since 1972. While Borzel points out some 
changes in the way data has been reported over time, this is not important for the analysis here, which seeks 
only to show that Italy has consistently been the worst-performing Member State with regard to 
implementation o f environmental law. Only Belgium appears to compete with Italy for the title o f “Worst 
Environmental Performer.”
281 16th Report on Monitoring Application o f Community Law, (July 1999)
282 See Capria, supra note [ ], at p. 145. Her statistics are only current though 1996.
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and only by the smallest o f margins. In addition, Italy’s percentage of the totals goes up 
as the stage of enforcement moves further along, showing that Italy is either 
unresponsive, unwilling or otherwise unable to reach a settlement with the Commission. 
Considering the fact that, as will be shown, Italy has few environmental laws that do not 
derive directly from EU legislation, these facts paint a poor picture of the state of 
environmental law in Italy.
It should at least be acknowledged that Italy has recently shown some signs of 
improvement. Its transposition rate for environmental directives has improved over the 
last 4 years. Part o f this may stem from the Legge Communitaria, also known as the La 
Pergola Act, passed in 1989.283 According to this law, by January 31st o f each year, the 
Minister for EU affairs must report to Parliament on the status o f the implementation of 
EU laws. Parliament must then pass an omnibus bill by March 3 1st of each year which 
attempts to meet outstanding EU obligations, either via Parliament amending or annulling 
laws, or through delegation to the executive branch (the Government). It appears that the 
bill has improved Italy’s record transposing EC directives. However, such improvement 
must be observed with caution. Successful transposition merely means that the 
government has passed a law implementing the Directive and communicated it to the 
Commission. It reveals nothing about whether the law was properly transposed, is being 
properly implemented on the ground, or whether the proper institutions are even in place 
to implement the law. The Italian Government has shown a propensity to simply 
reproduce the environmental directive in slightly different words and pass this off as
283 Act No. 86 of March 9,1989. Antonio La Pergola was the Minister for European Affairs when he 
proposed the bill to the Italian Parliament. La Pergola later served on the Italian Parliament. He was also 
the Constitutional Court judge that wrote the 1984 Granital opinion which finally accepted the supremacy 
of EC law over Italian law. He later served as an ECJ judge and subsequently as an Advocate General. See 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/members/cv ita lap ant e.htm for more biographical information.
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‘transposition.” This is especially true when the obligations are met via executive decree 
rather than through the parliamentary process. This reason for caution is borne out by the 
numbers: while Italy’s transposition rate for environmental directives in 2001 placed it 
near the EU average, it still had a large number of non-conformity cases, second only to 
the relatively new Member State Austria.284 In 2000-2001, it was the Member State 
subject to the most “own initiative” EIA cases (25).285 It should also be noted that in 
typical Italian fashion, the Parliament only managed to pass 2 La Pergola laws between 
1992 and 1998 although it was intended to be an annual lawmaking ritual.286
At the end o f the day, the empirical evidence supports the commonly held belief 
that environmental laws are not being properly implemented in Italy. While recent 
efforts have been made to remedy this situation, significant shortcomings remain. Before 
proceding to explain Italy’s difficulties with implementation, something must be said 
about the history and institutional context in which implementation is being attempted.
B. Environmental Law In Italy 
1. History
It is a common misconception that environmental law didn’t even exist in Italy 
until the 1980s. In fact the existence o f environmental laws dates back as early as the 
1930s, when laws regulating discharges of pollutants into public waters first appeared.287 
In 1966 a first pass was made at an air pollution law, though it wasn’t really implemented 
until the mid 1970s. Then in 1976 a first attempt at a comprehensive law on the
284 Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 241.
285 “Own Initiative” cases refer to those opened by the Commission without prompting from a citizen 
complaint. Typically they are commenced on the basis o f petitions from the Parliament. Report From the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application and Effectiveness of the EIA 
Directive (2001).
286 Adelina Adinalfi, The Judicial Application o f  Community Law in Italy (1981-1997), 35 Common Market 
Law Review 1313,1314 (1998).
287 Roberto Marchetti, Italy, in Konnandy, supra note 272, at p. 199.
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“Prevention of Water Pollution” was passed. Known as the “Merli Act”, this law persists 
today as the foundation for Italian water pollution control. Certain regions of Italy also 
passed pollution control laws in the 1970s, some of which later served as models for 
national legislation.288 Thus, there was not a complete vacuum in the realm of 
environmental law. What is true is that there were no comprehensive environmental law's 
or institutional structures. What laws did exist were basically responses to public health 
concerns resulting from pollution, rather than efforts towards an abstract goal of 
protecting the environment. In addition, these laws suffered the same fate of many EU 
Directives: they were amended time after time, weakened due to the granting of waivers 
or easements, or otherwise not enforced at the national or local level.289 The history of 
EIA in Italy mirrored the above description as there was no overarching requirement of 
EIA for proposed projects prior to the mid-1980s, when a law was prompted by the 1985 
Directive.
2. Roles and Institutions
Until 1986, Italy did not even have a separate institution within the central 
government to handle environmental affairs.290 In 1986, the Ministry of the Environment 
was established pursuant to Law No, 349 of 8 July 1986.291 Law No. 349 laid the 
groundwork for the system of modem Italian environmental law. In addition to setting 
up the Ministry, it delineated environmental responsibilities between existing national 
and regional bodies, amended existing environmental statutes so as to be consistent with 
the new regime, and commanded the Government to pass decrees implementing EU
288 R. Marchetti, supra note 272, at p. 200.
28i> R. Marchetti, supra note 272, at p. 205.
290 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 355.
291 Law No. 349 of 8 July 1986, Establishment of the Ministry of the Environment and Regulation on 
Environmental Damage, at Art. 1.
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directives (the term ‘Government’ in Italy refers specifically to the executive branch of 
the government). The Ministry of the Environment was charged with “guaranteeing, in 
an organized framework, the promotion, the conservation and the recovery of 
environmental conditions . .  .”292 [emphasis added]. Of these goals, perhaps the area in 
which it has failed most is in creating an “organized framework” for environmental 
protection. Italy had no environmental “goals” prior to the creation o f the Ministry of the 
Environment, and even if  it had had goals, there was no organization or statutory 
authority through which to accomplish them. At the same time, Italy was under 
increasing pressure from the EU and other Member States to fulfill their obligations 
under the EU treaty i.e. to implement EU environmental legislation. The result was a 
patchwork of different laws and decrees created primarily to satisfy individual 
requirements of the EU like the EIA Directive. Adopted more to appease the EU, this 
collection o f laws bore little resemblance to the “organized framework” envisioned by 
Law No. 349.
Even when EU regulations are faithfully transposed into Italian legislation, there 
is the problem of the actual application and enforcement of the laws. Part of this stems 
from the way in which EU regulations are transposed. Under the Italian Constitution, 
Parliament is attributed the power to enact national statutes.293 But in the environmental 
area, typically Parliament has only issued broad “framework” legislation in the form of a 
legga delega, which delegates to the Government (executive) branch the responsibility of 
issuing detailed regulations.294 The Government typically responds to the delegations via 
decreti (decrees). Decrees can be issued either by the Prime Minister (the President of
292 Id,, at Art. 2
293 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at 355.
294 See Environmental Law in  Europe, su p ra  note 56, at p . 355.
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the Government) or the President of the Republic (a largely ceremonial official). In 
either case, the extent of Government decree-making is strictly limited to that granted by 
Parliament in the delegation law. Typically the Government cannot alter basic things 
such as administrative structures, nor can it alter the budget or introduce new types of 
sanctions not available under existing law.295 Alternatively, in situations of emergency, 
the Government can adopt decrees which only remain in force for 60 days, unless ratified 
by a majority of both houses of Parliament. As a result, Government decrees in either 
form are often compromised laws, either due to the narrow confines delegated by the 
Parliament, or to the fact that for emergency decrees to remain in force they must 
ultimately be approved by Parliament. The final step in transposing EU directives into 
applicable law is typically left to regional or local authorities, which must transpose the 
Government decree into local law.296
Regions and local governmental bodies also play a sizeable role in Italian 
environmental law, and, accordingly, in its deficiencies. There are 20 regions in Italy, 5 
o f which have special autonomy per the Constitution. Each region has its own governing 
council with certain legislative and administrative capacities, the contours of which are 
not fully clear, as will be explored further below. Since the national government’s 
attempts to implement EU directives often take the form of a delegation from Parliament 
to the Government, and then a further delegation from the Government to the Regions, it 
is often the Regions that pass the operational implementing legislation and take 
responsibility for enforcement on the ground. As will be seen, this is how the El A
295 European Environmental Law; a Comparative Perspective, at p. 144, not confirmed.
296 8th Annual Report to the European Parliament on the Commission Monitoring of the Application of 
Community Law, COM(91)321, at 273
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Directive was implemented, albeit with significant delays and deficiencies in part due to 
the multiple tiers o f delegation.
The there is a role for the more than 100 provinces (roughly equivalent to US 
Counties) and 8,000 communes (roughly equivalent to US Cities). As in the US, these 
institutions typically have only a small role in the actual issuance o f  environmental 
regulations. Provinces do have a significant role in EIA as they often are the political 
body responsible for certifying the EIA and issuing the necessary environmental 
authorizations for a project to go forward.297 Traditionally they have shared this role with 
the regions, although various legislative seesawing has shifted this responsibility back 
and forth between the state, the regions, and the local level over the past 20 years. 
Provinces also have some of the responsibility for environmental monitoring and 
investigation.298 Communes also can play a prominent role in environmental protection 
in Italy. Like the provinces, they play a role in the authorization o f projects and the 
issuance o f  environmental permits. In a departure from the US, though, the individual 
Mayors o f the Communes actually have a leading role in environmental enforcement 
actions. They can issue injunctions, serve Urgency orders”299, and bring suit against 
violators o f environmental laws. In the US, these types of prosecutorial responsibilities 
typically reside in the State or Federal EPAs, not at the municipal level.
Lastly, consistent with the fragmentation found in all areas o f Italian law, 
environmental enforcement is further split among various entities. In addition to the 
mayors o f the municipalities, certain units o f environmental enforcement are found in the 
Carabinieri (the State police), the Corpo Forestale dello Stato (National Forest Service),
297 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 357.
m  See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56.
299 These are comparable to a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction in America.
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the Guardia di Finanza (Fiscal Police), and the Capitanerie di Porto (the Port Authority). 
The US also makes use o f various government agencies, especially for monitoring the 
environment, although in the US the enforcement system is tied together by a relatively 
strong central environmental authority (EPA) that helps coordinate enforcement efforts 
and set general policy goals. To date Italy has not enjoyed the same level of coordination 
amongst the various enforcement agencies.
The history and the institutional setting under which environmental protection 
operates in Italy is thus characterized by some common themes. Lawmaking, 
administrative decision-making, and enforcement is spread across a wide array of 
different bodies, opening up the possibility for overlapping or otherwise poorly defined 
responsibilities. Similarly, the history of Italian environmental lawmaking has been 
characterized by sporadic, reactive measures for environmental protection, usually geared 
towards specific human health concerns or in direct response to EU directives, rather than 
towards an abstract, comprehensive goal of a healthy environment. As will be seen 
below, these characteristics have played a role in the difficulties Italy has faced 
implementing environmental law, including the implementation of the EIA Directive.
C. Environmental Litigation in Italy
1. Overview
The above discussion has focused primarily on the legislative, institutional and 
administrative structures in place for environmental protection in Italy. Something must 
also be said about the court systems through which these structures operate. As 
previously indicated, there was little in the way of Italian environmental law until the 
rapid enactment of environmental directives by the EU in the 1980s. As Italy began to
f j
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implement these directives, there were finally specific laws in place that created causes of 
action for environmental wrongs. Prior to that, it is not to say that there was no 
environmental litigation in Italy. Lawyers just had to be more creative.
The Constitution itself provided a foundation for environmental suits. Article 
9(2) provides that the Republic shall “protect the landscape,” while Article 32 identifies 
“health as a fundamental right of individuals and as an interest o f the public.”300 The 
Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation have both affirmed that the term 
“health” in Article 32 includes the right o f the people to a healthy environment.301 Prior 
to specific environmental legislation, these Articles were often the vehicle through which 
Italian citizens could force environmental action on the part of the government, or 
through which the government could bring actions against individuals in the spirit of 
protecting public health and landscape. The Criminal and Civil codes were also sources 
of environmental causes of action prior to the existence o f environmental laws; each is 
discussed in greater detail below.
2. Overview o f the Court System
The Italian court system consists o f the Ordinary Courts and the Administrative 
Courts. As all challenges of the EIA process take place in the Administrative Court 
system, it will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. But first brief mention 
will be made of the other courts for the purpose of understanding the overall regime. The 
ordinary courts are divided into criminal and civil courts. Both have courts of appeal.
The Corte di Cassazione is the court o f last resort for the ordinary courts, but it is not 
exactly equivalent to the US Supreme Court. As in our Supreme Court, it is limited to
300 Italian Constitution (1948).
301 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 365.
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resolving questions of law. However, a separate Corte Costituziomle handles all 
questions relating to the compatibility of national or regional laws with the Italian 
Constitution.302 The Constitutional Court does not decide cases; it can only nullify laws 
when they are inconsistent with the Constitution.303 The Constitutional Court has played 
an active role in the continuing attempt to define the division o f environmental powers 
between the State and the Regions, as will be seen below.
The Italian system differs fundamentally from that of the US in that the criminal 
courts have always been and remain the primary source of environmental enforcement in 
Italy, while in the US criminal prosecution for environmental wrongs represents a small 
percentage of all environmental actions, and didn’t really came about until the 1980s. 
Another difference is that in Italy civil damages can be had in both civil and criminal 
trials, abrogating the need for a separate, second civil trial as in the US. Owing to the 
aforementioned absence o f environmental laws up until the late 1980s, creative Italian 
lawyers invoked provisions of the Italian Penal Code of 1930 (“damaging another 
person’s property” or “adulterating or poisoning water”)304 as well as the Italian Civil 
Code of 1942 (nuisance and trespass) to bring actions in the Ordinary Courts.305 While 
the drafters of these provisions probably never intended them to apply to environmental
302 See, F. Francioni and M. Montini, “Public Environmental Law in Italy”, in R  Seerden and M. 
Heldeweg, Comparative Environmental Law in Europe: An Introduction to Public Environmental Law in 
the EU Member States, Metro (Antwerp 1996), at pp. 242-245, for an overview of the Italian court system.
303 But see William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits o f  Judicial Self-Restraint: Lessons fo r  
America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1 (1999) for an interesting review of 
the way the Constitutional Court has gradually expanded its powers despite being formally restricted to the 
nullification of unconstitutional laws.
304 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 361
305 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 374. Nuisance law is found in Article 844 of 
the Civil Code, and is largely similar to the concept of nuisance in the US, calling on the judge to weigh the 
“reasonableness” of the interference with property or person against the benefits accruing to the polluter 
and society. The justification for damages in civil environmental cases was found in Article 2043 of the 
Italian Civil Code, which provides that “whoever causes unjust harm to another person, by negligence or 
willful misconduct, shall compensate the injured person for such harm.”
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contamination, Italian judges were able to “analogize” them to the environmental wrongs, 
especially in light o f  the pronouncements o f the Constitutional Court confirming the 
State’s responsibility to protect the landscape and the public’s right to a healthy 
environment. These same legal strategies were used in the United States prior to the 
enactment o f specific environmental statutes in the 1960s and 1970s.
3. Administrative Courts
Administrative Courts play a central role in the EIA process for it is they who 
have jurisdiction over the appeals o f decisions and orders o f government agencies of all 
levels.306 For example, they would hear a concerned citizen’s appeal over the approval to 
construct a factory next door to his house, or the factory owner’s appeal of the denial of 
such approval. In contrast to the United States, it is not always required for the appellant 
to “exhaust his remedies” through higher ranking government agencies. More commonly 
these disputes are heard directly in administrative courts.307 There are two levels of 
administrative courts. The courts of first instance are called the Tribunali Amministrativi 
Regionali (commonly referred to as TARs in Italy). Decisions of TARs can be appealed 
to the Consiglio di Stato (Council o f State), which is the highest administrative court and 
whose decisions are final.308
An administrative decision can overturned for one o f three reasons, which 
correspond roughly to the United States’ standards of review under § 706(2) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA): (1) a violation of an applicable legal provision
306 Legislative Decree 80 o f 31 March 1998 gave the Administrative courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
"disputes. . .  involving building and urban planning . . .  for purposes of this decree, urban planning refers 
to all the aspects concerned with the use of territory.” Again, for more on this and other issues relating to 
access to justice, see the 2002 chapter by Zito, supra note [ ].
307 See Environmental Law  in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 362.
308 See Environmental Law  in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 362.
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(analogous to APA’s § 706(2)(d) for procedural deficiencies); (2) a lack o f power by the 
issuing authority to issue the decision (APA § 706(2)(c), in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction); or (3) eccesso dipotere, literally translated “excess of power”(APA § 
706(2)(a), abuse o f discretion). The latter includes cases where the decision was 
contradictory, based on inadequate investigation of the facts, or characterized by- 
insufficient analysis of the public interests involved. These concepts track closely to the 
concepts of “arbitrary and capricious” and “substantial evidence” from the US APA. 
Whatever the grounds for appeal, it must be filed in the TAR within 60 days of notice of 
the administrative decision.309
Administrative Courts are used extensively in Italy to appeal El A development
consent decisions. According one source,
A large portion of Italy’s administrative litigation is concerned with 
environmental matters. With respect to large of hazardous industrial 
plants, it is especially rare to find all the political parties, local 
communities, and environmental organizations in unanimous agreement 
with a new initiative. The risk of appeal increases significantly when an 
environmental impact procedure is required, since this procedure attracts 
public attention and is more likely to generate opposition.310
In a recent interview311, an environmental lawyer claimed ‘T ve never seen a EIA
that wasn’t challenged in court.” She related that for the construction o f single “waste to
energy” facility in the Campania region of Italy, more than 40 appeals were made to the
local Administrative Tribunal! Asked why there were so many different suits, the lawyer
cited several reasons. First, the rules on standing in the Administrative Courts are
309 Drawn heavily from See ENVIRONMENTAL La w  in  EUROPE, supra note 56, at pp. 363-364; see also, 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §551 et seq, supra note 39.
310 Id. at p. 386.
311 Interview with an attorney in the Milan office of a large international law firm, August 1,2003. This 
attorney, who asked that his/her name be withheld, has practiced extensively in administrative and 
environmental law in Italy, typically representing developers, but sometimes also working with government 
agencies. Her comments will be utilized frequently in the passages below. From this point forward, her 
interview will be referred to as “Interview with Milan Attorney”.
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extremely liberal. For example, as will be discussed in the next section, in Italy certain 
recognized environmental groups have the right to appeal administrative decisions 
without the need to provide any proof o f direct interest in the decision.312 Second, the 
cost of access to Administrative Courts is negligible. Third, since in Italy there are no 
public hearings for projects subject to EIA (with the exception of geothermal plants, 
which are governed by a special EIA law in Italy), the TARs are the only accessible place 
to fight unwanted development. In that vain, it should be noted that judges in Italy are 
neither appointed nor elected. Entrance is based on the passage of a rigorous set of 
examinations, but once accepted, a judge can not be removed for political reasons. Thus 
a fourth reason for resort to the Courts is that they are the one place where in theory a 
voice can be heard free of political or economic biases.
Still another reason for frequent recourse to the courts is that they have been 
extremely receptive to EU EIA legislation. In fact, even where the Italian State or 
Regions have been remiss in passing proper EIA legislation, the TARs have frequently 
directly enforced the EIA Directive.313 It appears that the TARs have served as a 
protectorate o f EIA in Italy, and helped overcome some o f the deficiencies found in the 
legislative or administrative sectors.
4. Standing in General314
It is not possible to fully explain the Italian rules o f standing for the purposes of 
this study o f EIA implementation in Italy. However, some generalizations can be made 
and some unique aspects pointed out. The general rule with respect to standing in the
312 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 364
313 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311.
314 Drawn primarily from Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at pp. 360-364. and Orts, supra 
note. The Orts piece is great current source for information on standing and access to justice in 
environmental matters in Italy.
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Administrative Courts is that the appellant must have a “direct interest” in the decision.
In environmental matters, Administrative Courts have generally interpreted direct interest 
to include those who have suffered direct injury from the administrative decision (i.e. the 
individual who is subject of the administrative decision as well as other directly 
interested parties can appeal). Courts have also been liberal in granting to standing to 
those living in close proximity to the harm, even where direct injury is questionable. In 
the Administrative Courts, the focus has also more often been on the interests protected 
by the law, and less on whether the plaintiff in particular has been injured. This standing 
concept is similar to the US requirement that the plaintiff be in the “zone of interests” the 
law seeks to protect.
The most interesting aspect of standing in Italian courts is the relative ease with 
which non-profit environmental interest groups can gain access to the courts. Article 13 
o f Law No, 349 o f 1986 called on the Ministry of the Environment to make a list of 
“[njational associations of environmental protection” or ‘‘those present in at least five 
regions” with a continuous and stated purpose of environmental protection.315 Once 
identified, Article 18(5) gives these groups the right to “participate in the trials for 
environmental damage and appeal in administrative jurisdiction for the annulment of 
illegal acts.”316 Thus any certified environmental group can intervene in civil trials, and 
initiate EIA appeal in the Administrative Courts, without even showing direct injury or
3,5 Law No. 349 o f 8 July 1986, Art. 13(1).
316 Id., Art 18(5). These groups also enjoy other participatory rights. Up to 15 of these groups can be 
selected by the Prime Minister to be members of the National Environmental Council, a kind of advisory 
board to the MoE, with responsibilities like distribution of MoE funds and nomination of regional 
environmental officials. It should be noted that this right can be abused as has been seen under the 
Berlusconi reign. In June 2003, he managed to certify 7 new environmental groups per Article 13. 
However these environmental groups were of a right-wing bent, and now have posts on the National 
Environmental Council. Giovanni Valentini, “Ambiente, il ‘golpe’ di Matteoli esautori i dirigenti del 
ministero”, La Repubblica, June 3,2003, p. 25.
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direct interest in the matter. This is in contrast to the legal rule prior to the 1986 Law, 
similar to the US, which required environmental groups to have members who either 
were directly harmed or were living in the vicinity of the alleged harm. Moreover, Italian 
groups needn’t have participated during the administrative proceedings they are 
contesting in order to have standing; in the US such participation is necessary to enjoy 
the right to later challenge decisions in court.
The notion o f standing for NGOs in Italy seems to be broader than that of the US, 
especially after Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation. The 
notion of standing in the US is based on the constitutional requirement of a “case or 
controversy.” Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that 3 
requirements must be met in order for a plaintiff to have standing: 1) there must be injury 
in fact to the plaintiff; 2) there must a causal link between the injury to the plaintiff and 
the action complained of; and 3) the injury must be able to be remedied by a court 
decision. If an environmental organization wishes to litigate, three further requirements 
have emerged, that 1) members of the group would satisfy the above 3 requirements; 2) 
the injuries it seeks to redress are germane to the purposes o f the group; and 3) the 
individual members o f the group are not required to be involved in the litigation in order 
to resolve it.317 18 319In Lujan, the court made standing even more difficult by requiring that 
the members of the environmental organization must have directly been injured or face
31Q
certain and imminent possibility o f injury which a court decision could redress.
In Italy, instead, if  the NGO is one o f the groups that has been certified by the 
Ministry o f the Environment, it can challenge government decisions in the Administrative
317 Lujan v. Defenders o f  Wildlife, 112 S.CL 2130 (1992) [hereinafter Lujan].
3,8 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), and subsequent cases.
319 See generally, Lujan, supra note 317.
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wCourts. There are no requirements of direct injury to the group or to members of the 
group. Thus the notion of organizational standing seems broader in Italy. This 
conclusion must be qualified by two points. First, the Italian courts have sometimes used 
the post-1986 conception of standing to exclude informal citizen groups from bringing 
suit, on the basis that they were not one of the official NGOs certified by the government. 
In other words, a freshly formed “Citizens o f Florence” group could not get involved in 
environmental litigation unless as group they were directly affected by the environmental 
harm.320 Paradoxically WWF-Italia could initiate the suit from its headquarters in Rome 
without ever showing injury to itself or any of its members, so long as it was nationally 
certified, even if the harm took place in Florence. Instead in the US, if  a newly formed 
local group had members who met the constitutional standing requirements, the group 
would have standing. A second limiting factor is that some Italian courts, even after the 
1986 law, have barred NGOs standing in environmental cases if a sufficient nexus was 
not found between the injury suffered and the organizational objectives of the NGO.321 
This is consistent with US standing requirements for NGOs.
320 Law No. 241 of 7 June 1990 does give non-certified environmental groups the right to participate in 
administrative proceedings, although this participation does not give them an automatic right to participate 
in a later trial (unless they had a pre-existing “personalized” interest in the matter). This right o f 
participation is kind o f a hollow offer when it comes to EIA, since in Italy there are no public hearings in 
the EIA process. Participation is only permitted via written submissions. For a excellent and current 
discussion o f standing and access to justice in Italy, see Alberto Zito, et al “Italy”, in Jonas Ebbesson 
(Editors Eric \V, Orts and Kurt Deketelaere), Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in the EU, pp.
313-345, Kluwer Law (London 2002). Obviously the discussion above is simplified, and there are more 
nuanced issues such as the difference between a “right” and a “legitimate interest” and how that affects 
standing, treatment of collective interests, the issuance of temporary restraining orders, declaratory 
judgments, review of the administration's failure to act, burdens of proof, evidentiary issues, access to 
environmental information, etc.
321 In criminal cases, Article 91 of the Penal Code allows the certified environmental groups to intervene 
where they “have been officially recognized as having as their purpose to further the interests o f those 
affected by the crime.” Italian Penal Code, Art 91. hi one study of cases after the passage of the 1986 
Law until 1993, environmental groups attempted to intervene in 25 o f 30 environmental criminal cases, and 
were granted standing 19 times (on two occasions the NGOs were even awarded damages). In the 6 cases 
in which they were denied standing, the court said that there was not a sufficient nexus between the general 
objective of the environmental group and the alleged damage suffered. Stefano Nespor, Liability Litigation
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It is difficult to say which system provides greater access to the courts and greater 
environmental protection, but it seems that the Italian method makes more sense. These 
environmental groups exist precisely to defend the environment. I f  the US courts are 
concerned about “the vitality of the adversary process” (as some Supreme Court justices 
have claimed), the antiquated American notions of standing don’t make sense in the 
environmental context. Why would an individual citizen put up a better fight than 
environmental organization? What difference does it make whether Greenpeace has 
member living in proximity to the environmental harm? If  the court’s obsession with a 
case or controversy is based on the need for a vigorous adversary to aid in the court’s 
understanding of the issues, wouldn’t a certified environmental group be as good or better 
an adversary than an individual citizen? The Italian model, as a supplement to the 
traditional US standing rules, would seem to offer the most in terms of environmental 
protection. In any case it is clear that the Italian system gives wide access to certified 
NGOs to challenge EIA decisions in the Administrative Courts. This has been borne out 
by the numerous challenges to EIA decisions in the Administrative Courts.
5. Application o f EC Law in Italian Courts 
As will be seen below, the Italian Constitutional Court was late to fully accept the 
supremacy o f EC law (not until the 1984 Granital decision). In the years that followed, 
though, the Italian courts have been extremely receptive to EC law. In fact, they have 
been instrumental in compensating for the Italian government’s consistent failure to 
properly implement Community Law. This openness to EC Law, combined with the
in Italy, in Sven Deimann & Bernard Dyssli, Environmental Rights: Law, Litigation & Access to Justice, 
Cameron May (London 1995).
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relaxed standing rules and low costs of litigating in the Administrative Courts, has made 
up for some of the deficit in implementing Directives like the EIA Directive.
Here we detail some of the general characteristics o f the Italian courts* treatment 
o f  EC Law.322 Italian courts have consistently applied EC Treaty provisions and 
Regulations, rightfully viewing them as “immediately applicable in the Italian legal 
order.”323 More impressively, the Italian courts have also applied ‘general principles* of 
the European Court of Justice. For example, in applying the EIA Directive to a project 
where the Region had not yet implemented the law, the Italian court stated that the “delay 
by national authorities in deciding whether or not to grant a building license violated the 
Community principle requiring the [national] administration to take relevant measures 
within a reasonable period.”324 *Another general practice o f Italian courts has been to 
interpret Italian statutes in cases of ambiguity so as to conform to EC law. Finally, the 
courts have generally made liberal use of the reference procedure to the ECJ, especially
•  325in more recent years.
Regarding Directives, Italian courts have very frequently given them Direct 
Effect, applying the standard as articulated by the ECJ (that the directive be sufficiently 
precise, etc.). The courts have used Direct Effect in 3 ways: 1) as an independent source 
o f  law when the government has failed to implement a Directive; 2) to fill gaps when the 
government has incorrectly or incompletely transposed a Directive, or 3) to trump 
conflicting national laws on the matter.326 More remarkably, the Courts have utilized
322 The following discussion come almost exclusively from Adinalfi’s 1999 piece, supra note 286.
323 Court of Cassation, sec. I, March 9, 1982, No. 1470.
324 Reg. Adm. Tr. of Lombardy, sec. 1. April 2, 1993, No. 260, as translated by Adinalfi, supra note 286, at 
p. 1327.
25 Adinalfi, supra note 286, at p.
326 Adinalfi, supra note 286, at pp. 1329 -  1330.
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Direct Effect both “vertically” (a citizen invoking a Directive as against the Government) 
and “horizontally” (a citizen invoking a Directive as against another citizen). This use of 
Directives “horizontally” has occurred both before and subsequent to the ECJ’s Marshall 
decision (see footnote 254) in which the ECJ held that Directives need not be given 
Direct Effect between individual litigants. Even after the Court o f Cassation ruled that 
such practice was not in line with ECJ jurisprudence, many courts continued invoking 
Directives horizontally, for example by applying Directives “in equity”, and through 
various other legal fictions. This action is all the more surprising since in a civil law 
system like Italy’s, courts are in theory limited to the application o f laws -  equity should 
have no place in the legal hierarchy.
So, Italy does have history o f using litigation as a tool for environmental action. 
Up until the mid to late 1980s, environmental actions were based on the Constitution and 
on old provisions o f the Civil and Criminal Codes. Environmental laws enacted in the 
80s and 90s provided formal causes o f action, and the possibility o f both civil and 
criminal penalties. The criminal courts remain the primary vehicle for environmental 
enforcement. Certain identified environmental groups have a rather broad license to 
intervene in or initiate environmental matters. Administrative courts are the primary 
forum to make challenges to the approval or denial of an EIA, and they have been used 
extensively due to relaxed standing requirements, the absence o f public hearings in the 
Italian EIA process, and the low cost of proceeding in the Administrative Courts. Lastly, 
since about the mid-1980s, Italian courts have displayed a very favorable attitude towards 
EC law. As a result of all of the above, the difficulties the Government has had in
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passing and administering Community Law have been somewhat ameliorated by the 
activism of the Italian courts.
D. Identifying and Explaining the Problems with Italian Environmental Law
The difficulties implementing EU environmental laws across the EU has been 
illustrated. Explanations for the difficulties in implementation emanating from the EU 
itself have been offered. A particular and persistent implementation problem in Italy has 
been documented, both by looking at the EU statistics and by reviewing opinions in the 
academic literature. Having outlined the political, administrative, and legal structures in 
Italy, an attempt will now be made to demonstrate the difficulty of implementing EU 
environmental law within these systems. When possible, specific reference will be made 
to Italy’s difficulties implementing the EIA Directive. Again, the US experience will 
occasionally be referenced to provide context for the reader. After presenting this 
overview of the impediments to successful implementation of EU environmental law in 
Italy, the implementation of the EIA Directives and the current state of EIA law in Italy 
will be examined.
It is impossible to pinpoint a single reason as to why Italy has had such difficulty 
implementing EU environmental laws. Some of the explanation lies in history, some in 
the peculiarities of Italian culture, and much must be attributed to Italy’s notorious 
bureaucratic political and administrative systems. In the following pages, Italy’s 
difficulties are separated into 4 broad groups: Italy’s Late Start, its Political and 
Lawmaking Difficulties, its Convoluted Administrative Structure, and Corruption.
Within each group, subcategories of problems will be explored. While Italy’s late start 
with environmental protection and its political situation will be discussed first in order to
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follow a logical progression, relatively more time will be spent on the complicated 
administrative structure since that is an implementation problem with characteristics that 
can be applied to just about any EU member state. Corruption will then be addressed as 
it is one o f the impediments to effective implementation that is uniquely associated with 
Italy.
1. Italy’s Late Start
At least part o f the explanation for Italy’s difficulties in implementing EU 
environmental law can be pinned to its belated attempt to do so. This tardiness can be 
analyzed on three levels: the belated acceptance o f EU law, the belated acceptance of the 
environment as a political goal, and the belated existence o f popular environmentalism in 
Italy.
a. Belated Acceptance of EU Law
Italy was one o f the founding members o f the European Community. Presumably 
then, it would have come to understand the benefits and accept the challenges o f 
community membership at some point during the first 30 years o f its involvement in the 
EU. It has been involved from the start and is exceeded in electoral power only by 
Germany. Its size and longstanding membership would imply the ability to craft and 
influence EU policies in ways compatible with its own legal traditions, but this has not 
been the case. Instead Italy has been slow to accept the precedence of EU law, slow to 
implement its directives, and ineffective at enforcing EU laws even once transposed into 
law. Its record of violations before the Commission and ECJ, reviewed above, speaks for 
itself.
I l l
Part o f the reason Italy has had difficulties complying with community 
obligations is the fact that it didn’t even accept community law as supreme to national 
law until 1984, 30 years after joining the EC. The starting point for analyzing this delay 
is the role of the EC Treaty within Italian law. The EC Treaty was adopted in Italy by a 
normal parliamentary law, rather than through a constitutional amendment. The Italian 
Constitutional Court essentially had two choices: treat EC law as treaty law per Article 80 
o f the Constitution, in which case it would be on a level equal to that o f an ordinary 
statute, and thus subject to the whims of the legislature; or alternatively, treat the EC 
Treaty as a customary or general principle o f international law per Article 10 of the 
Constitution, in which case it would be supreme to normal parliamentary laws. The 
Constitutional Court waffled between these two interpretations for 20 years before opting 
for an entirely different solution in S.p.A. Granitoi v. Amminstrazione Finanziaria 
(1984).327 28 Prior to Granitoi, the Court had accepted the supremacy o f EC law in limited 
cases, with stipulated caveats such as the necessity for the Constitutional Court to first 
rule on the supremacy of a given EC provision when it conflicted with an Italian law. It 
had also attempted to limit the instances in which cases were referred to the ECJ, and said 
that EC principles could not trump fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution.329 
In Granitoi, the Court decided to treat Community law as neither a treaty nor general 
principle of international law, but rather as that of an external, autonomous legal system, 
with the consequence that it could not be subsequently modified by Parliament, and that
327 Act No. 1203, October 14,1957.
328 S.p.A. Granita!, v. Amministrazione finanziaria, Judgment No. 170 o f  June 8,1984, Corte Costituzionale.
329 See, Antonio La Pergola, Italy and European Integration: a Lawyer's Perspective, 4 Ind. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 259 (1994), for good review of the 4 important Italian cases interpreting the position of EC law.
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it would be immediately applicable in all national courts.330331 This interpretation stands 
today. If a Community provision is in conflict with a national law, the national law is not 
annulled or declared unconstitutional; it is simply to be ignored by the courts.30 132 Italy 
was the last of the then 10 Member States to accept the supremacy of EC law. This is the 
starting point for understanding why Italy has been so slow to adapt EC principles.
With regard environmental directives specifically, the impact of this delayed 
acceptance is not limited to specific instances o f  non-application prior to 1984. The fact 
that the national government and the Constitutional Court resisted the supremacy of 
Community Law for so long also may have affected the willingness of the State and 
Regional governments to do their part to secure implementation. In Brown’s 2000 study 
of the implementation of the EIA Directive in Scotland and Bavaria, he concluded that 
one of the key determinants of successful implementation, especially at the regional level, 
was the degree of buy-in from the national authorities.333 If  there isn’t validation and 
consistent application of Community norms in the national courts, how can the State and 
especially the Regional governments (who are already two steps removed from EU 
lawmaking) be expected to faithfully implement EU laws? The resistance of the Italian
330 For a discussion of this case and the role of EC law in Italy in general, see Antonio La Pergola and 
Patrick Del Luca, Community law, International law and the Italian Constitution, 79 Am. J. IntT L. 598 
(1985); Antonio La Pergola, Italy and European Integration: a Lawyer's Perspective, 4 Ind. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 259 (1994).
331 The Granital decision (supra note 328) was partially based on Article 11 o f  the Constitution, which said 
that Italy “shall agree, on conditions o f equality with other states, to such limitations of sovereignty as may 
be necessary to all for a legal system that will ensure peace and justice between nations.” This article is 
titled “Repudiation of War.” When the Constitution was ratified in 1948 following WWI1, certainly this 
provision wasn't made with an economic and social union like the EU in mind.
332 La Pergola, supra note 329, at p. 272. The Constitutional Court has reserved the right to strike down EC 
provisions that conflict with the basic principles o f the Constitution or the inalienable rights o f citizens.
33 See Brown, supra note 217, pp. 214-220 for an analysis o f the need to involve subnational governmental 
units in the EU environmental policymaking process in order to secure better enforcement of EU 
environmental directives.
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Courts to EC law throughout the 60s, 70s and 80s surely delayed the overall willingness 
o f governmental bodies to apply the community norms in good faith.
b. Political Apathy/Emphasis on Economic Development 
Mirroring the Italian courts* resistance to EU law has been the government’s 
resistance to EU law, especially EU environmental law. On paper, Italy is a member of 
the G7 (the seven largest economies in the world) and an economic powerhouse. 
Nevertheless it has been slow to embrace, from a political standpoint, the various social 
causes pursued by the EU and its Member States, again despite the fact that it was a 
founding member of the organization over 50 years ago. This is especially true relative 
to the importance it places on economic development. One former Minister of the 
Environment claimed “Environmentalist policy is conceived still, to a large degree, as 
something external, peripheral and sectoral with respect to the production and 
consumption processes. Its actions are principally understood as ex-post facto, for 
repairing damage and reducing destructive and polluting effects.”334
This apparent dichotomy (a rich nation still desperate for economic development 
at the expense of social issues) is at least partially attributable to the disparity in 
economic development between the north and south of the country. Despite longstanding 
and aggressive efforts from both the State and the EU,335 the south and north of Italy 
continue to have widely different socio-economic levels.336 It follows that the south of 
Italy has had the most instances o f derogation from environmental norms, while the
334 Minstero dell’Ambiente, 1st National Report on the State of the Environment (1989).
335 At the EU level, during the 70s and 80s the European Investment Bank made over 3 billion euros in 
environmental infrastructure loans, and Italy was by far the greatest recipient o f such loans. European 
Investment Bank, The EIB in 1989, at p. 5.
336 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, OECD Publication Service (Paris 1994), at p. 19. [herein, 
OECD 1994]
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northern regions have more advanced environmental regulatory systems. A second 
explanation is again one of timing. Italy’s rise to economic prominence took place 
largely during the 1970s,337 a period when other countries like the US that had huge 
economic growth in the post-war 1950s were already beginning to focus on post-material 
issues like the environment. Italy was still focused firmly on economic growth during the 
60s and 70s. As the next section on popular environmentalism will show, other social 
issues dominated the political landscape during the 60s and 70s, further delaying political 
focus on environmental issues.
Finally in 1987, * Verdi (The Green Party) managed to get some seats in the 
Italian Parliament, thus giving a voice for environmental issues among the competing 
political interests. Unfortunately i Verdi have never held more than 3% of the 
parliamentary seats.338 They have also suffered from a lack of leadership and direction 
and even ran two separate green tickets in some elections.339 The traditional political 
parties, on the other hand “have traditionally been allied with economic or business 
interests and have pandered to consumer interests.”340 While the small number of Greens 
in Parliament have not been able to wield much power, they have at least forced the 
major parties to think about environmental issues in the last decade, if only for fear of 
ceding more seats in the Parliament.
Despite these political advances during the 90s, political support remains firmly in 
favor o f economic development (especially under the current center-right Berlusconi
337 OECD 1994, supra note 336, at p .91.
338 Business Week European Edition, “Q&A: We are Pushing Like Hell”, with Green Party European 
Parliament Member Monica Frassioni, January 27,2003.
339 Mario Diani, Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement,
Edinburgh Univ. Press (Edinburgh 1995), atpp. 39-41.
340 Geoffrey Pridham and Michelle Cini, Enforcing Environmental Standards in the European Union: Is 
there a Southern Problem, in Michael Faure, et al, Environmental Standards in the European Union in an 
Interdisciplinary Framework, Maklu (Antwerp 1994).
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Government). In this political climate, it is easy to see how environmental legislation has 
been pushed to the back burner. There is some recent evidence of this aversion to EU 
environmental law. In 1999 the Commission took action against Italy under Article 10 of 
the EC Treaty, which requires Member States to cooperate in good faith with Community 
Institutions, for Italy’s failure to cooperate on environmental matters.341 Then in.a 2002 
speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said “this country takes orders 
from no one, including its European partners.” He went on to say that his European 
policy will tougher and more independent than Italy’s had been in the past.342 Again, if 
this is the message from the highest level o f government, should it come as a surprise that 
there is ineffective implementation o f EU environmental law at lower levels? The 
inability or unwillingness o f the Regions to timely pass EIA laws, discussed in greater 
detail below, can be traced at least in part to the absence of coherent political support for 
EC law from the national government, regardless of the political party in power.
c. Belated Emergence of Environmental Movement 
By looking at the development of populist environmentalism in Italy, one can get 
a clearer picture of why the government has been so slow to address environmental issues 
as just described. A popular misconception is that in Italy there was no environmental 
activism until very recently. In fact Environmental NGOs have long existed in Italy. In 
the early 20th century groups existed with a focus on protecting Italy’s cultural and 
artistic heritage. Environmental groups o f the modem variety came about somewhat
341 Commission of the European Communities, 17th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law (1999), Environment Chapter.
342 Melinda Henneberger, “Berlusconi Says Italy Won’t Take Europe’s Orders”, New York Times, January 
15,2002, See also, Henneberger, “Italy Cooling on Europe, and 2 Aides Explain Why”, New York Times, 
February 17,2002, describing Italy’s scaled back vision of European integration, with Great Britain serving 
as its model o f strength but independence.
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later: Italia Nostra was founded in 1955; the Italian branch o f World Wildlife Foundation 
(iWWF~Italia) was founded in 1966; the Italian branch of Friends o f the Earth (.Amici 
della Terra) in 1977; and LegaAmbiente in 1980.343 Other smaller groups with 
differentiated interests also existed and still exist today. The mere existence of these 
groups in the early years should not lead to the conclusion that they bore a lot of 
influence. For various reasons, their ability to influence politics was negligible until the 
1990s.
First of all, the various environmental groups rallied around two “camps” 
throughout much o f the 1970s. In one camp there were the preservationists, most notably 
backed by WWF-Italia, who tended to focus on creating national parks, protecting 
animals, and preserving the rich artistic and cultural heritage of Italy. In the other camp 
were the political ecologists, led by Lega Ambiente, who were more focused on pollution 
and industrial activity.344 Prior to the late 80s, both camps tended to be reactive and 
event-specific. They rallied and staged protests after major environmental events like the 
Seveso Dioxin incident345 in 1976, the decision by Italy to host cruise missiles in the 
early 80s, and the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster in 1986 (protests against the use o f nuclear 
power in Italy). The two groups didn’t really start to collaborate until the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster in 1986 (which happened to coincide with the creation of the Ministry of 
the Environment in Italy). It was only in 1986 that they began to jointly promote 
environmental referendum (e.g. referendum for the prohibition new nuclear power plants
343 Ibid, at p. 202.
344 Paolo Donati, Media Strength and Infrastructural Weakness: Recent Trends in the Italian 
Environmentalist Movement, European University Institute Working Paper SPS No. 94/14, at p. 4.
345 On July 10, 1976 a large amount o f dioxin gas escaped from a chemical plant just outside o f Milan, 
badly damaging the surrounding and causing some of the population to evacuate. In a bit of irony, the EU 
passed a directive in 1982 regulating the storage and use of hazardous substances that came to be known as 
the Seveso Directive. Italy was later brought before the ECJ for its failure to implement the Directive.
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in Italy), oppose development projects, engage in research and information 
dissemination, and lobby the legislative process.346 3478These modem environmentalist 
tactics were already commonplace in the US and other western States by the time the EU 
started heavily regulating the environment in the late 1980s. Italian NGO’s had to play 
“catch-up” in a sense as they refined their approach to influencing the Italian government 
to respond to increasing EU demands.
Wholly apart from the question of NGOs is the question of environmentalist 
sentiments among the population generally. In the years following the 2nd World War, 
Italy was focused on transforming itself from a still largely agricultural society to a 
modem economy. The focus of both politicians (as has already been described) and the 
people was squarely on economic development. It wasn’t until the 1970s that Italy saw a 
dramatic increase in industrialization and white collar, service oriented jobs. The 
emergence of a middle class with more disposable income and time enabled an increased 
post-materialist focus on social issues, and a focus generally on an improved quality of 
life.347 348 However, the “protest” movement in Italy during the turbulent 60s and 70s 
was focused mostly on social issues unique to Italian society: the heavy class-cleavages 
that still existed, on the right to abortion, and on the fight for power between the 
Catholics and the Communists.349 There wasn’t much energy left for environmental 
protests. Also, prior to the 80s environmentalism remained tied to the general anti- 
industrialist sentiments held by the still-strong communist/socialist parties in Italy. It 
wasn’t until these groups began to diminish in power in the late 1980s that people of
346 Donati, supra note 344, at p. 6.
347 Donati, supra note 344, at pp. 7-8.
348 Donati, supra note 344, at p. 34.
349 See generally, Diani, supra note 339.
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other political orientations felt comfortable embracing environmental causes without fear 
or risk o f being associated with the communists or socialists.350 351Again, these were 
problems uniquely found in Italy that slowed the drive towards environmental goals.
There is some disagreement over the level of environmentalism today in Italy. 
Opinion polls consistently show that concern for the protection o f the environment is at 
or above that of the EU average. However, one official in the Ministry of the
Environment described the level of environmental activism in Italy as “Zero”. According 
to her, residents only got involved in the EIA process, for example, when they were 
personally or financially impacted by an action.352 35Another member of an NGO 
complained that “there is no committee building. People are resigned to the status 
quo.” An Italian Green Party member in the EU Parliament responding to a question 
about the public’s response to Mafia “eco-crimes”, recently said “there’s no national 
reverberation of concern. And there’s very little information. Newpaper stories on eco- 
crimes appear one day, and then there’s no follow u p . . .  There’s just such a low level of 
awareness and a low level of public outrage and frustration.”354 However, another lawyer 
representing private interests complained o f  the continuous stream of environmental
350 Donati, supra note 344.
351 OECD 1994, supra note 336, at p. 19. [herein, OECD 1994] See also Rudy Lewanski, “Italy: 
Environmental Policy in a Fragmented State” , 1998, supra note [ ], at p. 135, or Lewanski, “Italy: Learning 
from International Co-operation or Simply ‘Following Suit” ’, in A. Underdal and Kenneth Hanf, 
International Environmental Agreements and Domestic Politics, at p. 259, Ashgate (Aldershot 2000). 
Lewanski points out that while the environmental movement grew throughout the 80s and 90s, this growth 
did not necessarily translate into willingness to take action or the capability to influence policy-making, 
which remained low mainly due to the fact that major political parties collect votes through a system of 
clientelism.
352 Interview at the Ministry of the Environment, Rome, Italy, with the Director o f EIA Programss, July 28, 
2003. [Herein, MoE Interview]
353 Interview with a member of the International Juridicial Organization for the Environment and 
Development, Rome, Italy, June 30,2003 [herein. IJOED Interview]. The interviewee wished to remain 
anonymous. UOED is a non-profit environmental advocacy group in Rome.
354 Business Week European Edition, interview with Monica Frassoni, supra note 338.
119
lawsuits facing her clients, especially EIA suits.355 It appears that the level of 
environmentalism may depend on the perspective of the person offering their opinion.
In any case, Italy did witness the emergence of established and active 
environmental organizations over the course of the late 80s and 90s. Italy regularly tops 
the list of environmental complaints submitted to the EU Commission, thanks no. doubt to 
the numerous violations for which the citizenry can complain, but also attributable to the 
activism of its environmental groups. Groups like WWF-Italia and Legambiente actively 
make legal claims in environmental matters, and do so jointly. For example, when the 
Government in 2001 passed the controversial Legge Obiettivo (to be discussed in detail 
below), which streamlines the EIA process for certain infrastructure projects, i Verdi, 
WWF~Italia, Legambiente, and Greenpeace-Jtalia jointly signed a statement of 
opposition directed towards the Ministry of the Environment.356 NGOs have also played 
something of a role within the Ministry of the Environment, sometimes participating in 
decision-making processes or being solicited as advisors to the MoE.
Regardless of conclusions as to the level of environmentalism in Italy today, the 
main point to recognize when looking at the development o f environmentalism in Italy is 
that in most western countries, this evolution took place during the 60s and to some 
extent the 70s, as opposed to the 70s and 80s as in Italy. Prior to the late 80s, the Italian 
environmentalists’ efforts to lobby the government to create environmental legislation 
and institutions had only been sporadic, and responsive to specific crises. This further 
placed Italy at a disadvantage relative to its EU counterparts when it came to the task of
355 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311.
356 Legambiente, Appello al Ministro per l ’Ambiente ed al Ministro per I Beni e le Attività’ Culturali per 
Salvare La Valutazione di Impatto Ambientale, Rome (Aprii 10,2002).
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implementing the onslaught of EU environmental legislation in the late 80s as there was 
not an established citizenry or NGO network to help spur the government along.
2. Political and Legislative Difficulties
In Section 1 above we have reviewed how Italy’s relatively late start in accepting 
EU law, in tackling environmental issues at the political level, and in general 
environmental activism negatively impacted its ability to implement EU environmental 
regulations when the EU increasingly started regulating in this area in the mid-1980s. 
Turning away from history, we now look to current aspects of the political and legislative 
system that impede successful implementation o f EU environmental directives. We will 
first examine Italy’s notorious political volatility, then look at the problem of “Politics o f 
Emergency”, and lastly but most importantly we’ll examine the complicated Italian 
legislative process. As these are problems of application, the experiences with the EIA 
Directive in Italy will be referenced to help illustrate the problems.
a. Political Volatility and the Predominance of Party Politics 
Continuing with the theme o f the political environment and its influence on the 
implementation of EU environmental law, we examine another obstacle in Italy: the 
instability o f governments and the susceptibility of the government to party politics. First 
an example of the volatility during the 1990s is offered. Between 1994 and 1996, a 
center-right coalition took power (Berlusconi’s first term), gave way 7 months later to a 
technocratic non-partisan party, which was replaced 16 months later by a center left 
coalition.357 It is difficult to envision meaningful political strides in any area when the 
Parliament and Government are changing so frequently. As noted above, in the
357 Martin A. Rogoff, Federalism in Italy and the Relevance o f  the American Experience, 12 Tul. Eur. & 
Civ. L.F. 65, 67 (1997).
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environmental area typically the Parliament only issues framework legislation. It is up to 
the Government (executive) branch to issue detailed implementing regulations. The 
Prime Minister is the head of the Government and gets to appoint his cabinet i.e. he 
appoints the head of the Ministry o f the Environment, the Ministry o f Defense, etc.358 
The Government can have a powerful effect on environmental regulation by delaying 
passage of implementing regulations, passing watered-down regulations, or by passing 
entirely new decrees wiping away prior law. On a more general level, the Government 
can drastically affect environmental policy depending on the person it appoints as the 
Minister of the Environment Prime Minister Berlusconi did just this during his first stint 
in office (1994-1995), appointing as the Minister of the Environment a neo-conservative 
who openly professed his support for nuclear energy, more highways, and hunting in 
national parks.359 To the contrary, when Romano Prodi’s center left government took 
power many favorable actions were taken with respect to the environment.360 More 
recently, as we will see below, the current Berlusconi Government garnered support for a 
Parliamentary Act establishing a special, fast-track EIA procedure for large national 
infrastructure projects. In a change that would have a more global effect, Berlusconi has 
introduced legislation into the Parliament whereby his Government would appoint a 
committee to draft a comprehensive environmental law framework, after which the 
Berlusconi government itself would draft entirely new implementing legislation.361 
There is widespread consensus (and fear) that the overhauled laws would heavily favor
338 The Prime Minister and his selected cabinet must then be approved by a majority o f both houses of 
Parliament. Vincenzo Sinisi, et al, Environmental Law o f  Italy, in J. Andrew Schlickman, et al 
International Environmental Law and Regulation, Butterworth Legal Publishers (Salem 1991).
359 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351, at p. 137.
360 Ibid.
361 Roberto Ferrigno, A Case Study on the Implentation of EU Environmental Legislation: Italy, European 
Environmental Bureau Publication, Brussels, March 2003.
business interests. Broad political shifts in this direction signal trouble for the successful 
implementation of HU environmental directives. More generally, whether the change is 
in a pro-business or pro-environmental direction, the fact that a change in the 
administration can result in such drastic changes in the approach towards the environment 
is itself an impediment to the development o f  a coherent, long-term environmental 
strategy.
The effects o f sudden and drastic switches in Government policy are also felt 
lower down the chain within the Government itself. One official in the Ministry of the 
Environment complained that the whole structure o f the EIA department had changed 
since Berlusconi took power, and that many officials had been let go or forced to find 
other positions. She also cautioned that the willingness and effectiveness of participation 
by NGOs in MoE activities was highly dependent on which political party was in 
power. Berlusconi also recently changed the process under which environmental 
decisions are made, requiring all major environmental decisions to be directly reviewed 
by his personally appointed Ministry of the Environment.* 363
It must be acknowledged that in the US, when the executive branch changes over, 
a similar process takes place whereby new officials are appointed heads of Federal 
Agencies, including the EPA. The US experience has mirrored Italy’s over the past few 
years. The right leaning Bush administration roll back numerous Clean Air Act 
implementing regulations and open up protected federal lands to mining and oil 
exploration. The problem in the US is slightly less exaggerated since (1) political 
changes in the executive branch occur at most every 4 years; (2) the EPA rulemaking
562 OECD 1994, supra note 336. MoE Interview, supra note 352.
363 This change will be examined in greater detail in a later section on the lack o f a strong central 
environmental authority in Italy.
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process is arduous and lobbies on both side of the equation heavily participate in the 
process; (3) due to the civil service patronage system, workers lower down the chain 
cannot be fired. Even if  the policy from the top is subject to change, at least some 
consistency can be maintained at the actual working level. Lower level employees have 
much discretion over the cases they choose to prosecute, and thus can maintain some 
consistency in the face o f administrative change.364 Still, partisan politics in the US, as in 
Italy, can have a notable impact on environmental protection.
The effects of this political volatility in Italy can be particularly strong in the 
national EIA process since the judgment of environmental compatibility on a project rests 
largely in the hands o f the Minister o f the Environment. Granted this decision is made 
under the advice and counsel of other Ministries, the involved region(s), and the EIA 
Commission,365 but the ultimate decision still rests with the actual Minister, subject to his 
political preferences and perhaps more importantly those of the Prime Minister who 
personally appointed him/her. The heads o f the other Ministries are also chosen by the 
Prime Minister, and the members of the EIA Commission are nominated by the MoE, so 
ultimately the Prime Minister’s political preferences are likely to prevail when the 
decision on environmental compatibility is made. At the local level, the problem of 
political volatility appears to be the same. One study of the implementation of the EU’s 
Local Agenda 21 (a program that encourages local sustainable development) in Italy 
found one of the biggest problems of implementing the program was that “[difficulty has 
been found in making durable choices, in part due to the frequent political changes in
364 The author was an intern in the EPA’s Region 9 Office of Regional Counsel in 2001 when the Bush 
Administration took office. While there was concern with the overall course the EPA would chart in the 
coming years, prosecuting attorneys still had discretion over which cases they would try and how they 
would try them.
365 Law No. 349 of 1986, Article 6.
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local governments . . .  whose actions are very often annulled by their successors.”366 
Whether at the national or local level, the EIA process and therefore the achievement o f 
the EU objectives in the Directive inevitably suffer if the impartiality of the decisions or 
the process constantly fluctuates with the political climate.
b. Politics o f Emergency
In the discussion of the history o f  Italian environmental law above, it was noted 
that during the 60s and 70s, the few environmental laws that were passed were passed 
were mainly in response to public concerns, and were not part o f  any strategic approach 
to environmental protection. It was until 1986,10 to 15 years after most other western 
nations, that Italy created a separate Ministry for environmental protection. Even since 
the creation of the MoE and the recognition o f certain environmental goals in Law No.
349 o f 1986, environmental legislation has not been adopted with a view to creating an 
overall regulatory approach to the environment. Instead, isolated legislative acts have 
been pursued, either in response to pressure from the EU to implement Directives, or in 
response to domestic or international crises.367 368In the literature, this Italian practice has 
come to be referred to as “the politics o f emergency”.
We have already seen above that the Italian environmental movement only tends 
to mobilize around big issues like as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Seveso dioxin 
incident, or the rising seas in Venice. The State tends to respond to these emergencies 
with hasty legislative acts or more frequently, government decrees, rather than taking a 
calculated approach free from emergency politics. This has resulted in both ineffective
366 Grazia Bmnetta and Egidio Dansero, Planning Sustainability in Urban Policies: the Italian Perspective 
After the Aalborg Conference, 6 European Urban and Regional Studies 3 ,280  (1999).
307 See e.g., Rodolfo Lewanski (2000), supra note [ ], a tp . 262.
368 See e.g. OECD 2002, supra note 274, at p. 129.
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legislation, and an excessive numbers of laws. As new Governments take power, old 
laws are either ignored or new laws are passed, sometimes without even repealing the old 
ones. Even the Ecology Unit of the Carabinieri, the primary group charged with the 
enforcement of environmental laws, complained that “it is difficult to interpret the laws 
and regulations because there are so many of them and because they stem from so many 
sources and are often mutually incompatible.*’369 If the Ecology Unit can’t figure has 
difficult sifting through the myriad regulations, how can local government bodies expect 
to apply the laws con-ectly? How can regulated parties be expected to understand the 
laws?
The Italian government’s response to the Commission’s urging to implement EU 
environmental laws was to initiate a process whereby all EU directives are transposed as 
part o f an omnibus “La Pergola” bill as described above. Clearly such laws are not going 
to be well conceived if  they are simply being pushed through en masse to satisfy EU 
obligations. The body o f Italian EIA laws demonstrates well the difficulties 
implementing EU environmental directives. First of all, the Italian government was 
criticized for trying to outline the entire EIA procedure in a single article of Law No. 349 
o f  1986.370 Though it has contemplated it, the government has never succeeded in 
passing an overarching EIA law similar to NEPA in the US. Instead it has passed 
numerous laws, decrees, delegations to the regions, not to mention discipline specific 
EIA laws for certain types of projects. Between 1988 and 1994, at least 20 different EIA 
laws were passed at the national level, and these only addressed projects in Annex I of
369 OECD 1994, supra note 336, at p. 102.
370 Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, The Environmental Impact Assessment in Italian Legislation, LIM Thesis, 
University of California, Berkeley, May 25, 1992, at p. 10.
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the EIA Directive!371 The attached table listing Italian EIA Legislation is daunting (See 
Annex). It lists over 40 different laws, decrees, circulars, etc. governing to EIA in Italy. 
And the table is by no means complete; it is merely an ad hoc compilation by this author 
over the course o f 2 years of research. If one must first decipher this maze of legislation 
before going about the business o f assessing environmental impacts, clearly there is 
something lacking in the way the Italian government has approached environmental 
protection.
c. Complexity o f the Legislative Arrangement
Summarizing the discussion of political impediments to implementation to this 
point, we have seen that Italy has passed environmental laws primarily to satisfy its 
obligations to the EU, or in response to environmental crises. Moreover, a sea of laws, 
decrees and circulars tend to control any given area of environmental protection, due in 
part to partisan politics in Italy and the ease with which a new Government can change 
the course on environmental matters. Aggravating these problems is a legislative system 
that requires several delegations, starting at the EU level and often finishing in the local 
Mayor’s office, in order to implement an EU environmental directive.
The delegation problem could be termed the ‘Telephone Game” effect. In the 
Telephone Game, a group of school children sit in a circle. The teacher whispers a 
sentence into one student’s ear, and asks the student to whisper it to his or her neighbor. 
This process is replicated from student to student until the message has made its way all 
the way around the circle, at which time the teacher asks the last student to repeat the 
sentence. Even among the brightest of school children, the sentence “Students should 
help keep our environment clean” inevitably transforms into “Students could clean the
371 R. Marchetti, supra note 272, at p. 204.
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environment” or some other variation upon the original. A message has arrived after 
some delay, and it bears some resemblance to the original message, but something has 
been lost in the transfer from student to student. The loss can stem from natural human 
error or from a deliberate choice by a non-compliant student to alter the message.
Similarly with the implementation o f EU environmental directives in Italy, there 
are numerous transfer points at which the EU message can get lost. For everything to go 
right, first the EU must pass a logical and coherent directive. Then Italy’s parliament 
must pass a framework law delegating responsibility to the Government (e.g. to the Prime 
Minister/Executive Branch) to create more specific implementing measures. Then the 
Government, usually with the assistance of the Ministry of the Environment, must issue a 
legislative decree or, alternatively, a law decree, itself a framework law delegating more 
detailed regulations to the Regions. In addition, the Government (through its Ministries) 
may issue regolamenti (regulations) or circulars, neither of which is binding law, but 
which in theory are to be adhered to by the entities to who they are addressed. At this 
point, the Regions have to enact implementing laws. Obviously these laws must 
implement the substance of the National law/decree/circular/regulation, but they may also 
need to delineate the balance of procedural responsibilities as between the Region itself, 
the provinces, and the municipalities. Finally, in most cases it is the municipalities and 
indeed the Mayor himself that must identify violations of said regulations or otherwise 
take responsibility for application o f the laws. As each “student” delegates responsibility 
to the next “student”, there is the risk of error in transfer, or the risk o f deliberate 
deviation (for political reasons or otherwise) from the mandates o f the original EU 372
372 For a good general discussion of lawmaking in Italy, see Mary Ellen Sikabonyi, Italyy in Dennis 
Campbell, Environmental Regulation: Its Impact on Foreign Investment, Graham & Trotman (London 
1992)
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directive. In the end, something o f the original EU intent is bound to be lost, and thus the 
consistent application of the EU’s environmental policies is jeopardized. Italy’s 
experience with the EIA Directive demonstrates perfectly the issues raised by the 
‘‘telephone game”. The proliferation of EIA laws has already been mentioned. Later, the 
numerous delays and difficulties in attaining full implementation of the Directive will be 
addressed in the description of EIA’s legislative history in Italy.
3. Convoluted Administrative Structure 
Thus far two major categories of problems affecting Italy’s successful 
implementation o f EU environmental directives have been described. The first category 
related to Italy’s relative tardiness in embracing EU law and environmental issues in 
general. The second major category had to do with the difficulties created by Italy’s 
political system and complicated lawmaking process. We now focus on perhaps the most 
important category impeding implementation: Italy’s convoluted administrative structure. 
This category is important both because it is such a glaring problem in Italy and because 
the problem is one that can be readily observed in other Member States, not just Italy. In 
Italy it is a complex problem that involves the dynamics between the MoE and the rest of 
the Government, the dynamics between the State and the Regions, the dynamics between 
the different Regions, and the overall dynamics of an environmental regulatory scheme 
where all o f these entities must mesh within the unique Italian culture in order for the 
system to work. Each of these dynamics will be dealt with in the following sections.
a. Lack of Strong Central Environmental Authority and 
Ministry Infighting
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The first source of administrative weakness emanates from the power struggle 
between the MoE and the rest of the Government. As was recounted above, Italy did not 
even have a centralized environmental authority prior to the establishment of the MoE in 
1986. This was in contrast to other Member States like Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, which had fairly advanced 
environmental programs prior to the onslaught of EU environmental legislation in the late 
80s.373 Even once established, the Moe has suffered from a lack of resources and a lack 
o f autonomy due to the many competences that it must share with other, more powerful 
Ministries. Part of the problem lies in history.374 Before the creation of the MoE in 1986, 
the few existing environmental responsibilities were handled by Inter-Ministerial 
Committees. For example, the 1976 Water Protection act was overseen by a committee 
o f  representatives from the Ministry for Public Works, the Ministry for the Navy, and the 
Ministry for Public Health.375 The regulation of solid waste was controlled by the same 
committee, but with additional members from the Ministry of Industry, Ministry for 
Internal Affairs, and the Ministry for Agriculture.376 One can only imagine the Ministry 
o f Public Health and the Ministry of Industry at the table trying to reach consensus on 
environmental matters. At one point an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Environmental 
Protection was created which was supposed to co-ordinate various powers that were 
dispersed among 16 different ministries.377 This attempt, like the other Inter-Ministerial
373 See Smith, supra note 76.
374 For a good summary of the institutional setting and the relations between the ministries, see Lewanski 
(1998), supra note 351.
373 Sinisi, supra note 358, at p. It-8.
373 Ibid.
377 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351, at p. 134.
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committees, failed due to continuous gridlock or at best only compromised solutions to 
environmental problems.
It was on the heels of these failures that the MoE was finally created in 1986. 
Unfortunately when the MoE was formed, the existing Ministries wanted to “protect their 
turf’. Through their strong lobbying, many environmental responsibilities remained 
spread about the different Ministries.378 For example, Ministry o f Public Works retained 
its powers in water management and urban planning; the Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
retained jurisdiction over particularly sensitive environmental areas; and the Ministry of 
Health retained the majority of control over air quality issues.379 Also, the use of inter- 
ministeral committees that existed prior to the creation of the MoE was institutionalized 
by the 1986 law that created the MoE. Articles 2 ,3 ,6 ,7  and 8 o f the 1986 Law include 
dozens o f provisions requiring the MoE to carry out its work in collaboration with other 
Ministries. As one author points out “In its original design, the procedure was seen as a 
tool to strike a balance between the various interests at stake, by means of intervention in 
the decision-making process by several ministers, each with different priorities. In 
practice, the most remarkable consequence o f  the mass introduction of the concerted 
decision-making procedure has been in most cases a considerable lengthening and a 
remarkable complication of the administrative procedures, with the result o f rendering the 
pursuit o f a consistent policy in the sphere o f  environmental protection very difficult.*’380 
The MoE to this day shares many environmental responsibilities with other Ministries,
378 See OECD 1994, supra note 336, at pp. 27-28, for an overview o f responsibilities shared with other 
ministries, as of 1994.
379 Clifford Chance, European Environmental Law Guide, London (1992).
310 F. Francioni and M. Montini, supra note 302, at p. 248.
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including some relating to EIA, although the MoE has slowly been consolidating its 
power over the years.
Another lens through which to see the weakness of the MoE is by looking at the 
resources available to it, especially relative to the other Ministries. As recently as 1994, 
the MoE didn’t even have a unified office in Rome. Officials were dispersed about 4 
different Ministries.381 While the offices were eventually consolidated, today even the 
geographic location o f the MoE offices belies its role in the Government: while in route 
to the Ministry for an interview, the cab driver noted that the MoE was “fuori mure", 
Roman parlance indicating that the office was located outside the ancient walls of the 
city. Perhaps symbolically, the Ministry of Finance is located in a prominent building 
precisely in the historical center of the city. As of 1993, the MoE had only 2.8 staff 
members per million inhabitants, the lowest of any European country. In 1992 the MoE 
had 164 officials, as compared to 30,000 total officials in the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Industry, Merchant Marine, Transport and Public Works.382 The numbers are dated, but 
the situation has not improved dramatically since the early 90s.383 384The reduction of 
government ministries from 18 to 12 in 1999 was a step in the right direction, and 
resulted in more personnel and resources being allocated to the newly named Ministry of 
Environment and Land Protection [hereinafter it will still be referred to as the MoE or 
Ministry of the Environment]. Despite the additional resources allocated, the MoE never 
managed to disburse more than 52% of its allocated funds from 199I-2000.354 And
381 Geoffrey Pridham, National Environmental Policy-Making in the European Framework: Spain. Greece, 
and Italy in Comparison, in Andrew Jordan, Environmental Policy in the European Union: Actors. 
Institutions and Processes, Earthscan (London 2002).
382 OECD 1994, supra note 336, at p. 96.
383 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351, at pp. 140-141 for a description of the resource problems still 
existing at the end of the 1990s.
384 OECD 2002, supra note 274, at p. 123.
allocated funds are $1 billion euro less in 2003 than they were in 2000, reflecting a 
downward trend that started when the current Berlusconi administration came to power. 
Earlier this month a member of a non-governmental organization in Rome related “I was 
at the Ministry of the Environment this morning -  it is evident there is a money shortage, 
(nothing works from the elevators to the photocopy machines). Hopefully it was-only 
today, but they are in a very stressed, overworked situation.”385 An official at the MoE 
acknowledged the same problem within the EIA department, commenting “I don’t even 
have a printer right now.”386 She also pointed out that the EIA division had recently been 
split among different offices, and that her and her group were now employees of Price 
Waterhouse Consultants, on contract to the Government, though in the same offices 
doing the same work. The lack o f resources allocated to the MoE relative to the other 
Ministries undoubtedly diminishes the role o f environmental protection relative to other 
governmental interests, and more generally impedes the effective functioning of the 
MoE.
Both the ministry infighting and the lack of adequate resources for the MoE 
adversely impacted EIA procedures in Italy. The Ministry of Public Works and the 
Ministry o f Industry attempted from the outset to narrow the application of the EIA 
Directive, first by exerting pressure on Parliament during the legislative process, and later 
by insisting on a narrow interpretation o f the procedures required by the EIA law or the 
projects to which it was applicable.387 In addition, EIA law requires the MoE to consult 
and make its decision o f environmental compatibility jointly with the Ministry of Cultural 
Heritage. If the Ministry in charge of the project disagrees with the decision o f the MoE,
383 NGO Interview, supra note 353.
386 MoE Interview, supra note 352,
387 Mattarella, supra note 370, at pp. 68,70.
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it can appeal it to the Council of Ministers (a broader pool of representatives from all the 
Ministries) for a final decision.388 The independence of the MoE is severely 
compromised under this scheme, since it knows that its decisions could ultimately be 
subject to the approval of all the other (more powerful) Ministries.
Some recent maneuvering with regard to the MoE should be noted. Act No. 300 
o f  1999 sought to alleviate some of the organizational problems of the Ministry system in 
general, for example by reducing the number o f ministries from 18 to 12.389 In June 2003 
a Presidential Decree was signed by the Berlusconi administration restructuring the MoE 
into 6 Directorate Generals. Unfortunately prior to this in March 2003, the cabinet head 
and Minister distributed a circular to all MoE staff requiring that any information relating 
to any attempt to resolve an environmental issue must first be sent to the Minister’s office 
before final resolution. This measure was criticized as “paralyzing the Ministry, 
concentrating power in the hands o f Minister Matteoli and his Chief of Cabinet, in a 
dangerous alliance between the political right and administrative functions. . .  some joke 
that [the MoE] should be renamed the ‘Ministero degli AfFari ambientale” [Ministry of 
the Business Environment].390 Moreover, o f the $1.7 billion euro allocated to the MoE in 
the 2003 budget, $1.24 billion is allocated directly to the “Cabinet and Offices of Direct 
Collaboration with the Minister’s Projects.” The move in 1999 to reduce the number of 
ministries from 18 to 12 was a legitimate effort to streamline the administrative 
bureaucracy, and had the potential to result in a stronger MoE. Regrettably the 2003
388 Law No. 349 o f 1986, Art 6, Paras. 3-6.
389 Sec generally, Vincenzo Ferraro, The Progress o f  Italian Administrative Reform in 1999,7  European 
Public Law 10 (2001).
390 Giovanni Valentini, "Ambiente, il ‘golpc’ di Matteoli esautorati i dirigenti del ministero”, La 
Repubblica, June 3,2003, p. 25. Translation by author. All of the above discussion on the reforms in 2003 
is derived from this article.
134
maneuvering to centralize all decision-making in the hands of Berlusconi’s handpicked 
Minister is probably not an effort towards creating a stronger MoE, but rather an effort to 
ensure that business interests prevail when it comes to environmental issues. It is too 
soon to tell if  either reform has achieved its goal, though interview subjects seemed to 
think that the MoE was still riddled in bureaucracy, with increasingly less concern for 
environmental protection under Berlusconi’s watch. The regrettable consequences of this 
with respect to EIA are highlighted below in the discussion of the recent Legge Obiettivo, 
a law that rolls back many existing EIA provisions in Italy.
b. State/Regional Struggle
The role o f the Regions in effective implementation of environmental laws cannot
be overstated.391 For example in the EIA context only a small share of all projects fall
under the domain o f the national EIA procedure which is under the supervision of the
MoE. The bulk o f the responsibility for implementing the EIA Directive falls to the
Regions. From an administrative standpoint, the longstanding struggle for power
between the Regions and the State fragments the entire environmental protection system.
The Director o f the EIA Centre in Milan commented on how the murky division of
powers has affected the implementation o f EIA laws in Italy:
“The peculiar way in which EIA has been introduced in Italy is probably 
due to the fact that a rational and effective settlement of the matter would 
have entailed the solution of some very knotty but crucial problems like 
the reform of public administration and the relationships between Roman 
and common law. For the politicians this is too difficult a task, which is 
not politically rewarding or, in their opinion, particularly urgent.
351 See Brown, supra note 217, for a discussion o f the importance o f “subnational” political entities in the 
implementation o f  EU environmental law. Brown compared the implementation of the EIA Directive in 
Scotland and Bavaria to emphasize how different subnational structures could result in different levels of 
enforcement on the ground, wholly apart from difference at the Member State level.
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Accordingly, they feel it is better to do the minimum required to fulfill the
Commission’s request. .  ”392 39
There has been an ongoing struggle between the Regions and the State as to who 
has control over environmental regulation. The starting point for understanding the 
division of powers between the Regions and the State is the Constitution. The 
Constitution seems to place at least some of the control within the hands of the central 
government. Article 9(2) provides that the Republic shall “protect the landscape”, and 
Article 32 says that the Republic shall protect “health as a fundamental right of 
individuals. But Article 117 of the original Constitution also gave the Regions some 
legislative powers with regard to environmental matters, particularly with regard to land- 
use planning, public works, and mineral and spring waters, subject to the caveat that this 
legislation didn’t conflict with national interests. Article 118 granted regions the power 
to set up administrative functions for the legislative rights granted to them by Article 117. 
All residual powers were impliedly reserved to the State (in contrast to the US 10th 
Amendment which reserves non-enumerated federal powers to the states). However, the 
precise contours of these powers were hardly clear from the Constitution. The result has 
been a seemingly endless stream of legislation, Constitutional Court interpretations, and 
even a Constitutional amendment in 2001. Some of these "clarifications” addressed the 
division of State/Regional powers generally, while others focused on specific sectors 
such as the environment or even more specifically on individual disciplines such as EIA. 
The resulting confusion has only served to further cloud the development of 
environmental law in Italy.
392 EIA Newsletter 10, Environmental Assessment Within the European Union, Environmental Assessment 
in Italy, http://www.art.man,ac.uk/EIA/nllOeuit.htm (1995).
393 Italian Constitution (1948).
The Constitutional measures allocating powers to the Regions weren’t even given 
effect until 1968, when a law was passed setting up the Regional Councils.394 Two 
Presidential Decrees were issued in 1972 to further implement the devolution process. In 
1977, the President of the Republic issued a decree specifying that the regulation of 
public health, including air, water and noise pollution fell to the regions.395 Nonetheless 
some o f these powers remained with the state (e.g. air auto emissions), and the degree of 
delegation to the regions was generally unclear. There was an obvious tension in the 
Regions when, in 1986, Law No. 349 created the national Ministry of the Environment 
and vested in it the broad power to determine a national plan for environmental 
protection.396 Over time, the Ministry’s areas of competence grew, and other laws were 
passed that consolidated environmental powers in the Ministry. The constitutionality of 
these laws was challenged several times by the Regions on the grounds that they were in 
direct contradiction to the Article 117 powers vested in the regions to regulate the 
environment.397 The Constitutional Court typically rebuffed these challenges, instead 
taking a moderate opinion that the environment was a unitary public good of such 
importance that, at a minimum, national framework laws could be created for its 
protection.398 At other times, though, the Court accepted the Regions’ contentions that 
national intervention was unjustified, stating that “regions cannot be denied a 
constitutional competence in the field o f protection of the environment.”399
394 See Rogoff, supra note 357, at p. 75.
395 Law No. 616 o f 24 July 1977, Article 101. See also, Sikabonyi, supra note 372, at p. 357.
396 Law No. 349,8 July 1986, at Arts. 1,2.
397 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 364.
398 See Environmental Law in Europe, supra note 56, at p. 364.
399 Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 183 o f 22 May 1987. Other judgments include No. 177 of of 
18 February 1988, No. 242 o f 28 April 1989 and No. 389 of 11 July 1989
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Independently o f the Constitutional Court’s pronouncements, numerous 
legislative attempts were made throughout the 1990s to better define the allocation of 
administrative tasks. For instance, in an effort towards administrative efficiency, Act No. 
142/1990 allocated many administrative responsibilities in the environmental area to the 
Provinces.400 From 1983 to 1997, three Parliamentary Commissions for Constitutional 
Reform were initiated with a view to restructuring the State/Regional governing structure. 
Each failed for lack of political consensus, the most recent in 1997 when (then) 
opposition leader Silvio Berlusconi withdrew his support for the revisions, effectively 
grounding the reform efforts.401 Between 1997 and 1999, the four so-called “Bassanini 
Acts” were passed with the goal of reforming public administration.402 These were 
passed via ordinary laws rather than through the more permanent step o f amending 
Article 117 of the Constitution. The most important o f the Bassanini Acts was Act No. 
59/97, which transferred a significant number o f functions from the State to the 
Regions 403 Act No. 59/97 listed those administrative matters to be retained by the state, 
leaving all others to the Regions and Municipalities. Decree 112 of 31 March 1998 
sought to implement Act No. 59/97 with specific regard to environmental matters. Under 
Decree No. 112, environmental regulation was to be delegated to the Regions; however 
the regulation of matters requiring uniformity throughout the State was to be reserved to 
the State. The State was also to reserve the powers of policy-making and coordination, as 
well as the power of intervention when Regions failed to fulfill their obligations or acted
400 See generally, F. Francioni and M. Montini, supra note 302, at p. 243-244.
401 Rogoff, supra note 357, at pp. 69-70,95.
402 See generally, Cristiano Musillo, Italian Administrative Reform: Its Completion and Implementation, 5 
European Public Law 3, at 363 (1999).
403 Act No. 59/97 (Bassanini 1) was modified by Bassanini 3 in 1998, but the changes are not material to 
this discussion.
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against the national interest.404 Thus the environment was an area of “shared 
competence”, to steal a term from the European Union vocabulary, whose contours 
weren’t clearly defined by the reform laws or the Constitutional Court’s pronouncements.
Finally in 2001, Constitutional Law No. 3 was passed, making important 
modifications to Title V of the Constitution.405 There are four important “global’’ 
changes in the amended constitution. First, Article 117 now lists exclusive and 
concurrent State powers; all other powers are now presumed to reside in the Regions. In 
the old version the Regions’ legislative powers were enumerated and all others were 
impliedly left to the State. Second, a new category of “concurrent” legislative powers has 
been introduced (those for which both the State and Regions can pass laws). Third, it is 
presumed that all administrative functions reside in the municipalities (the smallest 
political entity) unless explicitly assigned to the State, Regions, or Provinces. Under the 
old Article 118, administrative powers were presumed to lie with the Regions in 
correspondence to their legislative powers listed in the old Article 117, while the 
remaining administrative responsibilities were reserved to the State. Lastly, the revised 
Constitution took away from the State the power it formerly had to review the legitimacy 
of Regional laws. Any challenges now must take place in the Constitutional Court.
While falling short of total devolution or the creation o f a federal state, the 2001 
constitutional reforms definitely increased the powers o f the Regions, at least on paper.
404 Musillo, supra note 402, at 366.
405 Constitutional Law No. 3 of 18 October 2001. The law was passed by a solid 64% of the voters, though 
in a tribute to Italian ambivalence, only 34% of eligible voters participated in the vote for the most 
significant constitutional reform since the Constitution was adopted in 1948. For a discussion of the 
constitutional amendment as it relates to environmental law, see Eiminio Ferrari, Planning, Building and 
Environmental Law after the Recent Italian Devolution, 8 European Public Law 3,357 (2002). Ferrari 
believes that though the Constitution seems to grant environmental legislative powers exclusively to the 
state, only time will tell how the division will operate in practice (at p. 364).
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So where does environmental protection fall under the new Constitution? Not 
surprisingly, it is not entirely clear. In Article 117(2), the State is given exclusive 
legislative power over “(s) protection o f the environment, o f the ecosystem and of the 
cultural heritage.” However, among the concurrent legislative powers listed in Article 
117(3) are “health protection”, “land-use regulation and planning”, and “promotion of the 
environmental and cultural heritage.” Based on those 3 categories, the Regions could 
probably justify just about any legislation relating to the environment, in spite the fact 
that environmental protection is listed as one o f the exclusive State powers. Where EIA 
falls is also unclear. Is EIA considered to fall under the ambit of “land-use regulation and 
planning”, thereby rendering it a Regional competence, or does it fall under the more 
general State competence to “protect the environment’? Regardless o f the answer to this 
question, it seems entirely theoretical. Most Regions have already adopted EIA laws and 
administer them for non-State projects. It seems unlikely that this Constitutional 
amendment will change that reality.406
If the above discussion seems complicated for the reader, it has been no less 
complicated for the State, Regions, and citizens of Italy. The effect in practice of this 
National/Regional ambiguity has been a type o f middle ground, whereby the national 
government issues broad framework laws for environmental protection and sets policy, 
and then the Regions enact detailed implementing regulations in response to these 
delegations. Thus, much like the national government, the regions employ a patchwork 
system of environmental regulation since they are forced to respond to State 
requirements, rather than creating a comprehensive approach (at least on a regional level)
406 See OECD 2002, supra note 274, at p. 149, stating the obvious “It appears that the division of power is 
not yet clear.”
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to environmental protection. Instead each region has a multitude o f regulations 
implementing national decrees, and these regulations vary greatly from Region to 
Region. Additionally, Regions and the State waste time and energy “protecting their 
turf", especially in the administration of the laws, rather than focusing on the business of 
environmental protection. Meanwhile, important aspects o f an effective environmental 
regulatory program, such as planning and monitoring mechanisms, efficient data 
collection, regularly available environmental information and advanced environmental 
research all suffer due to the uncertain division o f power between the State and the 
Regions.407 Unfortunately, the issue remains unresolved. As recently as 2002 the 
Constitutional Court made another attempt to clarify the division o f environmental 
powers, this time in light of the 2001 Constitutional Amendments. The Court’s analysis 
fell on the side o f more regional control, but it used the normal caveats and qualifications 
about the national capacity to set policy, thereby rendering the holding predictably 
unclear.408 In the summer o f 2003, there were renewed calls for further “devolution” to 
the Regions or at least a clarification of the existing situation,409 but at the time of 
publishing the issue had not yet been resolved by the government. The uncertain division 
of powers continues to make complete implementation o f EU environmental directives 
difficult.
c. Variation Among Regions
To reiterate, regardless o f the legal resolution of the State/Regional struggle for 
power, significant environmental powers are now vested in the Regions, and in any case
407 See Pridham, supra note 381, at p. 88, See also, OECD 2002, supra note 274, at p. 31,
408 Constitutional Court 26 July 2002, No. 407. See Alberta Milone and Carmela Bilizone, La Valutazione 
di Impatto Ambientale, Casa Editrice (Pienza 2003), for an analysis o f the case in relation to the Legge 
Obiettivo (discussed below).
409 La Repubblica, “Bossi vuole un vertice sulla devolution,” p. 9, (July 16,2003).
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the Regions have staked a role by regulating the environment on their own initiative. But 
the fact that power is now vested in the Regions perpetuates another problem -  the 
existence of widely disparate environmental institutional capacities amongst regional and 
local authorities.410 As each Region creates its own implementing regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms, there is little consistency across Regions. Again, the 
arguments of Scott, Sabel, Ladeur and others in support of “flexible” EU approaches to 
environmental protection must be addressed. As discussed above in the context of EU 
delegation to Member States, these authors assert that decentralization and greater 
opportunity for tailored actions at the local level result in innovation, learning, and 
ultimately in better protection regimes. The US system also frequently allows for 
variation in environmental regimes among the US states, and there are examples where 
innovative environmental solutions have been achieved in one state and then shared with 
other states.
Unfortunately these arguments suffer the same shortfalls within Italy that they 
suffer at the European level. The overarching institutional structures o f Italy and the US 
are entirely different. First of all, in the US environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act 
and the Clean Water Act are not merely broad delegation statutes like those found in 
Italy. They are voluminous, and often get into the minute details o f environmental 
protection (something that has been criticized in other contexts). Secondly, the US EPA 
is a relatively strong administrative agency capable of providing effective oversight over 
state implementation o f national statutes. It can supplement and substitute for the state
4,0 OECD Environmental Perfoimance Review (2002), supra note ( J, at p. 114.
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with its own enforcement actions where the state is failing in its duties.411 It also has the 
“power of the purse” in the sense that it can threaten to cut off funding in the event a state 
fails to properly implement and administer and environmental statute.412 It has already 
been shown however that the Italian Ministry o f the Environment is a weak ministry, in 
absolute or relative terms, and the Italian National Association for Environmental 
Protection is merely an information repository, just like its European counterpart.
Thirdly, due to traditional political and social chasms between the Regions, Italy has not 
traditionally had the same degree o f coordination and sharing of positive experiences 
amongst regions, a benefit that the “flexibility” model is founded upon 413 Finally, the 
United States encompasses such a large geographic area that delegation to, and variation 
among, the states is probably a necessity. Italy, on the other hand, has a smaller land area 
than the State of California;414 it probably doesn’t need 20 different Regional versions of 
the Clean Air Act or 20 different El A procedures within its smaller geographic area.415 It 
might be better served to have one consistent EIA law and then concentrate on integrating 
“best practices” from other EU Member States.
411 It should be acknowledged that Italian Law No. 349 o f 1986, Article 8(3) provides a similar right of 
intervention for the MoE in the case of Regional or Local failure to implement state laws. However, it does 
not have the power to threaten the withholding of funds, and with the resource problems at the MoE, 
addressed above, the provision seems to be little threat to non-compliant regions.
412 See “Conformity Clause” of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7410(c) (1999). The Clean Air Act actually 
allows for suspension of these funds in the event a state does not have a currently conforming regional 
transportation plan. The EPA has yet to actually suspend funds, but it has recently used the threat of 
suspension to provide incentive to act. When Atlanta failed to create a regional transportation plan as 
required under the act, EPA threatened to withhold federal highway funds. Georgia quickly complied so as 
not to lose control over the highway funds. See generally, Michael R. Yame, Note, Conformity as 
Catalyst: Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 27 Ecology L.Q. [ )  (2000).
413 See OECD 2002, supra note 274, at p. 33. The frequency of sharing amongst the northern regions is 
said to be higher.
4,4 Italy’s land area is 116,303 square miles; California’s is 155,959 square miles. US Department of State 
website, Italy country profile (2002) http://www.state.gov/countries/; California State Homepage (2002) 
http://www.ca.gov/state/portal/myca_homepage.jsp.
415 There are 20 Regions in Italy. US Department o f State website, supra note [218].
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The degree of inconsistency between regions creates confusion for regulated 
parties whose business extends beyond a single region, and makes oversight of 
environmental programs very difficult for the already overstretched national 
environmental authorities. This problem of inconsistency has been noted in the 
variability of EIA procedures applied from region to region.416 One lawyer commented 
that she had had “mostly positive experience in the northern regions where there is a 
history of environmental administration.” To the contrary, she found her experiences in 
the southern regions to be much different. She attributed this partly to history; in her 
words there was no history of environmental regulation as well as no tradition of 
industrial development in the south. And since development in the south is almost 
always some type of emergency response brought on by EU or State aid, the EIA process 
is almost always conducted in derogation of EIA norms. Finally, the lawyer pointed out 
that in many cases, the national authorities had to step in to aid in the EIA process since 
the Region was not competent to carry it out itself.417 The wide disparities in the quality 
o f the EIA process places an unnecessary burden on regulated parties, and an unnecessary 
penalty on citizens in the disadvantaged regions.
d. Institutional Fragmentation and Administrative 
Bureaucracy
We have just identified the weakness of the MoE, the struggle for power between 
the State and the Regions, and the variation amongst Regions as contributors to Italy 
convoluted administrative system. In the literature there is wide consensus that still 
another factor is at work that relates to the administrators and the administration itself.
416 OECD 2002, supra note 274, at p. 183.
417 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311.
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wholly apart from these institutional explanations. Only few (English-speaking) authors 
have attempted to define this problem or determine why it exists; instead it is just a kind 
of accepted and irrefutable fact. In March o f 2003, Roberto Ferrigno, an Italian member 
of the European Environmental Bureau in Brussels added to the chorus: “The government 
lacks the political will to fight environmental crime. The local competent authorities are 
unable to properly enforce existing legislation. The regional agencies responsible for 
controls are understaffed and underequipped.”418 A wise man once said “If everyone is 
saying it, it must be true.” In the following section we will attempt to define why Italy’s 
bureaucrats have consistently been criticized.
Part of the difficulty in defining Italy’s administrative bureaucracy is that there is 
no single cause or explanation for it. One starting point is the many institutional 
problems previously alluded to. For example we already know that there are too many 
actors involved in environmental protection, with ambiguously defined responsibilities 
and too many laws to enforce. On top o f the coordination that must take place between 
the State, Regions, Provinces, and the various enforcement bodies, there are also other 
scientific or specialist bodies like the National Association for Environmental Protection, 
the National Health Institute, and Geological Service which overlay the various political 
entities. These bodies sometimes act as consultants while at other times they play a 
primary role in environmental monitoring and enforcement. The general incoherence as 
to the separation o f functions between the various administrative bodies at times results 
in too many bodies trying to act at once; at other times the result is stagnation and 
inaction. Even when there is action, it is not always clear which o f the multifarious State, 
Regional, or Local laws is to be applied.
418 Roberto Ferrigno, supra note 361.
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Another important aspect of bureaucratic inefficiency yet to be discussed is rooted 
more in the administrative culture itself. Historically, Italian administration has been 
characterized by a failure to meet deadlines, a tendency to make and break promises, a 
legalistic, closed process, where there is little focus on the actual attainment of results and 
little (legitimate) interaction with the interested public.419 As one author put it “in Italy 
the administrative activity has a tradition of distance, and almost isolation from the 
people.”420 This rigidity is completely at odds with the organic nature o f something like 
the EIA Directive, again putting Italy at a disadvantage in its ability to implement the 
directive. Another administrative problem is the frequent Italian practice o f granting 
temporary loosening of standards, delaying deadlines, or granting outright waivers to 
obligations.421 Lewanski argues that these practices have created a culture in which the 
regulated entities feel it’s “a bit foolish respect formal obligations and deadlines.”422
Compounding this difficulty is the fact that Eli environmental directives tend to 
be “rather northern in outlook,”423 thus creating a misfit with the Italian administrative 
system from the start. The legal and institutional structures of Italy often aren’t 
compatible with those of the northern Member States, requiring the additional legislative 
step of modifying institutional structures to properly implement the substantive aspects
419 See e.g, Corrado Carrubba, Participation Experience in Italy, in Martin Fuhr et a], Participation and 
Litigation Rights of Environmental Associations in Europe, Peter Lang (Frankfurt 1991). See also, 
Alessandra Marchetti, Climate Change Politics in Italy, in Tim O’Riordan and Jill Jager, Politics of 
Climate Change: A European Perspective, Routledge (New York 1996), at p. 298. See also, Lewanski 
(1998), supra note 351, at p. 146. Lewanski also places some blame on the civil servants themselves, 
claiming that technical competence is unimportant and rarely found in bureaucrats, and that since career 
advancement is based on seniority, there little incentive for innovative policies or exceptional work.
420 Mattarella, supra note 370, at p. 52.
421 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351, at p. 147. The problem of granting pardons persists today. Italian 
Green Party member in the EU Parliament recently criticized the Berlusconi administration: “There is no 
backing to fight eco-crimes at [the] national level, and the center-right government is now issuing pardons 
for all kinds of crimes.” Business Week European Edition, interview with Monica Frassoni, supra note 
338.
422 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351, at p. 147.
423 Pridham, supra note 381, at p. 91.
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of the directive. This has held especially true with the EIA Directive, since Italy has 
traditionally had a closed administrative system with little opportunity for public 
participation.424 In the scholarship the Italian allowances for public participation in the 
EIA processes have been roundly criticized. Participation has been variable; absent in 
some cases and excessive in others. It is alleged that what public interaction does take 
place is o f the ‘under the table’ variety (see section on Corruption below), which 
obviously doesn’t bode well for a process like EIA which depends on an open, active 
participatory process for its effectiveness. To the contrary, there are no public hearings 
during the EIA process with the exception of the EIAs conducted for geothermal plants. 
One lawyer indicated that Italian authorities were so dissatisfied with the difficulties 
experienced on the geothermal projects that they are hoping to revoke the public hearing 
provision even for those projects,425 426a tribute to the entrenched resistance to the opening 
up o f administrative processes. By way o f comparison, in America the public hearing is 
an integral part of most administrative decisions, including EIA processes, even if 
administrators are not always fond of the process.
Part of responsibility for the ineffective administration also falls on a citizenry 
that is conditioned to the administrative history described above. Italians citizens aren’t 
used to the concept of public participation. In fact instances o f public participation 
generally come about not as some altruistic defense o f the environment, but rather when a 
project is likely to invade some property or other individualized right. About the only 
participatory aspect that is consistently adhered to on the administration side is the public
424 In fact the introduction of the EIA Directive in Italy is often credited with inspiring recent Italian efforts 
to reform its administrative capacities.
425 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311.
426 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311. See also Mattarella supra note 370, at p. 53.
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notification of the project and El A, which unfortunately doesn’t take place until after the 
EIA has been completed, thereby depriving the public of the opportunity to guide the 
analysis. The public has often not been provided with the same technical information as 
the administration (as required by the Directive), and until recently hasn’t even had 
access to such information upon request. Regarding access to information, Law 
349/1986 (the law establishing the Ministry of the Environment) actually states that every 
citizen has the right of access to environmental information held public authorities, 
without even having to establish personal interest.427 428Unfortunately, according to at least 
one study “the right to information. . .  on the environment is not widely respected. In 
fact, in most cases public authorities refuse to release information, relying mainly on a 
restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘environmental information’.’ This,
coupled with the absence of formal hearings or procedures for submitting comments429 
(both of which are problems of Italian administrative law not limited to EIA), has served 
to marginalize the effectiveness of public participation.430 The absence of established 
public participation procedures partly explains the frequent resort to the Administrative 
Courts to challenge EIA decisions.
427 Law No. 349/1986, at Article 14.
428 See generally, Mauro Albrizio and Patrizia Fantilli, “Italy”, pp. 175-182, in Ralph E. Hallo, Access to 
Environmental Information in Europe, Kluwer Law (London 1997), and OECD 2002, supra note 274, at p. 
171, noting that while the situation has improved at the national level, access to environmental information 
at the regional and local level is insufficient. It should be noted that Italian Administrative Courts have 
again been actively helping to enforce these provisions. In Judgment 118/91 o f the TAR of Catania, 
Sicilia, the court ruled that the definition of 'environmental information’ is not to be restricted to the state 
o f the environment, but should include all documents relating to specific instances o f pollution, 
enforcement of environmental laws, and administrative activities affecting the environment. Despite the 
laws regarding access to information and the generally favorable interpretations from the TARs, “enforcing 
the right has proved difficult because of an inefficient bureaucracy and its traditional secrecy about 
environmental matters. In fact environmental groups have been forced to appeal the refusal to many times" 
(Albrizio at p.180).
429 Under the 1996 Atto di Indirizzo (establishing Regional EIA), public authorities MAY conduct a public 
hearing if they consider it appropriate. Needless to say the entrenched Italian administration has not often 
consider it appropriate.
430 Mattarella, supra note 370, at pp. 49-50.
It is not as though the government is unaware of the administrative difficulties. 
The previously mentioned Bassanini Acts of 1997 also sought to remedy the 
administrative lethargy. In addition to delegating administrative powers to the Regions 
and Municipalities, Act No. 59/97 (Bassanini 1) sought to reduce the number o f different 
administrative agencies to be involved in a given matter and simplify the process*of 
“lawmaking by delegation” described above.431 Act No. 127/97 (Bassanini 2) contained 
provisions to improve interaction between the citizenry and the administration, and 
reduce unnecessary paperwork. Implementation of the Bassanini laws has been 
predictably slow. For example, Act. No. 59/97 called for the simplification of 112 
specific administrative processes; only 5 had been simplified in the 2 years following 
passage o f the Act.432 In one example of an attempt at simplification, an effort was made 
to streamline the ELA process and the project approval process in general (Act No. 447 o f 
20 October 1998). The goal of the law was to consolidate EIA and all other permitting 
procedures into one combined approval process. Of course, even laws aimed at 
streamlining must overcome Italy’s implementation problems: the law was never carried 
out in practice and efforts to do so were ultimately abandoned.433 As one author stated “it 
will take some time to understand the practical effect of these reforms on the Italian 
administrative system and bureaucracy, which has traditionally shown itself to be more 
reluctant than others to open itself to the challenges of the future.”434
4. Corruption
431 Musillo, supra note 402, at p. 368.
432 Musillo, supra note 402, at p. 369.
433 MoE Interview, supra note 352.
434 Musillo, supra note 402, atp . 372.
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Three major categories of explanation for Italy’s difficulties implementing EU 
environmental directives have thus far been offered. To review briefly, the first had to do 
with the belatedness o f Italy’s efforts, the second with the political and legislative climate 
in Italy, and the third with the crippling administrative bureaucracy. There is one 
remaining category that must be discussed. Although this category does not lend itself 
well to conclusions that can be drawn about implementation in all Member States, it 
cannot be ignored because it undeniably and uniquely affects the operation of 
environmental law in Italy. This last category is corruption. Corruption can take many 
forms. The general population most often associates corruption in Italy with the Mafia. 
The Mafia does have a role to play in environmental problems, but the role of corruption 
needn’t be restricted to the Mafia. There is also corruption that takes place at the political 
and administrative levels that impairs the proper functioning of the environmental law 
regime. Each of these forms of corruption will be discussed.
a. The Role of the Mafia
There still exist in Italy episodes of traditional ‘‘Mafia” activity which can plague 
environmental protection. The role of the traditional Mafia and of the “informal 
economy” remains significant. As recently as 1997, various studies placed the “shadow 
economy” at between 20% and 36% of GNP. An estimated 37% of the jobs are irregular 
in some form. Both of these indicators are even more pronounced in the south of Italy.435 
Earlier this year the European edition of Business Week ran a cover story on Italy’s Eco- 
Mafia.436 According to Business Week, there are over 4,000 illegal dumpsites in Italy,
435 Serena Vicari, Naples: Urban Regeneration and Exclusion in the Italian South y 8(2) European Urban 
and Regional Studies 103 (2001), at 105.
436 Gail Edmonson and Kate Carlisle, “Italy and the Eco-Mafia: How billions are made through dumping 
waste -  with little public outcry,” Business Week, European Edition, January 27, 2003.
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mostly the result o f organized crime groups winning bids to haul waste, and then 
dumping the waste untreated into farmlands and other areas. Amazingly, some of these 
same groups have apparently changed hats and later won state contracts for cleanup of 
the unauthorized sites. Obviously if  the Mafia is dumping hazardous wastes in some 
unidentified field, then no EIA is performed, the EIA process fails, and the environment 
suffers. How can proper analysis o f environmental impacts be done when, for example, 
organized crime controls up to 30% of the waste industry? Italy is not the only country in 
Europe that can point to cases of illegal dumping, but “[i]t’s the direct control o f 
organized crime that makes Italy different,” according to an EU official at the European 
Environmental Bureau in Brussels.437 438The Mafia has a role in the political and 
administrative corruption described below.
b. Corruption in the Political Ranks
At the political level, the Italian government has long been plagued by corruption. 
In fact, several interviewees claimed that corruption in the political ranks, rather than 
“gangs and guns” mafia activity on the street, was the bigger threat to the environment. 
Corruption in Italian politics came to a head in the early 1990s with the so-called mani 
pulite (clean hands) investigations.439 The scandal uncovered a widespread system of 
patronage and clientelism. Large amounts o f money had been exchanged for electoral 
votes or other political favors. Many of these episodes involved the bidding for large 
public infrastructure projects, some of which had negative environmental impacts and 
were pointless in economic terms (e.g. highways built in areas with hardly any traffic).440
431 See Ferrigno, supra note 361.
438 MoE Interview, supra note 352; NGO Interview, supra note 438.
439 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351, at p. 148.
440 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351, at p. 148.
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In some cases government money intended for environmental purposes was diverted to 
other uses or to organized crime.441 In other cases, cash subsidies were distributed on the 
basis of persona] and political relationships.442 When asked how Italy differs from the 
rest of the HU, a Italian Green Party member o f the EU Parliament recently stated “The 
difference is the involvement of the Mafia. The moment you have a criminal network 
involved, it's much more difficult to combat. They exert so much power on local and 
regional authorities. They obstruct the passing of legislation and the enforcement of 
law.”443
Clearly the integrity and effectiveness of a system like EIA is jeopardized if 
approvals or other favorable outcomes can be bought from politicians with money or 
votes. The risk is especially acute in the south of Italy, where organized crime is still 
prevalent and where a large share of development is publicly funded due to the influx of 
aid from the EU and the Italian State.444 Reforms have been made, but many still believe 
there is a problem. One member of an NGO related a story in her hometown. With no 
notice, an existing bridge that had been functioning perfectly well was tom down and 
construction started on a new one. The new bridge failed on its first day of use. The 
Italian military was called in to set up a temporary bridge, which remains functioning 
today. Later it was discovered that the company that constructed the failed bridge was a 
fronting company with ties to organized crime. On a much grander scale, there is
441 See A. Marchetti, supra note 419, at p. 299. Note that the situation could have been worse. It later came 
to light that then Minister o f the Environment Ruffolo resisted pressures from his own socialist party to 
collect payoffs for the distribution of environmental projects under his watch. See Lewanski (1998), supra 
note 351, at p. 141.
442 Vicari, supra note 435, at pp. 106-107.
443 Business Week European Edition, interview with Monica Frassoni, supra note 338.
444 See generally Vicari, supra note 435, for an interesting analysis o f the effects o f clientelism, political 
corruption, and organized crime on the democratic process, with particular regard to public development 
projects. The potential impact on a participatory process like EIA is worrisome.
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widespread concern over the potential involvement of organized crime in the construction 
of a much bigger bridge, the proposed 2 mile span connecting Sicily to mainland Italy 
over the Straights o f  Messina.445 The response to these concerns from the Minister of 
Transport and Infrastructure Pietro Lunardi is hardly reassuring (“You just have to learn 
to live with it. Let everyone resolve their own problems as they see fit. The mafia has 
always existed.”)*446 If  organized crime groups have ties to politicians and to important 
public projects, can the integrity o f EIA procedures be ensured?
Again, it is difficult to know how widespread this problem is, but every person 
interviewed for this thesis agreed that corruption existed in the political ranks. One 
interviewee was aware of threats made to banks and developers, in this case to discourage 
the construction o f a legitimate waste facility where the Mafia was already controlling the 
waste industry in the area.447 Another person that suspected the Mafia was illegally 
dumping near his home had his own soil tests performed when he was unable to obtain 
information from the local administration. After being threatened, his home was shot at, 
and a few weeks later he was beaten and had to be hospitalized.448 With risks like this 
still a reality, especially in the south of Italy, procedures like EIA that rely on public 
participation for their effectiveness no doubt suffer. Who is going to participate if there 
is a risk o f being shot or beaten as a result?
c. Corruption in Administration and Enforcement o f the Laws 
Unauthorized construction (so-called abusivismo) is another problem still 
prevalent in Italy today that causes the EIA process to suffer. The term Abusivismo refers
445 See generally, Antonio Mazzeo, “Bridge over troubled water”, at 
http://www.justresponse.net/bridge over troubled water.html (July 21,2002).
446 Ibid. This quotation is paraphrased from an already paraphrased quote in the referenced article.
447 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311.
448 See generally, Business Week, supra note 436.
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generally to the unauthorized erection of buildings, intentional breaches of zoning laws 
and building codes, and unauthorized structural changes to existing buildings. This 
phenomenon is plainly observable in the south of Italy, where one readily finds examples 
of half-built structures or misplaced buildings that remain standing nonetheless.449 
Abusivismo ties together several of the problems mentioned above. Cultural 
characteristics that encourage disobedience of the law, economic exigencies that provide 
pressure to develop, a disinterested public that is more apt to turn its head, and ineffective 
and insufficient administrative controls, all combine to make abusivismo possible. 
Amazingly, the government has facilitated such acts through the program of condoni 
edilizi during the late 1980s. This system pardoned acts of abusivismo in return for 
payment of a kind of “tithe” to the government.450 Wrong on numerous levels, this 
system also plays right into the hands of organized crime units or others who are willing 
to pay a small price for the money they can ultimately earn through development of a 
project. The OECD estimates that today some 15 to 20% o f buildings are built without 
permits.451 Needless to say abusivismo paralyzes the EIA process since it is impossible 
for the government to make a decision on environmental compatibility for a project that it 
doesn’t know exists.
A more general cultural characteristic of Italy that is also found in America and 
other countries, but not to the same degree is the concept that “it’s not what you know, 
but who you know.” As enforcement is often carried out on a very localized level in 
Italy, there is room for variation and informal agreements. One book offering advice to 
developers in Italy stated “The importance o f good personal contacts cannot be
449 See Lewanski (1998), supra note 351.
450 Clifford Chance, supra note 379, at p. 115. This entire abusivismo section is derived from this source.
451 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Italy (2002), supra note 274, at p. 114.
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overemphasized. The officials actually implementing the laws are crucial ‘friends’.”452 
A personal anecdote may explain this phenomenon best. This episode was recounted to 
the author by the owner of new Florentine restaurant. He was attempting to open his 
outdoor terrace for summer dining, and had taken all the necessary steps to satisfy health 
and safety codes. However, there remained one insignificant step which neighbors 
opposed to the terrace were seizing on to delay its opening. The owner of the restaurant 
was sharing his tribulations with a customer one night when the customer informed him 
that he had a good friend on the local health board. Apparently this customer enjoyed his 
meal that night (and perhaps enjoyed a discount). A few days later, the “friend” on the 
health board granted the necessary approvals and the terrace opened for dining.
Again, this is not to say that such acts o f patronage and clientelism are unique to 
Italy. In America as in most places, it never hurts to have some “friends on the board.” 
However, instances o f quid-pro-quo seem particularly ubiquitous in Italian culture. And 
Italy is uniquely susceptible to such occurrences due to the decentralized, inefficient 
administrative structure described above. On one level the bureaucracy is too 
disorganized to prevent such occurrences, and on the other hand it is so disorganized that 
citizens are almost forced to rely on one another to navigate daily life, rather than await 
the normal administrative processes.
5. Conclusions on the Impediments to Implementation o f EU 
Environmental Law in Italy
In the preceding sections, numerous explanations for Italy’s difficulties in 
implementing EU law have been explored. It has been stated many times that it is 
impossible to point to any single source o f the problem. Rather it is an accumulation and
452 Sinisi, supra note 358, at p. Jt-2I.
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intermingling o f all of the problems discussed above. Some o f these problems are 
general nature and the lessons learned from them can inform implementation efforts in 
other Member States. Others like corruption and the ingrained cultural aspects of the 
administrative bureaucracy seem to be uniquely Italian implementation problems. Thus 
far in the discussion o f all of the implementation problems, frequent reference has been 
made to Italy’s experiences with the EIA Directive. The final two sections of this paper 
will explore these experiences in greater depth, first by looking at the legislative history 
o f  EIA in Italy, and then by looking at the current status of the EIA process, including 
some recent case studies of EIA enforcement.
E. The Legislative History of EIA in Italy
1. Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that Italy’s implementation of the EIA directive is 
incomplete, owing to the transitional nature of the laws on which it is based, the inability 
o f  all Regions to pass necessary legislation, and the failure after 20 years to pass a single, 
consolidated, all-encompassing EIA law. The legislative histoiy is complex. It provides 
a nice case study of some of the difficulties in the Italian legislative process described 
above. The discussion will be broken up into two parts -  National EIA and Regional 
EIA. For ease of following, reference can be made to the accompanying chart of all 
Italian EIA Legislation.
2. Legislative History -  National EIA
While several EU nations (Germany, England, France, and Ireland) already had 
well-developed EIA laws at the time the 1985 Directive was passed, others such as Italy, 
Spain and Greece did not. In Italy, EIA was more an abstract topic for legal theorists; the
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closest the government had come to requiring anything resembling EIA was to order 
studies done for isolated projects or groups o f projects.453 Consequently, Italy was forced 
to introduce completely new EIA legislation in order to implement the Directive.454
As previously noted, Law No. 349 o f  1986 established the Ministry of the 
Environment and set about the task o f creating the institutional structures for 
environmental protection in Italy. Article 6(1) o f Law No. 349 directed the Government 
to submit to Parliament within six months an outline as to how it was going to implement 
EU environmental directives.455 The subsequent paragraphs of Article 6 set up an interim 
system “[w]hile awaiting the legislative implementation o f Community directives on the 
environment.”456 The interim measures set up a “shortcut” procedure for EIA whereby 
the project proponent submitted to the Ministry o f the Environment457 *, the Ministry for 
Cultural Affairs, and the relevant Region, a “communication” identifying environmental
Aeffects of the project and any mitigation steps being taken to alleviate these effects.
Notice of the “communication” had to be published in “the most widely-read daily paper 
of the interested region and in a national paper,”459 and the public could comment to 
Ministry of the Environment “in accordance with current laws.”460 The Ministry of the 
Environment would then “render an opinion on the potential environmental impact”461 
and could order suspension of the project i f  the project was “fundamentally jeopardizing
453 Mattarella, supra note 370.
454 Members Seen Using Different Criteria in Implementing Impact Assessment Directive, 14 Int’l Envtl. 
Rep. 216 (Apr. 24 1991). [CANT find this on Westlaw!]
455 Law No. 349 of 8 July 1986, Art. 6(1).
456 Id., at Art 6(2).
457 Responsibility for administration o f the EIA procedure was placed in the hands of a specific General 
Directorate established within the Ministry of the Environment. EIA Newsletter 10, Environmental 
Assessment Within the European Union, Environmental Assessment in Italy, 
http://www.art.man.ac.uk/EIA/nl 10euit.htm.
4iJ Law NoT 349, at Art 6(3).
459 Id.
460 Id., at Art. 6(9).
461 Id., at Art. 6(4).
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ecological and environmental needs.”462 The process bore some resemblance to a typical 
El A statute, but was very thin on the details. More importantly, it was another 2 years 
before President of the Council of Ministers identified those projects to which it would 
apply.463
Decree No. 377 of 1988 listed those projects to which the interim EIA procedures 
were to apply.464 The list essentially coincided with the large-scale projects listed in 
Annex 1 of the EIA Directive, for which EIA is mandatory under the Directive. Art 1(4) 
o f Decree 377 threatened the scope o f its application by allowing Ministry of the 
Environment, the Ministry of Cultural and Environmental Property, and the interested 
Region to jointly decide “the cases to be excluded from said procedure.”465 Article 2(3) 
basically restated the interim EIA procedures created in Law No. 349 two year earlier, 
though with slightly more detail. So called “supplementary technical norms” 
(comprehensive EIA regulations regarding exactly what was to be included in the EIA) 
were to be issued “within 90 days of the publication” of the 1988 decree.466 467
Amazingly (by Italian standards), these technical EIA requirements were 
submitted not within 90 days, but a nonetheless respectable 140 days later. The Prime 
Minister’s Decree of 27 December 1988 aimed to clarify “the contents of the studies of 
environmental impact and their arrangement, the relevant documentation, the activity of 
judicial inquiry and the criteria for the formulation of the judgment o f compatibility.’ 
Basically, it sought to explain what had to be in the environmental impact report, how it
462 Id., at Art. 6(6).
463 Decree No. 377 of 10 August 1988. by the President of the Council of Ministers.
464 Id., at Art. 1(1).
465 Id., Para. 4.
466 Id., at Art. 3.
467 Prime Minister’s Decree o f 27 December 1988, at A rt l(l)(a).
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was to be arranged, and the process to be used for determining “environmental 
compatibility.”468 As to the latter, it provided factors that the Ministry of the 
Environment was to consider in determining whether a “judgment o f environmental 
compatibility” was to be issued, and also required the body to issue an opinion as to why 
it came to its decision.469
All things considered, the Decree o f 27 December 1988, when combined with 
Decree 377 o f the same year, provided a fairly complete framework of how El A was to 
be performed. From May 1990 to August 1992, the Italian government significantly 
cluttered the situation by passing at least eleven acts (laws, decrees, etc.) bringing 
individual categories o f  projects within the scope of National EIA, and providing special 
EIA procedures for these categories o f projects (e.g. hydroelectricity, geothermal works, 
hazardous waste facilities, deep sea oil exploration, etc.).470 However, no major 
amendments were made to the general EIA process until Decree o f  the President o f the 
Republic o f 11 February 1998 and Decree No. 348 of the President of the Republic on 2 
September 1999. These Decrees essentially modified the technical requirements o f EIA 
for specific projects and added some additional projects to those already subject to the 
two 1988 Decrees, in compliance with the amendments introduced by the 1997 
Directive.471 The two 1988 degrees were originally intended as temporary legislation 
pending a comprehensive EIA law. However, as no comprehensive EIA law has ever
468 Id., at Art. 1(2).
469 Id., at Art 6(2).
470 Status o f  EIA in Italy, http://www.art.man.ac.uk/EIA/lf5.htm.
471 See generally, Decree o f the President o f the Republic No. 348 of 2 September 1999, “Regulation 
setting forth technical standards concerning environmental impact studies for certain categories o f 
projects.”
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been passed,472 the two 1988 Decrees, as amended, along with the discipline-specific 
laws, have continued to serve as the basis for EIA in Italy.
It is important to place the state of EIA in context. The EIA procedures described 
are only applied to very large projects such as highways, large chemical plants, dams, etc. 
that are listed in Decree No. 377 of 1988. Most of these projects require the 
administrative approval o f a national agency or are otherwise “national” in size and 
scope. For this reason, the procedures are referred to as the “National EIA” procedures. 
The 1988 Decrees indicate nothing with regard to all other projects (roughly equating to 
those in Annex II of the Directive), most of which are likely to be handled on a regional 
or local basis.473 It is worth restating that Law No. 349 of 1986 had called for 
comprehensive EIA legislation to be submitted to Parliament within six months. Over the 
past 15 years, numerous laws have been proposed but none have made it past the first 
house of Congress; currently no organic EIA law is in place.
3. Legislative History -  Regional EIA 
To reiterate, the EIA legislation described above applied to projects that 
corresponded roughly to the projects listed in Annex I of the EU EIA Directive. There 
was no framework in place for Annex II projects. As a result the Commission opened 
infraction proceedings against Italy in 1992 and addressed a reasoned opinion to Italy in 
July 1993 for its failure to properly transpose Annex II of the Directive.474 It was not 
until 1994 that the Italian government began taking steps towards establishing EIA at the
472 Numerous legislative alternatives have been introduced in the Parliament. They range from the simple 
(consolidating the existing laws into a single law) to the complex (creating a single law that encompasses 
the 1985 Directive, all amendments, plus provisions for plans and programs and the Regional EIA process).
473 The projects o f Decree 377 were mainly the Annex I projects from the EU Directive, for which EIA was 
mandatory. The remaining projects corresponded basically to those in Annex II of the EU Directive, for 
which the Member States were required to establish criteria as to which projects EIA would apply.
474 Ercmann, supra note 273, p. 543 at footnote 10.
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regional level. Law No. 146 of 1994 (the first La Pergola law) initiated the process, 
commanding the President of the Republic to issue decrees implementing HU 
environmental directives ranging from waste management to asbestos to EIA. Article 40 
of this law specifically required a decree setting forth the requirements for Regional 
EIA.475 This decree came in the form of the atto di indirizzo e coordinamento (act o f law 
and coordination), created by Presidential Decree of 12 April 1996. Recall from the 
discussion o f the EIA Directive that in order to completely implement the Directive, the 
Italian government had to either (1) make a list o f Annex II projects to which EIA would 
apply, or (2) establish criteria for when EIA would apply to projects falling into Annex II 
categories.476 In addition, the government had to establish what EIA procedures would 
apply to such projects, or at least delegate to the regions the responsibility for doing so. 
The 1996 Decree required that the Regions perform EIAs for the projects listed in Annex 
A and B of the Decree. From a schematic standpoint the Decree followed the model of 
the Directive by making EIA mandatory for certain of the Annex II projects as listed in 
Annex A, and requiring the Regions to establish criteria for the remainder of the Annex II 
projects listed in Annex B.477 The Regional EIA laws were to require the detailed EIA 
procedures required by the Decree. There were also measures addressing public 
participation and how EIAs were to be used in the decision to grant development consent. 
The State had done its job in delegating responsibility to the Regions, but it was still up to 
the Regions to pass legge regionale (Regional Laws) implementing the 1996 Decree.
475 Law No. 146 o f  22 February 1994, “Setting forth provisions for the fulfillment of obligations stemming 
from Italy’s membership in the European Community.” See Article 40 particularly “Concerning 
arrangements for environmental impact assessment.”
476 See 1997 Directive, Art. [GET ARTICLE CITE HERE]
477 Thus the Annex II projects from the Directive were further divided into 2 groups. Italy used both of the 
options available to it under Article 4 of the Directive: lists projects, and establishing criteria.
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The delegation of EIA responsibilities to the Regions in 1996 was consistent with 
a more general trend in Italy in the late 1990s to delegate certain administrative functions, 
including environmental protection, to the Regions.478 To this end, Law No. 59 was 
passed in 1997, authorizing the National Government “to grant functions and tasks to the 
regions and local agencies, towards reforming public authorities and towards bureaucratic 
simplification.*’479 Legislative Decree No. 112 of 31 March 1998 (known as Legge 
Bassanini) took on the project of transferring environmental responsibilities from the 
State to the Regions as required by Law No. 59.480 Articles 34 and 35 o f Decree No. 112 
delegated to the Regions additional powers in matters of EIA, and specifically transferred 
certain additional categories of projects from the domain of National EIA to the 
Regions.481 482As such, the delegation to the Regions in 1996 of the responsibility for 
drafting detailed EIA implementing legislation was quite consistent with the trend 
towards decentralization o f Italian administrative law in the late 1990s.
However, the Presidential Decree of 12 April 1996 only provided a framework for 
Regional EIA procedures. It was up to the Regions themselves to enact detailed EIA 
laws, including the establishment of a “VIA Authority” that would be responsible for 
issuing the final determination of environmental compatibility for projects subject to . 
VIA. The response o f the Regions has been variable. Tired of waiting for the national 
government to act, nine o f the more forward-thinking regions had already introduced EIA
478 See Section [V(C)(2)] above regarding the historical struggle for power between the Regions and the 
State.
479 Law No. 59 of 15 March 1997, at Art. 8.
480 Unfortunately, one interview subject believed that Decree 112 “had done nothing for the simplification 
o f  environmental law.” MoE Interview.
481 Legislative Decree No. 112 of 31 March 1998, at Arts. 34,35, and 71.
482 Presidential Decree of 12 April 1996. The Regions were responsible for creating implementing laws 
within 9 months o f  its issuance (or adapting existing EIA laws).
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laws prior to the 1996 State Decree.483 These pre-existing laws ranged on the low end 
from those requiring EIA for a few discrete projects, to those at the high end that even set 
up SEA procedures for plans and programs.484 Only the Veneto region had established a 
comprehensive EIA law that met the standards envisioned by the Directive. The other 8 
Regions with existing laws would have to amend them, while the remaining 11 Regions 
would have to start from scratch.
Weary o f the insufficiency or absence of EIA laws in many Regions, the 
Commission issued a second Reasoned Opinion in 1997, which was supplemented by 
another Reasoned Opinion on 29 September 1998, asking Italy to “take the necessary 
measures for placing certain projects listed in Annex II of the [EU EIA] Directive under 
environmental impact assessment”485 as “the [1996 Decree] is not self-executing and 
requires a norm of actualization on the part o f the Regions.”486 The Commission was 
also concerned that “some of the projects in Annex II are not addressed” in the 1996 
Decree of delegation to the Regions 487 The Decree of Council of Ministers on 3 
September 1999 sought to alleviate the Commission’s concerns by amending and 
augmenting the list of projects subject to Regional VIA. The Commission dropped its 
proceedings against Italy when these measures were notified to them (along with the 
most up-to-date Regional Laws), although the Commission indicated it would be 
“studying the information provided by Italy in 1999.”488 At this point the State had 
pretty well exhausted the legislative opportunities available to it; it fell to the remaining
483 Five of the nine regions with pre-existing EIA laws were the autonomous regions, which are generally 
more inclined to act on their own that wait for the government machinery to turn its wheels.
484 Mattarella, supra note 370, at p. 12; EIA Newsletter 13 (1996), Recent EIA Developments Within the 
European Union, Environmental Assessment in Italy, http://art.man.ac.uk/EIA/nll3ita.htm.
48s Decree of the President o f the Council o f Ministers o f 3 September 1999, in the Preamble.
486 See Alberta Milone, supra note 408, at p. 180 for an overview of the Commission actions against Italy.
487 Ibid., as translated by author.
488 1 7th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application o f Community Law (1999), Environment Chapter.
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recalcitrant Regions to enact the necessary implementing laws. By 2000, most regions 
had put in place at least some type of EIA law.
Still, a fourth Reasoned Opinion was issued to Italy in 2000. This time the 
dispute centered on 5 Regions (Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Piemonte, 
Veneto, and Tuscany) which had excluded the necessity for EIA in cases where the 
request for development consent had been made before the Regional Law took effect, or 
in some cases where development consent had already been granted before the Regional 
law took effect489. This must have felt like EIA 101 for the Commission, as it recalled 
the early ECJ EIA caselaw requiring Member States to apply the Directive to all projects 
for which development consent was requested after the July 3, 1988 deadline for 
transposition, with no allowance for transitional periods. The Regions subsequently 
made the necessary modifications to their legislation, and the Commission dropped its 
proceedings in 2001.490
There remain today deficiencies in regional implementation. It is true that each of 
the 20 Regions has some law governing EIA. However 4 Regions (Calabria491, 
Campania, Marche, and Sicilia) have only implemented the law via Delibere della Giunta 
Regionale (DGR). DGRs are not true Legge Regionale (which have the force of law). 
Instead, DGRs are a kind of circular. In most cases, they simply state that the EU EIA 
Directives exist, as well as the 1996 Delegating Decree from the State, and that these 
laws will be enforced within the Region. No actual transposition of the law ever takes 
place, and DGRs can be freely derogated from by the government. Two other Regions
489 See Alberta Milone, supra note 408, at pp. 180-181.
490 Third Annual Survey, supra note 215, EIA chapter.
491 Calabria present a very strange case since on 16 Aprli 2002, it passed Act. No. 19 requiring EIA for 
plans and programs! Thus, it has no EIA law for the Directive that passed in 1985, but has a law 
implementing the Directive whose deadline doesn’t arrive until 2004.
164
(Lazio and Sardegna) have in place only a Legge Finanziaria as opposed to a Legge 
Regionale. A Legge Finanziara is analogous to a DGR in that it basically announces that 
the Community Directives and relevant State HIA laws will be enforced in the Region. A 
Legge Finanzaria also does not have force o f law. [confirm exact nature of LF] Each of 
the 6 Regions is currently considering an official Legge Regionale, but until they »manage 
to pass the laws, Italy has technically failed to fully transpose the Directives.492 It should 
be noted that at least 2 interview subjects held the belief that the Directives were de Facto 
enforced in these Regions, mainly due to the citizenry’s recourse to the Administrative 
Courts, which has basically forced the Regional Governments into action.493 This 
comports with the prior discussion on the treatment of EU law in Italian Administrative 
Courts, where it was concluded that the courts have been very keen to apply EU law in 
the absence of full transposition on the part o f the Italian government. The next section 
will examine in greater detail the situation with enforcement of the Directive in practice.
Above all, one should not lose sight o f the fact that Law No. 349 of 1986 called 
for a comprehensive EIA statute to be presented for approval by Parliament within six 
months. Such a law has been entertained by Parliament over the years, but nothing has 
been passed to date. Italian practitioners must instead deal with a daunting body of over 
40 different laws, decrees and circulars relating to EIA in Italy, not to mention the 
numerous Regional and local laws!494 This state of affairs clearly puts a strain on the 
goal of meeting the EU policy objectives contained in the EIA Directive.
492 The information on the status o f Regional Laws was obtained from the internal materials o f the Centro 
VIA, a non-profit organization in Milan that serves as a professional association for EIA practitioners in 
Italy. It holds conferences, distributes an annual newsletter, and generally serves as a focal point for 
lawyers, engineers, politicians, etc. who use EIA in their professions, I also interviewed an official there 
who wishes to remain anonymous [herein, Centro VIA Interview].
493 MoE Interview, supra note 352. Centro VIA Interview.
494 See attached table on Italian EIA Legislation.
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VI. Recent Developments for EIA in Italy
The discussion to this point has been intended to lead one to the conclusion that 
Italy does not have the institutional capacity to implement EU environmental laws like 
the EIA Directive, thus showing that the policy goals of the EU can be thwarted 
depending on the situation in an actual Member State. While examples o f EIA practice in 
Italy have been cited along the way, the analysis so far has primarily been at a theoretical 
or foundational level. The next and final section will move beyond the theoretical and 
look at the current state of affairs with respect to EIA in Italy.
A. The Status of Implementation
1. Legislative Implementation
It is clear from the discussion above that Italy has not adequately transposed the 
Directive. National EIA is taken care of by the two 1988 Decrees and the amendments 
thereafter. The Regions were delegated responsibility for implementing the Directive 
with regard to Annex II projects. As shown above, they struggled to complete this task, 
drawing the ire of the Commission in the form of Reasoned Opinions in 1993,1997,
1998 and 2000. But what is the status of things now? Italy remains in non-compliance 
due to the fact that 6 Regions still have not passed EIA legislation that has the force of 
law. The Giunta Libere and Legge Finanzictre in these Regions are most comparable to a 
circular or temporary law. The ECJ has repeatedly held that such circulars, which are 
subject to amendment at will by the national administration, do not meet the requirement 
of legal certainty for implementation of Directives.495 Italy would seem to be a candidate 
for Commission proceeding similar to the one resulting in an ECJ judgment against Spain
495 For an example of such a case involving Italy in an environmental matter, see Commission v. Italy^ C- 
95/92, ECR1-3119 (1993).
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in 2002. I asked the Director of EIA at the MoE why the Commission was not pursuing 
an action against Italy, and she responded “gli basta” (it’s enough for them).496 The 
Commission knows that Italy is technically in violation, but they are satisfied that these 
Regions are carrying out the EIA process in practice. Given the numerous challenges 
Italy is facing in implementing environmental Directives (much of the recent attention 
has focused on the waste problem), the Commission has chosen not fight this battle, at 
least for now.
Still, the possibility of enforcement actions in the future is possible. The deadline 
for the 1997 Amendments came and went in 1999. One upside of the fact that most 
Regions had no EIA law as of 1997 was that when they finally did get around to passing 
legislation, they passed laws that would comply with the updated Directive. Many 
regions even included provisions for plans and programs as articulated in the 2001 SEA 
Directive, which had already been under consideration by the Community at the time the 
Regional laws were being passed in the late 1990s.
The real challenge for Italy may be the implementation of the 2003 Amendments 
with respect to public participation and access to justice. Access to justice doesn’t appear 
to be a problem; Italy’s Administrative Courts have been very receptive to EIA 
challenges and to the application of the EIA Directives even in the case of missing or 
deficient Italian legislation. However, Italy still has no procedure in place for a public 
hearing during the EIA process (with the singular exception of geothermal plants). 
According to one lawyer, public participation in Italy at this point essentially amounts to 
publishing an announcement in a national newspaper that an EIA has been performed,
496 MoE Interview, supra note 352.
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indicating where the HIA can be viewed.497 The 2003 Directive, however, requires that 
the public be informed “early in the environmental decision-making procedures. . .  and 
at the latest as soon as information can be reasonably provided.”498 The public must be 
informed of the request for development consent, the fact that the project will be subject 
to an El A, of any currently available information, and from whom/where to get this 
information. The EU is all but requiring a kind of public hearing, something foreign to 
the current Italian administrative system. Clearly the current Italian practice of 
publication in a national newspaper after the EIA has already been completed, but before 
a decision is made, will not be sufficient. Moreover, per the new version of Article 9 of 
the Directive, the Italian administration will have to be responsive to public comments 
when it issues its decision on environmental compatibility; it will not suffice to simply 
give the reasons the decision was reached. The changes required to satisfy the 2003 
Amendments are not simple. It’s not a matter of applying EIA law to a few new projects, 
and making a few cosmetic changes, as after the 1997 Amendments. The 2003 
Amendments will require Italy to fundamentally change its administrative procedures.
As much as it has preferred to keep these procedures behind closed doors, Italy may soon 
be forced to further open its EIA process to the public.
2. Enforcement on the Ground
Despite concerns raised above about the 2003 Amendments and the continuing 
absence of formal Legge Regionale in some Regions, a sufficient legal framework for 
EIA seems to be in place in Italy, at least until the 2003 Amendments come due. There
497 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311. See La Repubblica, August 6,2003, for an example of 
such publication in the national newspaper. The effectiveness is lessened by the fact that the EIA has 
already been performed. To get the fiill benefit o f the EIA, the public should be able to participate during 
the EIA’s formation, to help guide the process.
498 2003 Directive, A rt 3(4).
remains the issue of effective administration of the laws, and all of the problems analyzed 
above that seem to impede successful implementation. It is difficult to accurately 
identify “negative occurrences” like the failure to conduct an EIA or the failure to do so 
properly. They only become apparent when a legal challenge is raised. There is little in 
the way of statistics on the number of EIA legal claims made annually in Italy, or even 
the number o f EIAs performed (owing in part to the division o f EIA competences 
between the State and the Regions). Commission figures claimed Italy had conducted on 
average 39 EIAs/year until 1999 (contrast with estimates for Sweden, Greece, Germany 
and France ranging from 1,000 to 7,000/year).499 Italy failed to provide the Commission 
with data after 1999.
One way to estimate how well Italy is complying is by looking at the EU 
proceedings. While the EU has declined to pursue a global EIA proceeding against Italy, 
it has not stopped actions on individual projects. A simple “google” search on “Italy and 
‘Environmental Impact Assessment’” turned up 5 different projects since August of 2001 
for which the Commission had initiated proceedings against Italy under the EIA 
Directive.500 The Commission’s own information reveals at least one other. A Reasoned 
Opinion was sent in 2000 for the failure to conduct an adequate EIA on a landfill in 
Spoltare.501 In the summer of 2001 Italy received a letter o f formal notice for the failure
499 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application and 
Effectiveness o f the EIA Directive, 2001. The report cautions the reader to be careful drawing comparisons 
with these numbers since they reflect reporting from the Member States themselves. Still, the incredibly 
large difference between Italy and the other Member States is telling, especially given that Italy has one of 
the largest populations in the EU.
500 Ibid. The Commission’s own materials indicate that a 6th Reasoned Opinion was issued in 2000, though 
no detailed information could be found for that violation. The same report also indicates that Italy was the 
Member State subject to the most “own initiative” EIA cases opened in 2000-2001 (25 Cases).
301 Third Annual Survey on the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Law (2001), supra note
215.
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o f the Region of Abrnzzo to cany out an EIA on a road-building project in Teramo.502 In 
March of 2002, the Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice.503 In August 
2002, Italy received second written warnings for failure to perform EIAs on a yacht 
marina and a waste facility.504 In December o f2002, Italy received two new formal 
notice letters.505 The first involved an inadequate EIA performed on a project to 
permanently channel water between two lakes. The second involved the failure to cany 
out an EIA for a 4-lane road the Treviso Region. The fact that an informal search turned 
up 6 Commission proceedings initiated against Italy for EIA violations in a 2 year period 
indicates there are still problems of enforcement on the ground.
Another way to measure the effectiveness of the EIA process on the ground is by 
looking at case studies o f the EIA process. In 2000 a case study called “The 
Effectiveness of Provisions and Quality of Practices Concerning Public Participation in 
EIA in Italy” was published.506 The study drew conclusions about EIA in Italy in 
general, as well as detailed analysis o f two EIA procedures (a regasification terminal in 
Monfalcone and a Fiat industrial waste facility in Verrone). The huge difference in the 
EIA experiences with the two projects (positive in Verrone and negative in Monfalcone) 
is representative of the problem of wide variance in EIA procedures across jurisdictions. 
Some of the general conclusions o f the case-study were that (1) the only face to face 
discussion allowed for in the regional EIA law is between the developer and public. The 
government decision-making body receives only a summary of these interactions, if  they
502 Crystal Palace Campaign, http://www.crvstal.dircon.co.uk/prelease r63.htm. August 1,2001.
503 Press Release from the European Commission DG XI, Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil 
Protection, Waterunc.com, http://www.watemnc.com/gb/dgllen6la 2002.htm. March 14,2002.
504 Edie.net, http://www.edie.net/news/Archive/5762.cfm, July 19,2002.
505 Press Release from the European Commission DG XI, Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil 
Protection, Commission Press Room, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.
506 Luca Del Furia and Jane Wallace-Jones, Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Volume 20, Issue 
4 , pp. 457-479 (August 2000).
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take place at all; (2) even written comments must be scientific or technical in nature, 
thereby narrowing the range of actors able to participate; (3) there is no possibility for 
public comment until after the EIA is published, rendering the public unable to suggest 
issues for study prior to when analyses are performed; (4) the procedures suffer from 
many administrative shortcomings such as the existence of numerous administrative 
bodies with undefined and unbounded competences, overlapping regulations, a general 
lack of transparency, lack o f technical competence on the part o f administrators, 
perceived ties between government and developers, public apathy and belief that they are 
unable to influence the process, lack o f  focus on social issues, and difficulties for private 
persons to access documents. In sum, the study’s conclusions on Italian EIA point to 
nearly all o f the problems o f Italian environmental law outlined in this thesis. Referring 
to the two specific case studies above, the authors concluded “the passive approach with 
[respect] to legal obligations as seen in Verrone has been the more prevalent one to date. 
. .  On the contrary, the proactive approach taken in Monfalcone seems to have 
promisingly set a precedent in Italy. . .  the “metodo Monfalcone” has taken on an 
identity of its own.507 In other words, the heart and soul of EIA (active public . 
participation to shape analysis and bring positive change to projects), has been the 
exception rather than the rule. On the bright side, the experience at Monfalcone 
represents something to build upon, as both the developer and the public learned that 
there are benefits to early and active public participation.
A Milan lawyer related another EIA case that once again involved the European 
Commission. In the early 1990s, the Italian government declared a state of emergency
507 According to the authors, after the positive interchange between the public and Fiat at Monfalcone, 
conferences about public participation in EIA were held in Italy to highlight to practitioners some o f the 
benefits of a proactive approach.
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for waste. They decided that they needed to rapidly construct several new waste sites, 
and specifically, waste-to-energy facilities. The new facilities were to be funded in part 
by the European Investment Bank (“EIB”). The Italian government set up a special 
commission to oversee the EIA process for these facilities. This commission was to 
streamline the EIA process do to the alleged urgent need for new facilities. At the 
direction o f the EIB, the Commission got involved. Among their complaints at a specific 
waste-to-energy facility in the Campania Region was the failure to perform an adequate 
analysis of alternatives, the inadequacies of public participation, and the general 
vagueness o f the EIA as to environmental impacts. Italy’s defense was Article 2(3) of the 
EIA Directive, heretofore not mentioned in this analysis. Article 2(3) allows a Member 
State in exceptional cases to exempt a project from the EIA Directive. Before doing so, 
the Member State must consider if some other form of assessment is appropriate, inform 
the public of the exemption, and inform the Commission and Member States of the 
justifications for the exemption.508 Of course, Italy had done none o f these things.
In October 2001 the Commission sent a letter to the Italian government giving it 2 
months to make observations on the Commission’s allegation the EIA Directive had been 
violated.509 The Commission’s letter noted that the waste project was covered by the 
Directive and that the simplified procedure employed by Italian authorities did not satisfy 
EIA requirements. On a more fundamental level, the Commission noted that Article 1(8) 
o f the 1996 Act o f  Indirizzo (Regional VIA Law) permitted the exemption of entire 
classes of projects when the Italian government declared “state of emergency to protect 
citizens from an imminent danger or natural calamity”, a kind of blanket exemption not
508 1985 Directive, supra note 19, at Art. 2(3).
509 Letter from Margot Wallstrom, European Commission, to Renato Ruggiero, Italian Minister of Foreign 
affairs, on October 23,2001.
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envisioned under any o f the EIA Directive’s 3 possible exceptions.510 Article 2(3) of the 
Directive allows for such exemptions on a project by project basis, but only after specific 
procedures are followed, including notice to the Commission and Member States.511 
After some wrangling, the Commission and Italy reached a settlement allowing Italy to 
go forward with the waste project. According to the Milan lawyer, Italy convinced the 
Commission that at the most basic level, the Directive had been satisfied since there had 
been publication o f the project in a local paper and the public had been given some (albeit 
minimal) opportunity to participate. On a more practical level, the Commission realized 
that a new waste-to-energy facility was probably better than the alternative of 
unmonitored Mafia disposal that has plagued the Campania Region, even it was to be 
realized at the expense of EIA formalities. Nonetheless the Commission’s notice letter 
stated that Italy’s “Emergency Exception” in the Regional VIA law was in violation of 
the EIA Directive, leaving open the possibility of future infringement proceedings should 
the Commission decide to revisit the issue.
While the above is but a sampling of enforcement cases against Italy, it shows 
that the Commission is staying on top o f Italy, both for failed application of the Directive 
in specific instances, and for overall incompatibility of Italian laws with EIA 
requirements.
B. Legge Obiettivo: Moving Backwards 
1. What is the Legge Obiettivo!
The most recent development in Italian EIA practice is perhaps the most 
troubling. On December 21,2001, the government passed Act No. 443, commonly
510 Art I (4 ,5), national defense and legislative exceptions, Art II (3), exemption for a specific project after 
notice to Commission and other Member States.
5,1 EIA Directive 2(3).
173
referred to as the Legge Obiettivo. The law facilitates one the key elements of the 
Berlusconi government’s plan for economic growth: the construction of 19 “super­
projects” and well over 100 other large-scale infrastructure projects (so-called Grandi 
Opere). The law delegated to the Government the responsibility to issue decrees to 
identify the projects subject to the Legge Obiettivo, and to streamline the EIA process for 
the Grandi Opere. In a coincidence that begs the question of collusion, the Government, 
via the Comitato Interministeriale per il Programma Economico (CIPE) [Inter-ministerial 
Committee for the Economic Program], issued a decree with the list o f 129 Grandi Opere 
on the same day the delegation law was issued.* 513 The projects aren’t limited to 
infrastructure, but also include plants deemed to be of “strategic importance”, especially 
in southern Italy. The simplification o f EIA procedures for these 129 projects was 
detailed in Decree 190 o f 20 August 2002. There are at least 3 disturbing elements o f this 
law.
First, it will permit the EIA for these projects to be performed when the project is 
only in the preliminario stage. In Italy, there are three defined stages of a project. The 
first is the Progetto di Massimo. At this stage, the project is basically an idea, a 3 or 4 
page summary of a proposed development. The second stage is the Progetto 
Preliminario, where the project more well-defined and there are some details about 
where, when and how it will be realized. The final stage is the Progetto Dejinitivo, 
where specific details as to the nature, scope and location of the project are known. At 
this stage, the developer is ready to commence the project. Normally, the EIA is 
performed at this third stage. This is logical since it is only then that the environmental
312 Some critics say Berlusconi is not just interested in economic growth, but rather wants to ensure his 
legacy by having his name attached to projects like Bridge over the Straights of Messina.
3,3 Decree 121,21 December 2001, in actualization o f Article 1 of iht Legge Obiettivo.
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impacts can be accurately assessed. Instead, the Legge Obietivo directs the EIA to be 
performed when the project is still a Progetto Preliminario, I f  approval is granted at that 
point, who is to say the final project won’t look different from the preliminary one? Who 
is to say that environmental conditions in/around the project, or the information 
pertaining to them, won’t change prior to commencement of the project?
The second disturbing element o f  the Legge Obiettivo is that it calls for the entire 
EIA process, including public participation, to be completed in 180 days. Typically the 
EIA process for projects of this scale takes at least two years.514 Under the streamlined 
process, 90 days are allotted to complete the EIA, 60 days are allotted for public 
participation, and the CIPE makes a decision on environmental compatibility 30 days 
later.515 Are 90 days really enough to prepare an assessment o f a project that would be 
the longest suspension bridge in the world, for example? Are 60 days long enough for all 
o f the interested public to comment on the impacts of a project? Furthermore, the law 
asks that public participation be limited to “highly qualified executive subjects”, and such 
direct interventions are to be limited “to the minimum necessary to safeguard the quality 
o f the product.”516 Public participation continues to be restricted to the period after 
publication of the EIA. Even if participation is inappropriately limited in time and scope 
in this fashion, is 30 days a sufficient period for CIPE to adequately process and respond 
to public comment before issuing its decision on compatibility? These provisions are 
fundamentally at odds with the whole concept o f  EIA, especially in light of the 
strengthened public participation measures called for in the 2003 Amendments.
5,4 Interview with Milan Attorney, supra note 311.
515 Internal Documents o f Centro Via, supra note 492, and Decree 190 o f  20 August 2002.
516 Decree 190 o f 20 August 2002.
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The third disturbing element o f the Legge Obiettivo is the dramatic shifting o f 
responsibilities between the ministries. Under the normal EIA procedure for national 
projects, the Ministry of the Environment has responsibility for overseeing the EIA report 
and it issues the final decision on environmental compatibility, taking into consideration 
the comments from the public, the EIA Commission, and the involved Region(s). Under 
the streamlined process, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport has the leadership 
role in the preparation of the EIA. The decision on environmental compatibility will be 
made by CIPE (Commitato Interministeriale per il Programma Economico). This is 
essentially the group charged with overseeing the Government’s economic growth 
program. They will not receive advice from the normal EIA Commission (a team 
composed of civil servants), but instead will be “assisted” by a committee of experts 
handpicked by the Government from a larger list. The role o f  the MoE and the Regions 
is limited solely to giving their opinion.517 It is near impossible to envision a satisfactory 
decision on environmental compatibility when this much institutional bias is built into the 
process.
The potential impact of this law is frightening because it reduces the role o f EIA 
for the very projects likely to have the most environmental impacts. The projects subject 
to this thinned-down procedure are the biggest ones, projects like the bridge from 
Calabria to Sicily over the Straights o f Messina. If a full-scale EIA is performed on no 
other projects, it should at least be performed on these projects! Still more frightening is 
a provision tucked into the end of the 2002 Decree which takes back from the Regions 
the decision on environmental compatibility for certain infrastructure projects and places
517 See chapter in Alberta Milone and Carmela Bilizone, La Valutazione di Impatto Ambientale, Casa 
Editrice (Pienza 2003).
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it in the hands o f CIPE. The Regions and the MoE are only offered the chance to issue an 
opinion.518 Moreover, sitting EU President Berlusconi has placed large infrastructure 
projects at the center o f his plan for EU economic growth, to the chagrin o f European 
environmental groups concerned that Berlusconi will “export the Italian model of 
development” to the rest of Europe.519 One can only wonder if  Berlusconi will attempt to 
extend the simplified EIA process to the 18 superprojects envisioned for the EU.
2. Responses to the law
Even financial entities have had a cautious response to the Legge Obiettivo, A 
2003 Standard & Poors report on infrastructure projects in Italy noted that the relaxed 
approval process was making Italy a more attractive investment market for project 
financiers. However, the same report noted that the “legislative framework could benefit 
from further amendment” and that “there is broad scope for environmental objections” to 
infrastructure projects.520 It is for this reason that of the more than 100 projects listed in 
the Legge Obiettivo, “only 12 projects have attracted [private] investor interest to 
date.”521
The Regions also responded. The Marche, Tuscany and Umbria Regions and the 
Autonomous Province o f Trento made recourse to the Constitutional Court to protest the 
incompatibility of the 2002 Decree with the newly reformulated Article 117 of the 
Constitution. Recall that the amended constitution attributes powers to the Regions
518 Decree 190/02, at Art. 17. See also, Alberta Milone, supra note [ ], discussing the ramifications of this 
provision.
519 See generally, “Decollano le grandi opera Uè", in La Repubblica, July 16,2003, atp. 16. For an excerpt 
o f the impassioned address environmental groups made to the Berlusconi government on the eve of its 
assumption of the EU presidency, see “Gli ambientalisti italiani ed europei pongono il ‘caso italia’ e 
chiedono al Presidente Berlusconi garanzie sul rispetto per l’ambiente,” Greenpeace Italia website, 
http://www.greenpeace.it (July 2003).
^  Italian Highway Concessions: All Eyes on Milan”, Standard & Poor's Report (2003) [Internet Source].
521 Ibid.
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unless specifically enumerated to the State in the same article. In particular, public works 
are not attributed either exclusively or concurrently to the State. The Regions and some 
experts believe that the new law directly violates this provision by taking from the 
Regions the decision on environmental compatibility for certain regional infrastructure 
projects.522 The outcome of this suit is not yet known.
Predictably, the Legge Obiettivo has drawn opposition from environmental 
groups. In April 2002, a joint-statement of opposition was signed by 9 Italian 
environmental groups.523 It was an appeal to the Minister o f the Environment not to 
sacrifice EIA in the legislative decree to be issued pursuant to the Legge Obiettivo. Its 
salient points were 1) that the implementing decree strips the power to decide 
environmental compatibility from the MoE and puts it in the hands of CIPE; 2) that the 
EIA is performed when the project is in the preliminario stage rather than when it is 
definitivo; 3) that only 60 days are allowed for comment; 4) that the law strips important 
planning functions from the cities in direct conflict with the Constitutional separation of 
powers between the State and the localities; and 5) that the law affects the 250 biggest 
and most important projects to be realized in the near future. In other words, the NGOs 
raised many of the same concerns outlined above. Furthermore, the joint statement 
specifically identified two potential violations o f the EU EIA Directive: 1) ihc Legge 
Obiettivo exempts all major infrastructure projects from the full EIA process, whereas 
Article 2 of the Directive only allows projects to be exempted in exceptional
522 See Milone, supra note 408, for a discussion of this case and for a general discussion of the 
compatibility of the Legge Obiettivo with Article 117.
523 “Appello al Ministero per l’Ambiente ed al Ministero per i beni e le Attività’ Culturali per salvare la 
valutazione di impatto ambientale” (Rome Aprii 10,2002), co-signed by Italian environmental 
organizations Promosso di Verdi, WWF-Italia, Legambiente, Italia Nostra, Comitato per la bellezza,
Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica, Greenpeace, Marevivo, Cipra.
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circumstances and on a case-by-case basis; and 2) even if a project were to validly 
exempted, under Article 2 of the Directive, the exemption would have to be notified to 
both the Commission and the public, neither o f which took place under the Legge 
Obiettivo. Despite the objections raised by Italian environmental groups, the 
implementing decree (190/2002) as issued did not respond to their concerns.
The environmental groups made a strong argument that the Legge Obiettivo is in 
violation of the EIA Directive. Nonetheless there is some confusion among officials at 
the Italian MoE as to whether the Commission has initiated action against Italy. One 
employee at MoE was of the belief that the Commission was in the process of addressing 
a formal letter to Italy. However, the director o f legal affairs for EIA at MoE claimed to 
be unaware o f any such action. At least one news source from January 2003 claimed that 
the environmental group Legambiente filed a complaint with the Commission on October 
23, 2002, citing the “incompatibility o f the Legge Obiettivo with community norms” and 
asking the Commission to open a procedure in the ECJ. According to this source, on 
January 21, 2003, the Commission sent a letter to the Italian government acknowledging 
receipt of the complaint from Legambiente and demanding the Italian government not 
move forward on any projects while the Commission considered the compatibility of 
Legge Obiettivo with community law.524
Legambiente officials were unclear as to what basis the Commission was relying 
on in ordering the moratorium on Legge Obiettivo projects. Wholly apart from the failure 
to meet EU requirements for exempting projects from EIA, the Legge Obiettivo seems at 
odds with EU EIA Directives with regard to when the decision on environmental 
compatibility is made, and the degree to which public participation is allowed (although
524Jbid.
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the latter may not be a violation until the 2003 Amendments to the Directive take effect). 
There are also potential violations of Community public contracting and procurement 
laws.
After a series o f recent correspondence with members of the Italian Green Party 
in the EU Parliament as well as with an official in the Commission’s DG Environmental 
Services, it appears that the Commission is not currently pursuing action against Italy for 
the Legge Obiettivo’s with respect to the EIA Directive.525 In the winter of this year, 
Italian Green Party members sat down with Commission officials in the hopes of 
devising a strategy to invalidate the Legge Obiettivo, but were frustrated by a perceived 
loophole in the Directive. Since the process defined by the Legge Obiettivo only applies 
to projects in thepreliminario stage, the Directive is not applicable. Per Article 9, the 
Directive only controls the process at the point of the granting of development consent, 
not at any preliminary phase. Given those conclusions, the Commission advised the 
Italian delegates to pursue actions against individual projects at the time of final approval, 
as is their right with any other project.
The Commission is still considering an action against Italy with respect to 
violation of Community public contracting/public procurement laws, so there is still hope 
that the Legge Obiettivo can be stopped or at least slowed down to enable adequate 
environmental analysis. It remains to be seen whether the Commission and the Italian 
government can come to agreement or whether the case will proceed to the ECJ. Judging 
by the way Prime Minister Berlusconi has ingratiated himself to the EU thus far during
S2S This whole paragraph is based on a series of e-mails between the author, Monica Frassoni, Italian Green 
Party Representative in the EU Parliament, Gianluca Solera, Adviser on Urban and Regional Affairs and 
Transport, The Green/EFA Group in the EU Parliament, and Marco Onida, Italian Official in the 
Commission’s DG Environmental Services. These communications took place in September 2003.
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his reign as EU President, he just might invite such an intervention by the Commission, 
thereby jeopardizing his master plan for economic recovery.
VII. Conclusion
The use of EIA as a tool for more informed decision-making is now 
commonplace the world over. From its genesis in the 1969 NEPA statute, EIA has come 
to be recognized as a universal mechanism for identifying and quantifying the adverse 
environmental impacts o f an activity and incorporating this into the decision-making 
process. While the European Union first advocated the use o f EIA in its 1973 
Environmental Action Programme, it had yet to firmly establish the institutional authority 
to issue legislation concerning the environment. By the 1980s, the European Court of 
Justice had confirmed the fact that environmental protection bore a relationship to the 
free competition and harmonization o f the European Community. This led to the 
adoption of the first EIA law in 1985. The Single European Act o f 1987 created the 
modem structure for environmental protection in the EU provided the EU with an express 
legal basis for passing environmental legislation. Later amendments to the treaties 
established environmental protection as one o f the principle goals o f the EU.
While the goals of the EIA laws in the US and EU are largely the same, the 
method of implementation and the effectiveness of the two systems has differed. On a 
strictly textual comparison, the EU Directive is not as strong as NEPA and the 
accompanying CEQ Regulations. However, the interpretations of the ECJ have 
significantly strengthened the reach o f the Directive, as have amendments in 1997 and 
2003. Still, the effectiveness of any EU environmental directive is inextricably tied to the 
peculiar institutional setting found in the EU. At the EU level, achievement of
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environmental policies is constrained by a legislative process that can result in ambiguity 
or “legislative misfit”, reliance on an overstretched and under-resourced Commission to 
enforce directives, and the lack of a strong central environmental authority to tie the 
system together. Wholly apart from challenges at the HU level, successful 
implementation of EU environmental directives like the EIA Directive is directly tied to 
each Member States’ capacity to implement the directive. A close examination o f the 
situation in Italy reveals a series o f obstacles to successful implementation of EU 
environmental directives. Among these are (1) Italy’s relative delay in accepting the 
supremacy of EU law and committing itself to environmental goals; (2) the unpredictable 
legislative and political environment in Italy; (3) the complex web o f different laws and 
administrative bodies without clearly defined roles, resulting in an excessive 
administrative bureaucracy, and (4) an elevated presence o f corruption that disrupts the 
orderly operation of the law.
These impediments to successful implantation of EU environmental directives 
have been borne out in Italy’s experience with the EIA Directive. The legislative 
transposition of the Directive was a long and complicated process that arguably remains 
incomplete. Experience with EIA on the ground, as evidenced through Commission 
actions, case studies, and various interviews reveals deficiencies in the application of 
Italian EIA laws. Recently there has been an attempt by the current center-right 
government to further marginalize EIA procedures in Italy through the passage of the 
Legge Obiettivo, a bill which would streamline the EIA process for hundreds of large 
infrastructure projects. It is as yet not known whether the Commission will pursue an 
action against Italy for violation of Community law under the streamlined procedure.
On the positive side, Italian Administrative Courts have proven to be a solid 
counterweight to the less-than-perfect implementation of the EIA Directive in Italy. This 
is primarily due to their relaxed standing laws and a willingness to directly apply the 
provisions o f the EIA Directive, even in the absence of Italian implementing laws. 
Notwithstanding this bright spot, the Italian experience with EIA reveals, in dramatic 
fashion, the challenges the EU faces in trying to achieve important environmental goals 
while creating comparable competitive conditions within the Member States. Due to the 
EU’s unique institutional setting and peculiarities within the individual Member States, 
uniform achievement o f EU policy goals like environmental protection remains a 
challenge.
VIII. Annex: Italian EIA Legislation
Act No. 349/86 8 July 1986 Establishing Ministry of the Environment; Art. 6 requiring 
implementation of EU directives within 6 months, including a 
comprehensive EIA Statute; establishing interim procedures for 
National VIA.
Act No. 67/88 11 March 1988 Establishing the Commission for Environmental Impact 
Assessment.
DPCM No. 377 10 August 1988 Listing projects subject to National VIA; provides more detail 
for interim procedures; promises detailed technical legislation 
regarding contents of EIAs for said projects
DPCM 27 December 1988 Providing detailed technical requirements o f EIAs called for in 
Decree No. 377 for projects subject to National VIA; 
establishes standards forgiving projects a Pronouncement of 
Environmental Compatibility.
Circular 11 August 1989 Publicity o f actions concerning requests for a judgment of 
environmental compatibility.
Circular 30 March 1990 On the application of EIA to ports and harbor projects.
Act No. 102/90 2 May 1990 On certain projects in regions affected by exceptional 
atmospheric conditions in July and August 1987.
Act No. 142/90 8 June 1990 On the reform of local authorities, granting them certain powers 
in the field o f VIA.
Circular 12 July 1990 On the application of EIA to certain landfills.
Act No. 240/90 4 August 1990 On state projects for development of transit ports.
Act No. 241/90 7 August 1990 On administrative procedure and access to information.
Act No. 366/90 26 November 1990 On Nuclear Physics lab in Gran Sasso
Act No. 380 29 November 1990 On the padano-venice waterway systems.
Act No. 396/90 15 December 1990 On projects in Rome.
Act No. 9/91 9 January 1991 On the extension of EIA to power line projects.
Circular 8 April 1991 On the judgment of environmental compatibility for certain 
waste sites.
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Decree 22 November 1991 Implementing the procedure for Act 240/90
Decree November 1991 On provisions for toxic waste plants
Act No. 412/91 30 December 1991 On public finance provisions.
Decree 100 27 January 1992 On provisions for titanium dioxide plants.
Act No. 220/92 28 February 1992 On provisions for oil projects on or near the sea.
DPR 27 April 1992 On provisions for high voltage electrical lines.
Decree 475 1994 Concerning VIA for intermodal transport hubs.
Act No. 36 5 January 1994 On provisions for water-transfer projects.
Act No. 146/94 22 February 1994 Requiring the Government to issue a decree initiating Regional 
VIA process (
DPR 526 18 April 1994 On provisions ex plorai ion/extraction of hydrocarbons.
Act No. 206 31 May 1995 On provisions for hydrocarbon extraction in N. Adriatic.
DPR 12 April 1996 Atto di Indirizzo e Coordamento providing framework for 
regional VIA procedures pursuant to Act No. 146/94
Act No. 59/97 15 March 1997 Allocating certain administrative and legislative functions to the 
Regions.
DPR 11 February 1998 Adding additional projects to National VIA and clarifying the 
judgment of environmental compatibility.
Decree 112 31 March 1998 Transfers responsibility for certain environmental matters to the 
Regions, including VIA for certain types of projects.
Decree 348 2 September 1999 Modifying technical standards for projects falling under 
National VIA, in compliance with 1997 Amendments.
Decree 3 September 1999 Adjusting the categories of projects subject to Regional VIA 
pursuant to the Decree of 12 April 1996
DPCM 1 September 2000 Delegating to regions VIA for hydrocarbon plants.
Act No. 422/00 29 December 2000 Clarifying that the 1985 Directive applies when development 
consent was requested prior to March 14, 1999, not amendments
Act No. 443/01 21 December 2001 Legge Obiettivo simplifying VIA procedures for large 
infrastructure projects (grandi opera).
Decree 121 21 December 2001 Listing the grandi opera to be subject to simplified VIA.
Act No. 55/02 9 April 2002 Simplifying VIA procedures for thermoelectric plants.
Decree 190 20 August 2002 Decree simplifying VIA procedures per Legge Obiettivo.
Various Various At least 20 Regional Acts on VIA
Various Various At least two provincial acts on VIA from the autonomous 
provinces of Trento and Bolzano
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